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Integral Pressurized Water Reactor (iPWR) type SMR designs were studied featuring 
Passive Safety Systems (PSS) in all cases. As many as 11 current SMR designs use PSS to 
remove decay heat. Variations in PSS designs were studied and compared using evaluation 
metrics and a proposed weighting method. This resulted in classification of iPWRs designs 
based on the methodology presented. A prototypic Passive Residual Heat Removal System 
(PRHRS) was then studied using a scaling analysis to compare the scaling ratio of system 
parameters, and failure probability relative to existing reference LWR plant data. The 
impact of single versus two-phase PRHRS designs was also considered. We found that a 
classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model describing active systems does not 
consider time evolution nor event ordering that a dynamic PRA approach can 
accommodate. We thus developed and realized basic coupling between LabVIEW as 
simulation code and CAFTA as PRA code. Coupling these codes using Python provides 
real-time simulation that leads to a dynamic simulation result. A representative difference 
in failure probability using dynamic versus classic PRA revealed that for one, there can be 
more component demands with different event ordering; thus providing insights into PSS 
failure probability in the iPWR-type SMR designs. The limitation of the work is essentially 
in the proprietary details of each SMR design. The value however is in the integrated 
method of system analysis. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
1.1 Background  
Nuclear energy currently provides 10% of the world’s electricity [1] which is the second 
largest source of low-carbon energy worldwide after the hydroelectric power, and provides 
a safe, reliable and sustainable energy future [1]. Nowadays there are 450 nuclear power 
reactors operating in 30 countries with a combined capacity of 400 GW(e) and many 
reactors are under construction all over the world (as of September 2019) [1]. Meanwhile, 
there is a strong interest in small and simpler nuclear power plants (NPP), including Small 
Modular Reactors (SMRs) due to their flexibility, affordability and inherent safety features 
with simplified design and enhanced reliability. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) defines SMRs as “advanced nuclear reactors with electric power of up to 300 
MW(e), built as modules in a factory setting then shipped to sites as demand arises, aiming 
for the economy of multiple by shortening construction schedule” [2]. Innovative SMR 
concepts are in particular seen as attractive in terms of its unique features, simplified 
design, and flexible power generation and applications [3]. There are different types of 
SMRs named Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR), Gas-cooled Fast Reactor (GFR), Heavy 
Water Reactor (HWR), Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) and integral Pressurized Water Reactor 
(iPWR) [3]. Here, we focus our attention on iPWR-type SMRs due to its specific feature 
of integral design. The major difference of iPWR-type SMR is the integration major 
primary reactor coolant system components within a single pressure vessel. This approach 
minimizes the design basis accidents (DBAs) to an extent possible by 
eliminating/mitigating accident initiators. For example, reduction of small to large primary 
system penetrations and elevated penetration positions reduce the possibility of loss of 
coolant accident (LOCA). In this research, the safety-in-design of eleven (11) iPWR-type 
SMR designs in various developmental phases were considered with primary focus on the 
safety in design features.  
After the three severe accidents, Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986) and the recent 
Fukushima Daiichi (2011), lessons were learned to improve reactor safety and reliability 
of energy removal system for future Generation IV and designs of SMRs [4]. Further to 
advance safety-in-design, SMRs are expected to feature renewed improvements in defense-
2 
 
in-depth (DiD) and to systematically mitigate progression, per INSAG-10 (International 
Nuclear Safety Group) classification. DiD is categorized into five (5) levels (Table 1.1) per 
IAEA INSAG-10 [5] and has been applied (partially) in almost all large advanced reactors. 
For SMR there is further expectation of full application of DiD levels. The SMR design is 
expected to prevent progression to the next DiD level. 
Table 1.1: DiD Levels and objectives respectively 
DiD Level  Objective 
Level 1  Prevention of abnormal operation and failures  
Level 2  Control of abnormal operation and detection of failures  
Level 3 Control of accidents within the design basis  
Level 4 Prevention of accident progression and mitigation of the 
consequences of severe accidents  
Level 5  Mitigation of significant radioactive materials releases  
With this in mind, iPWR designs employ passive safety systems (PSSs) to enhance the 
safety margin, and subsequently reduce the predicted core damage frequency (CDF) as one 
measure of safety-in-design [6]. The IAEA defines PSSs as “a system that is composed 
entirely of passive components and structures or a system, which used active components 
in a very limited way to initiate subsequent passive operation [7]”. Thus very few or no 
active components are used in PSS which are taken as initiators. Also this statement says 
nothing about time evolution of function which should be important for PSS due not only 
to uncertainties but dependencies [8] on recognized initiating events, notably design basis 
accidents (DBAs) and post Fukushima, beyond design basis accidents (BDBAs). Adequacy 
of extended, sufficient decay heat removal is generally accepted as tantamount. PSSs thus 
take advantage of natural physical phenomena such as buoyancy-driven flow (single and 
two-phase), thus reducing reliance on external power and human intervention, to assure 
evolution in time to a safe end state of postulated events. The use of PSS as expected to, 
reduces and mitigates the likelihood of postulated severe accidents such as station-black-
out (SBO) and loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Besides, fewer active components are 
required in PSSs (relative to conventional designs) which in turn contribute to refinement 
of safety-in-design. Moreover, human error can be minimized as no human intervention is 
needed. Therefore, it is possible to use PSSs in SMR design that simplifies and potentially 




There are various (decay heat removal) PSS designs used for different functions, and 
different designs are deployed in various iPWR designs with similar energy removal 
strategies in mind. The similarities and differences of PSS designs need to be considered 
to provide guidance for selecting PSS designs for different purposes which helps to 
advance SMR safety-in-design. After the proper PSS design is chosen for SMR, the open 
issues of PSS which are uncertainty and dependency need to be solved to advance SMR 
design evaluation and improve system reliability. Thus risk assessment is needed to provide 
quantitative assessment of PSS designs. 
Risk assessment for nuclear engineering was firstly raised by B. J. Garrick. He completed 
his PhD, 1968 on a research topic later called Reactor Safety Study (RSS) [10]. 
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) then emerged and was applied to nuclear power plants, 
transportation systems, space systems and defense systems in many industries [10]. PRA 
is used to estimate risk of systems (malfunctions, failure, etc.) as designed by estimating 
probabilities to determine what can go wrong (how likely as well), how can it go wrong, 
and what its consequences will be. Therefore, PRA is helpful in predicting the probability 
of components and systems, malfunctions and failure, as related to risk associated with the 
design. Defined by NRC [11], now PRA is specified to estimate the risk corresponding to 
Level 1, 2 and 3; that attention is paid on the initiating events of core damage frequency 
for level 1, the frequency of accident with radiation for level 2; and the consequences of 
injury to public and damage to environment for level 3 [11]. Taking DiD into consideration 
together with PRA, risk assessment information can enable one to reveal the strength, 
capabilities and weakness of individual level and overall DiD. There is thus a need to link 
and quantify each level of DiD with corresponding PRA level information to assist in 
making a more quantifiable and effective, risk-informed decision. Here we present a 
relationship among DiD and PRA levels, expectations from iPWR-type SMRs and existing 
regulatory requirements (Table 1.2) [12]. 
The probability of occurrence decreases as DiD and PRA level increases, however the 
consequences increase significantly, i.e., small occurrence probability but large 
consequences, and in contrast, larger occurrence probability but smaller consequences. 
4 
 
Design basis accidents (DiD level 1 to 4) are well treated within the realms of PRA, 
whereas beyond design basis accidents (DiD level 5) that are beyond engineered safety are 
systems rely on mitigation or anticipated emergency (human) intervention [12]. We focus 
on Level 1 of PRA – primarily the CDF of a nuclear power plant, corresponding to the 
effectiveness of the PSS (or decay heat removal) –  to reduce and mitigate impact of the 
DBAs when they occur. 










Level 1 < 10−2 IE frequency 
Level 1 
< 1 × 10−5 (CNSC) 
and 
< 1 × 10−4 
(USNRC) 
Level 2 < 10−5 
Failure detection capability 
and control action 
(automatic or manual) 
Level 3 < 10−8 Core damage frequency 
Level 4 < 10−10 
Conditional containment 
failure probability 
Level 2 < 0.1 (USNRC) 
Level 5 < 10−12 
Large early release 
frequency 
Level 3 
< 1 × 10−6 (CNSC 
and USNRC) 
Although PRA-type methods have been well-developed and is widely used in many 
industries [13], there are still challenges and opportunities with respect to the development 
of the SMR as a next generation system. Passive safety system driven by natural circulation 
(flow) and/or gravity initiated systems are widely used in current SMR designs, as inherent 
safety-in-design features. Although the failure probability associated with passive systems 
can be estimated using classical PRA with hardware components and systems considered 
[14], this approach then maintains limitations as well. The controlled state variables such 
as temperature and pressure are influenced by the states of hardware components, as well 
as system parameters referred to as phenomenological factors. These are typically heat loss, 
flow friction, oxidation, non-condensable gases content, and void fraction in passive safety 
systems [14]. For example the natural circulation flow rate is affected by flow friction, 
presence of non-condensable gases (in condensation) and presence of a vapor phase as 
described by void fraction. Relative to forced circulation system, the driving force is 
smaller. These system parameters are usually not issues for active safety systems as 
phenomena are activated and components are operated by external power, but they cannot 
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be ignored in PSS, which are operated without external power nor human intervention. 
These factors also contribute to uncertainties and dependencies in analysis of the PSS, 
leading to reduce confidence in the overall system [8]. The probability of PSS performance 
varies with events and event ordering due to system design dependency; for example 
increases number of actuations of passive safety relief valve can occur (demands), if the 
passive heat removal system fails. We note that although time is considered in classical 
PRA, Weibull type reliability curves, real-time interaction and decay heat removal per PSS 
are not considered in time [13]. Thus new methods or additional considerations are needed 
due to recognized limitations of classical PRA [15]. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The objectives of the research are: 
1. Demonstrate technical comparison among iPWR-type SMR designs with similar 
PSS features. 
Since various PSS designs were deployed in each iPWR-type SMR design 
identified, their similarities and differences are studied, to evaluate the safety-in-
design impacts. Here PSS designs with similar function were compared using 
proposed evaluation metrics. 
2. Demonstrate comparison among different PSS designs. 
PSS designs with different functions will be compared to reveal their impact 
relative to figures of merit, such as core damage frequency, and dependence among 
PSS designs using evaluation metrics. 
3. Evaluate eleven (11) iPWR designs studied to gain insights on iPWR-type SMR 
designs. 
A technical ranking approach is proposed to assess the overall advantages and 
disadvantages of the eleven iPWR designs, based on the comparison of PSS designs 
and functions relative to decay heat removal. 
4. Develop scaling analysis for PRHRS. 
Scaling analysis was used to assess a PRHRS system for iPWR designs. A 
comparison was developed from two respects: a) between the prototype (LWR) and 
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the model (SMR) PRHRS designs (as no existing PRHRS designs for PRHRS); b) 
between two different PRHRS designs. 
5. Develop an Event Tree/Fault Tree model for the ICS using CAFTA. 
Dynamic PRA is developed to ultimately improve the reliability of PSS. Taking the 
ICS as benchmark system (due to its simplified design), classical PRA model is 
demonstrated using the software tool, CAFTA. 
6. Develop a simplified dynamic ICS model using software tool, LabVIEW. 
LabVIEW was used to simulate the real time performance in a simplified primary 
loop with ICS. The evolution of system parameters was obtained from dynamic 
PRA simulations. Original effort to use RELAP was terminated due to “controlled 
good” restriction. 
7. Couple CAFTA and LabVIEW to show dynamic PRA via Python. 
Dynamic PRA can be realized via the coupling of classical, static PRA with real 
time simulation. Here Python was used to connect the two system codes so that the 
time evolution of PSS function could be demonstrated. 
1.4 Scope of the Research 
 
Figure 1.1: Graphical summary of integrated scope 
= this work 
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This research consists of three major chapters that correspond to the comparative 
assessment and ranking approach, comparative assessment of PRHRS based on scaling 
analysis, and a basic demonstration of dynamic PRA via coupling of CAFTA and 
LabVIEW. The graphical summary of integrated scope is provided in Figure 1.1. 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is composed of six chapters which are organized as below: 
Chapter 1: This chapter introduces the background information about the research, 
motivations for the coupling of system codes, objectives of the research and organization 
of the thesis. 
Chapter 2: Literature review of classical PRA techniques, PRA of PSS, the reference 
coupling method between MAAP5 and RAVEN, and limitations are reviewed here.  
Chapter 3: Comparative assessment of PSS and ranking approach of iPWR-type SMR 
designs. 
Chapter 4: Comparative assessment of PRHRS based on scaling analysis and PRA. 
Chapter 5: Demonstrate dynamic PRA method via coupling of LabVIEW and CAFTA via 
a case study presentation. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion based on comparative assessment and potential use of dynamic 
PRA, its impact on the design of PSS. Finally, future development of the research.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
This chapter presents a literature review including the limitation of classical PRA, 
especially under modeling of PSS components and the reference coupling method for the 
dynamic event tree analysis as one way to develop dynamic PRA. Further, limitation of 
reference coupling is also discussed here.  
2.1  Limitation of classical PRA  
The classical PRA/PSA technique is widely used to assess risks in large NPPs subject to 
DBAs. Event tree and Fault tree (ET/FT) analysis are used in what maybe called classical 
PRA. In the nuclear industry, PRA provides insights into the strengths and weaknesses of 
the design and operation of a nuclear power plant [11]. More detailed information about 
classical PRA can be found in the most cited, WASH-1400 (1975) report [16]. Here we 
only focus on its limitation.  
As the classical PRA was proposed more than 40 years ago [16], a number of concerns 
have been raised and limitation of classical PRA is shown as below with additional 
reviewed references [17]: 
a. Treatment of time element [18][19][20]. 
b. Dependencies of dynamic interactions [21]. 
c. Limited capability in modelling system/components with multi-states [22]. 
d. Treatment of event sequence ordering [23]. 
e. Inadequate treatment of human interactions/error [24]. 
Because of these limitations, the failure probability of DBAs cannot be completely 
evaluated via classical PRA. Besides, many next generation NPPs – especially SMRs rely 
on PSS to improve overall system reliability and enhance safety features [6]. PSS rely on 
natural physical laws such as natural circulation and gravity driven based on density and 
pressure difference. Gravity driven systems are used for coolant injection and commonly 
actuated due to pressure difference. Further, fluid systems when heated, becomes lighter 
and rises; conversely fluid sinks when it becomes relatively colder and denser. As 
combination of density difference in a confined volume forms natural circulation (NC) 
[25]. NC can be sub-categorized into two types: (1) single phase NC; and (2) two-phase 
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NC [25]. Many SMRs deploy two-phase NC PSS since a larger driving force can be 
achieved due to the larger density difference between water and steam [25]. When 
compared to an active system, the driving force of single phase NC is small relative to 
forced flow. Also although there are fewer hardware components in PSS, spatiotemporal 
phenomena such as pipe fouling, oxidation, presence of non-condensable gases, corrosion 
over time, and degraded heat transfer are taken into consideration in PSS due to the 
uncertainty and dependency of PSS. These phenomena are not considered as major issues 
in classical PRA since active components/systems are used such as pumps [25]. As a result, 
classical PRA can only analyse the hardware components and systems but may not be 
suitable for PSS due to its limitations in treatment of time, dynamic interactions, event 
ordering and lack of consideration of spatiotemporal phenomena in PSS. 
2.2 Passive system reliability analysis  
Much effort has been expended to solve the uncertainty and dependency of PSS. The 
passive system reliability analysis method based on the isolation condenser system 
demonstrates a good approach [26]. This method is based on two parts, with classical 
reliability analysis of both hardware components and passive safety function.  
 
Figure 2.1: Isolation Condenser System 
The isolation condenser system (Figure 2.1) was for passive system reliability analysis and 
was introduced in the design of the boiling water reactor (BWR). The ICS relies on natural 
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circulation mechanism and is used to remove decay heat when the normal heat removal 
system is unavailable. It is designed to decrease the pressure inside the reactor pressure 
vessel (RPV) in order not to open the safety relief valves which leads to loss of the heat 
sink. Also frequent actuation of safety relief valves (SRV) can cause valves failure; SRV 
failure can initiate a severe accident that leads to core meltdown.  
The ICS consists of a cooling pool, a heat exchanger and associated piping and valves. It 
is located above the RPV and entering steam is condensed in the pool through heat 
exchange. The condensate returns back to the RPV which then establishes natural 
circulation. The heat transferred to the cooling pool is vented to the atmosphere. The 
isolation valve on the steam pipeline is normally open while the condensation valve is 
normally closed. The ICS is actuated by the opening of the condensation valve; thus 
considered an active component. Thus, the ICS can be categorized into a Type-D [7] 
passive system that the safety function is accomplished through passive means (natural 
circulation), but the system is actuated by active components (condensation valve).  
The failure of the active components is treated in classical PRA, while the mechanisms and 
the boundary conditions need to be identified to determine the failure of the passive 
components. The failure is likely to happen when the mechanisms and the boundary 
conditions change. Therefore, reactor operating experience is necessary to determine the 
components/systems reliability. Here fault tree and event tree analysis is taken to evaluate 
the failure probability of the components/systems. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a top-down, 
deductive procedure to understand how systems can fail and determine event failure rate. 
It can be generated in both qualitative and quantitative way and the construction approach 
is provided by Vesely et al. (1981) [27] and Stamatelatos et al. (2002) [28]. Meanwhile the 
event tree analysis (ETA) is a top-down, inductive procedure to consider all the outcomes 
with both success and failure events and their failure probability. It is well-established in 
WASH-1400 [16]. Here the ICS fault tree and event tree are generated in a qualitative way 
in order to present how the events are related. The main failures of the ICS are split into 
the event of isolation condenser failure (active components) and natural circulation failure 
(phenomenological factors) [26].  
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By using qualitative analysis, the fault tree for NC failure can be generated based on 
Burgazzi’s theory; that is, changing phenomenological factors into reasonable hardware 
components failure (Figure 2.2) [26]. 
 
Figure 2.2: Fault tree of Isolation Condenser System (See table below) 
Thus the unavailability of passive systems can be determined. Here the fault tree is 
generated with the parent events shown in blue and the basic events shown in black. The 
probability of parent events is contributed from the basic events under AND/OR gates, thus 
the probability of the top event (event 01) is determined. The detailed list of the events 
corresponding to Figure 2.2 is shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: List of events from the fault tree 
Number Event Number Event 
01 ICS failure 16 Bypass condensation valve failure 
02 Natural circulation failure 17 Makeup valve fails to operate 
03 IC failure 18 Bypass makeup valve fails to operate 
04 Pipe rupture 19 Vent valve fails to operate 
05 
Insufficient heat transfer to 
external source 
20 Vent valve fails to operate CCF 
06 
High concentration of non-
condense 
(Vent valve fails to purge 
uncondensables) 
21 Bypass vent valve fails to operate 
07 Heat exchanger failure 22 Bypass vent valve fails to operate CCF 
08 Condensation valves failure 23 Condensation valve fails to open 
09 
Insufficient water in IC pool 
(makeup valve fails to operate) 
24 Condensation valve fails to open CCF 
10 
Degraded heat transfer 
(excessive pipe fouling) 
25 Condensation valve fails to remain open 
11 Vent valves failure 26 Condensation valve fails to remain open CCF 
12 Bypass vent valves failure 27 Bypass condensation valve fails to open 
13 Multiple pipe rupture 28 Bypass condensation  valve fails to open CCF 
14 Multiple pipe plugging 29 Bypass condensation  valve fails to remain open 
15 Condensation valve failure 30 Bypass condensation  valve fails to remain open CCF 
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After the probability of ICS failure is obtained from the fault tree, it is then input into the 
event tree of ICS (Figure 2.3) under the initiating event – here, SBO. Together with other 
systems, the consequence of different sequences can be demonstrated with the availability 
of the sequence in CAFTA. Here the overall sequence probability comes from the 
probability of ICS and ADS function determined in chapter 5. 
 
Figure 2.3: Event tree of ICS under SBO 
2.3 Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment  
Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment approach is raised in order to compensate for the 
incompleteness of classical PRA. There are four (4) potential dynamic approaches 
incorporating dynamic element and interactions in risk analysis of DBAs. These are 
Expanded Event Tree, Logic Flowgraph Method, Markov model and Dynamic Logical 
Analytical Methodology (DYLAM) [29]. Further research is made focusing on the explicit 
treatment of time dependency by Sui (1994) [30]. The review and comparison of the four 
dynamic approaches were made for reliability analysis of digital systems in 2006 by 
Aldemir [20]. Aldemir noted that the best two approaches are Expanded Event Tree and 
Logic Flowgraph Method with respect to most of the requirements being satisfied with the 
least negative or uncertain features [20]. Here Dynamic Event Tree (DET) with a reference 
coupling approach is chosen due to the fact that the coupling method provides both real-
time dependent system performance and ET/FT analysis [15]. The DET is built to evaluate 
the possible consequences when the basic events and branches are set. Two computer codes 
are needed for this method with information exchanging: a plant analysis code (simulator) 
and a scenario generator (driver) [15]. A plant analysis code is used to simulate system 
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behavior under the assumed branching conditions. The code needs to be stopped at every 
branch, allowed to change variables and restart again. The driver code is used to generate 
branches and calculate the probability.  
Different driver and simulation codes for generating DET are presented, such as ADAPT 
– MAAP4 [31], RAVEN – RELAP7 [32], ADAPT – MELCOR [33], MCDET – MELCOR 
[34], ADS – RELAP5 [35] for different purposes and systems. Here the reference coupling 
method is between MAAP5 and RAVEN as the simulator and the driver codes respectively 
[15]. The Reactor Analysis and Virtual Control Environment (RAVEN) is designed for 
performing PRA and is capable of analyzing failure probability. The Modular Accident 
Analysis Program Version 5 (MAAP5) is designed to simulate the response of the light 
water reactor power plants. The two computer codes are coupled via Application 
Programming Interface (API) in Python programming language. Then the case study under 
SBO accident in a PWR is conducted with only active systems to be considered. The system 
is designed to run the simulation with different branches simultaneously which saves time. 
Also the unrelated results can be automatically ignored as programmed with only the 
important data which saves the effort for further analysis. However, this method is still 
undergoing development, testing, validation and generally with restricted accessibility. 
And it is developed for active systems. Also drawbacks exist in other DET approaches 
using system coupling such as only consideration of hardware components and developed 
for post-accident scenarios. Therefore, the attention on DPRA of PSS is paid in this thesis. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Since computational resources are available, there is not driving need to only use classical 
PRA for iPWRs. In fact, dynamic PRA considers temporal, dynamic interactions, event 
ordering and thus provides details of PSS performance. Dynamic PRA uses sensible 
coupling of system codes (simulations) in time with ET/FT based classical PRA. The 
coupled system codes can perform the dynamic probabilistic risk analysis based on 
different event sequences with specified system conditions. This approach has proven to 
be effective for active systems/components, accident scenario and post-accident analysis 
as attributed to Nielsen et al and others. However, passive systems were not considered and 
discussed in much of the publish literature. 
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In order to better understand the features of passive system, compensate for the system 
dependency and finally improve the overall system reliability, the current research is 
intended to study the similarities and differences among different passive system designs. 
Then one passive safety system is taken as example to further compare the features based 
on scaling analysis since there is no available data for existing designs of PSS in iPWRs. 
Finally a new dynamic method is developed focusing on passive components/systems 
using system coupling. The dynamic method is established taking similar idea as the 
reference coupling method between MAAP5 and RAVEN, and case study is provided to 
both qualitatively and quantitatively compare the result with classical PRA. The study will 
show or refute that different results can be generated from classical and dynamic PRA. 
Thus together with the comparative assessment, the overall approach better evaluates the 
PSS design in iPWR and increases knowledge of functional evolution .  
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Chapter 3. Comparative assessment and ranking approaches  
Knowing the similarities and differences of PSS designs is the basis to advance safety-in-
design. Thus, this chapter provides the comparative assessment of PSS designs based on 
weighting and ranking approach. There are eleven (11) iPWR conceptual designs around 
the world with different construction designs and safety features. These iPWR-type SMR 
designs have been publically announced and with technical specifications available [3]. 
Different PSS designs are considered for different purposes with their unique functions by 
each vendor, thus the PSSs are designed with different standard and design philosophy 
which is hard for researchers to study their features. IAEA reviews most of the SMRs on 
their design features, construction and operating configurations with the information 
provided by countries and organizations related [3]. General information is included for 
PSS which provides basic understand of different PSSs. While more detailed information 
is needed to comprehensively understand the similarities and differences among PSS 
designs and iPWRs, thus the comparative assessment of PSS and ranking approaches of 
iPWRs are made to evaluate the features of each design. 
The comparative assessment of PSS designs is first made focusing on their design features 
(such as cooling time, components, and redundancy and diversity); then detailed 
comparison is made with the simulation data and system performance. Evaluation metrics 
and weighting approach are made with the information provided to quantitatively compare 
PSS designs in iPWRs.  
3.1 Classification of PSS  
Passive safety systems in SMRs as well as light water reactors (LWRs) can be broadly 
classified into three (3) major types based on: (1) class; (2) operating principle, and; (3) 
safety functions. Note that, classification of PSSs of nuclear reactor designs is mainly based 
on each design’s system objective and functional requirements. The purpose here however 
at this stage of SMR designs and anticipated development is to propose technical 
expectations. In this paper, PSS is discussed based on safety functions in order to meet the 
functional requirements of each iPWR design.  
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3.1.1 Classification by class  
Passivity is raised by IAEA describing the ratio of passive components deployed in PSS that 
the higher ratio of passive vs active components, the higher categories of passivity is 
classified. For better qualitative evaluation and classification, passivity can be broadly 
classified as follow by IAEA [7]: 
I. Category A: characterized by systems that has no signal inputs of intelligence, no 
external power sources, no moving mechanical parts and no moving working fluid, e.g., fuel 
cladding and surge tanks. 
II. Category B: characterized by systems that has no signal inputs of intelligence, no 
external power sources or forces, no moving mechanical parts but have a moving working 
fluid, e.g., passive containment cooling systems based on natural circulation of air flow. 
III. Category C: characterized by systems that has no signal inputs of intelligence, no 
external power sources or forces, but composed of moving mechanical parts with or without 
moving working fluids, e.g., relief and check valves. 
IV. Category D: intermediary zone between active and passive where the execution of 
safety function is made through passive methods, i.e., passive execution/active initiation, 
e.g., emergency shutdown systems based on gravity. 
The degree of passivity lowers from category A to D with higher ratio of active components, 
however the passivity does not mean the reliability. As a result, a given safety feature of the 
same type in a higher passivity category does not mean more reliable than that in a lower 
category. The difference in category designation only indicates the different extent of 
application of the passive safety system. 
3.1.2 Classification by principle of operation 
Passive safety systems can also be classified into two (2) types based on the principle of 
operation: (a) gravity driven systems; and (b) natural circulation. 
3.1.2.1 Gravity driven systems 
Several PSSs utilizes the natural force of gravity as the driving mechanism for their 
actuation and continuous operation. For example, passive safety injection system and 
gravity driven primary shutdown system. The driving force is created by an elevated 
coolant tank or system (above the reactor core) which injects coolant/control rods into the 
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reactor core without the need for any external power under low system pressure condition. 
Typically, coolant injection system based on gravity driven requires the opening of an 
isolation valves along with the driving force exceeding above the system pressure. The 
elevated tank is usually isolated from the reactor coolant system (RCS) by a series of check 
valves which are held shut by pressure difference between the elevated tank and RCS 
respectively. Example of such PSSs includes accumulators and pre-pressurized core 
flooding tanks. PSSs based on this principle can be thought of as an open loop system, in 
that, the injected coolant does not return back to the coolant source naturally. 
3.1.2.2 Natural circulation 
Natural circulation (NC) is a phenomenon which occurs in the presence of heat causing 
and density gradients. It enables a closed loop fluid system with heat source and heat sink 
to circulate continuously without the need for external power source. Fluid in the heated 
part becomes lighter and rises, while fluid in the sink part becomes relatively cold and 
denser, thus dropping down and forming natural circulation. The buoyancy force is further 
enhanced by creating an elevation difference between the heat source and sink besides 
density difference. NC can be sub-categorized into two types: (1) single phase NC; and (2) 
two-phase NC. Single phase NC involves only the liquid phase, whereas two-phase NC 
involves a mixture of liquid and steam where the coolant is boiled to change its phase into 
steam. A larger driving force can be achieved in two-phase flow system compared to 
single-phase systems.  
3.1.3 Classification by function 
PSSs in iPWR-type SMRs can broadly be classified into four (4) key functions [2] namely: 
passive residual heat removal system (PRHRS), passive safety injection system (PSIS), 
passive reactor depressurization system (PRDS) and passive containment cooling system 
(PCCS).  
3.1.3.1 Passive Residual Heat Removal System 
Passive residual heat removal system (PRHRS) removes the continuous core decay and 
sensible heat by natural circulation. Typically, PRHRS consist of two (2) or more 
redundant trains which is sufficient to remove the decay heat [36]. Each train is generally 
composed of heat exchangers (HXs) immersed in cooling water, associated piping and 
valves. PRHRS is actuated by opening of dedicated valves which typically fails open under 
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loss of power or signal condition. This enables steam to enter the tube side of the immersed 
HXs which are then condensed by transferring heat to the water in the pool. The condensate 
returns to the vessel or steam generator (SG) by gravity, thus establishing a natural 
circulation loop. PRHRS can be categorized into four types with distinct system 
configuration [2]: (a) coolant makeup tank (CMT) side NC coupled with reactor pressure 
vessel (RPV) with HXs immersed in a coolant tank (e.g., Westinghouse-SMR); (b) reactor 
pressure vessel (RPV) side NC with HXs immersed in a coolant tank (e.g., CAREM25); 
(c) SG side NC with HXs immersed in a coolant tank (e.g., SMART); and (d) SG side NC 
with HXs immersed in reactor pool (e.g., NuScale). Figure 3.1 depicts the differences in 
the approach (from left to right separately). System redundancy is considered for PSS 
designs, here we only show one train for demonstration. 
    
3. 1a: CMT side in cooling tank    3. 1b: RPV side in cooling tank 
   
3.1c: SG side in cooling tank   3.1d: SG side in reactor pool 
Figure 3.1: Passive Residual Heat Removal System 
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3.1.3.2 Passive Safety Injection System 
The function of passive safety injection systems (PSIS) includes the control of reactor 
coolant inventory and removal of reactor decay heat. PSIS is provided to accommodate 
loss of coolant due to leaks or LOCA when the normal makeup system is unavailable. In 
many iPWRs, the main purpose of PSIS is to prevent core damage during small break-
LOCA (SB-LOCA). PSIS can be categorized into two types [2]: (a) NC based injection 
(e.g. core makeup tank); and (b) one-time injection to compensate for sudden loss of 
coolant inventory (e.g. accumulator). The key difference between the two approaches is 
depicted in Figure 3.2a and 3.2b. Typically one-time injection PSIS consist of a tank with 
borated water pressurized with nitrogen or other inert cover gas, whereas the borated tank 
in NC based PSIS is under system pressure through a pressure balance line and a normally 
open valve. An outlet valve connects bottom of the tank to the direct vessel injection line 
which is connected to the reactor vessel downcomer, thus enabling direct vessel injection. 
The iPWR designs that implements these concepts includes SMRAT and ACP100. 
   
3. 2a: NC based PSIS    3. 2b: One-time injection PSIS 
Figure 3.2: Passive Safety Injection System 
3.1.3.3 Passive Reactor Depressurization System 
The function of passive reactor depressurization system (PRDS) is to rapidly reduce the 
reactor coolant system pressure to enable safety injection systems operation so that the 
reactor water level is maintained above the top of active fuel. PRDS can be categorized 
into two types: (a) Automatic depressurization system (ADS) (e.g. ACP100); and (b) NC 




Figure 3.3: Passive Reactor Depressurization System 
ADS consist of several safety relief valves (SRVs) mounted on the main steam lines that 
are automatically operated in stages based on the reactor water level. The reactor pressure 
is reduced by releasing steam directly into the containment, water storage tank inside the 
containment or suppression pool where steam is condensed. The NC based 
depressurization system is similar to the PRHRS where the RPV is coupled with immersed 
HXs, establishing a circulation loop. It has the advantage of depressurizing the reactor 
vessel without loss of coolant inventory. However, it must be underlined that the primary 
function of this system as credited in the design is to depressurize the reactor vessel, in 
contrast to the PRHRS whose objective is to remove decay heat. Thus, NC based 
depressurization system is a pressure regulating system initiated by signals including RPV 
pressure, main steam line isolation valve (MSIV) closure fraction and RPV water level. 
3.1.3.4 Passive Containment Cooling System 
Passive containment cooling system (PCCS) is designed to maintain the integrity, pressure 
and temperature inside the containment within the design limit. PCCS can be broadly 
classified into [2]: (a) Air cooled metal containment (e.g. ACP100); (b) Pressure 
suppression type (e.g. CAREM25); (c) Pool type (e.g. NuScale). Air cooled containment 
consists of a large volume of metal containment surrounded by reinforced concrete that 
allows for air circulation, thus condensing steam at the inner surface of the containment. In 
the suppression type containment, high temperature steam released from the pressure 
vessel is directed to a suppression pool, which is condensed thus mitigating pressure 




submerged in a water pool allowing a continuous passive cooling of containment. The 
steam released inside the containment is condensed as well as heat is removed through the 
containment wall to the external water pool. They are shown in Figure 3.4 from left to right 
separately. 
             
3.4a: Air cooled 3. 4b: Suppression type   3.4c: Pool type 
Figure 3.4: Passive Containment Cooling System 
3.2 Design characteristics and technology 
Currently there are eleven (11) iPWR-type SMR designs in different developmental phases 
around the world with varying design philosophy and safety features. A brief introduction 
of the iPWR-type SMRs is given below with their characteristics and safety features. Also 
a comparative assessment of these PSSs is presented to distinguish their similarities and 
differences. 
3.2.1 Introduction of iPWRs 
3.2.1.1 CAREM25 
Central Argentina de Elementos Modulares 25 (CAREM25) is Argentina’s national SMR 
development project with the goals to indigenously develop, design and construct advanced 
small water cooled reactors with high level of safety for electricity generation purpose. 
CAREM25 is a prototype plant based on indirect steam cycle with a capacity of 31 MW(e) 
intended to serve as the basis for future commercial CAREM that will generate a capacity 
of 150 MW(e). Distinctive design characteristics of CAREM include integrated mini-
helical vertical SGs (12 numbers), NC primary cooling mechanism, self-pressurization, in-
vessel hydraulic control rod drive mechanisms (CRDM). Additionally, to cope with 
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extreme natural hazards, SBO scenario in CAREM25 is intrinsically included into DBAs. 
The reactor core comprises of 61 fuel assemblies of hexagonal cross section fuel with an 
enrichment of (1.8 - 3.1) % UO2. The reactivity is controlled by means of burnable poison 
(Gd2O3) and movable absorbing rods (Ag-In-Cd alloy), thus yielding a boron free core. 
Safety systems of CAREM25 consist of two (2) reactor protection systems (RPSs), two (2) 
shutdown systems with one driven by hydraulic control rods and the other by gravity 
injection, two (2) PRHRSs, reactor depressurization valves, two (2) low pressure passive 
injection systems and suppression pool type containment system. Availability of one (1) 
PRHRS ensures a grace period of 36 hours in which fundamental safety functions are 
accomplished without requiring any operator action or electrical power. The unique feature 
of CAREM25 is the pressure-suppression type containment with a drywell and wet well to 
cool the containment. Plant safe state corresponds to the actuation of safety systems during 
the grace period, and final safe state corresponds to the actuation of active systems after 
the grace period to bring the reactor to cold shutdown mode. Though the power of 
CAREM25 is low, it is planned to be scaled up to 100 MW(e) and also reach 300 MW(e) 
for a full commercial scale NPP using forced circulation cooling. [3] 
3.2.1.2 SMART 
The System-integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor (SMART) is a promising advanced 
small-sized iPWR with an output of 100 MW(e) designed by Korea Atomic Energy 
Research Institute (KAERI). SMART can be used as an energy source for electricity 
generation, seawater desalination, or district heating. As an integral design structure, eight 
(8) SGs, a pressurizer, four (4) reactor coolant pumps, and twenty-five (25) CRDMs are 
located inside a single RPV. There are 57 fuel assemblies with the enrichment less than 5% 
in 17x17 array. The passive safety systems of SMART are composed of a reactor shutdown 
system, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), PRHRS, a shutdown cooling system 
and a PCCS. Also other safety systems are included such as ADS, pressurizer safety valves 
and several accident mitigation systems. Therefore, there is no need for emergency diesel 
generator or human actions for at least 72 hours and also large break-LOCA (LB-LOCA) 
and SB-LOCA are eliminated and mitigated respectively. There are four independent trains 
with a 33% capacity each within PRHRS, ECCS and PCCS. Probabilistic assessment has 
been made to evaluate the safety level of SMART and to find the shortcomings of the 
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design. As a consequence, the reactor safety is enhanced and CDF is reduced. The CDF 
and the large early release frequency (LERF) are found to be less than 1.0E-7 and 1.0E-8 
per reactor year respectively. There are also some distinguishing safety features of SMART 
including integrated steam generators and reactor coolant system, in-vessel pressurizer, 
horizontally mounted canned motor pumps, improved natural circulation capability and 
advanced LOCA mitigation system. The power of SMART can be increased per demand 
requirements, and also the cost is expected to be 20% less for a twin unit and further 
reduced for more units’ deployed. [3] 
3.2.1.3 NuScale 
The NuScale Power Module (NPM) is a small, light water cooled PWR operated under 
natural circulation primary flow conditions. The NuScale plant is scalable and designed to 
generate an electrical output of 50 MW(e) for each module and up to 12 modules with 600 
MW(e) power as demanded in a single facility. Each NPM is self-contained which runs 
totally independently from the other modules. And all modules are controlled in a single 
control room. The reactor core of NPM consists of 37 fuel assemblies using UO2 in 17x17 
array with the enrichment below 4.95%, and 16 control rod assemblies with 4 rods in a 
control group and 12 rods in a shutdown group. NuScale deploys a lot of engineered safety 
features to provide stable long term core cooling under all conditions including a high 
pressure containment vessel, two redundant passive decay heat removal systems and 
containment heat removal systems, two ECCSs and severe accident mitigation systems. 
The whole containment is underground and submerged in a pool of water which is able to 
remove the decay heat after shutting down for up to 30 days followed by air cooling. There 
are five innovative features of NuScale which are 1) compact size; 2) natural circulation 
cooling; 3) well-developed light-water reactor (LWR) design; 4) supported by a one-third 
scale integral test facility; 5) compact movable modular containment. Also with other 
design features, LB-LOCA has been eliminated. Preliminary Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment has been conducted and the CDF is found to be less than 1.0E-8 per module 





The ACP100 is an innovative multi-purpose reactor design based on existing PWR 
technology, that adapts an integrated RCS design and advanced passive safety features. 
ACP100 is being developed by China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) to generate 
an electric power of 100 MW(e) per module with an option to increase up to eight (8) 
modules as demand arises. Besides electricity generation, ACP100 is also intended for 
cogeneration purpose such as desalination, heating and steam production. The integrated 
steam supply system installed within the RPV consists of the reactor core, sixteen (16) 
once-through steam generators (SGs) and a pressurizer (PRZ). ACP100 reactor core 
consists of 57 fuel assemblies in a 17x17 square pitch configuration with a total length of 
2.15 m, and an expected UO2 enrichment of (2.4 - 4.0) %. The reactivity is controlled by 
means of control rods (25 rods), solid burnable poison and soluble boron. Primary cooling 
mechanism of the ACP100 under normal operating and shutdown condition is achieved by 
means of forced circulation with four (4) dedicated pumps. The distinguishing features of 
ACP100 include integrated tube-in-tube once through steam generator, underground 
nuclear island and large coolant inventory per MW(th). An industrial twin unit 
demonstration plant with a capacity of 310 MW(th) per unit is planned in Fujian Province, 
China. Feasibility study shows that ACP100 may cost approximately 5000 USD/kW, and 
is expected to be economically competitive against large NPPs if more than four (4) 
modules are built simultaneously. [3] 
3.2.1.5 mPower 
The mPower plant consists of an iPWR-type SMR and related balance of plant with an 
output of 390 MW(e) in total for two modules and 195 MW(e) per module designed by 
Generation mPower LLC. The mPower is an integral design with once-through steam 
generators, pressurizer, in-vessel CRDMs and vertically mounted canned motor pumps for 
its primary cooling circuit and passive safety systems located inside the RPV. Also the 
emergency planning zone requirements are minimized due to its design features. U-235 
with enrichment of less than 5% is used as the fuel rods in the reactor core consisting 69 
fuel assemblies in 17x17 array with a shortened active length of 2.4 m. The mPower reactor 
deploys a decay heat removal strategy with an auxiliary steam condenser on the secondary 
system, water injection or cavity flooding using the refueling water storage tank and 
passive containment cooling. There are two decay heat removal systems (DHRSs), two 
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ECCSs, two ADSs and one PCCS. The safety features of mPower includes low core linear 
heat rate, underground RPV, large RCS volume and small penetrations at high elevations 
which mitigates SB-LOCA. The refueling water storage tank in ECCS can provide cooling 
from 7 to 14 days without alternating current (AC) power or operator actions. And an 
enhanced spent fuel pool configuration is deployed underground with a large heat sink to 
cope up to 30 days in case of loss of fuel pool cooling. The power of mPower plant can be 
increased to meet the demand requirement by adding two modules as a ‘twin pack’ plant 
and it can also support other heat-requiring industries, desalination or co-generation 
applications. [3] Unfortunately, the mPower project has been called to stop due to 
unsatisfied expectation and funding issues in 2017 [37][38]. 
3.2.1.6 CAP150 
The CAP150 with a capacity of 150 MW(e) is designed by Shanghai Nuclear Engineering 
Research and Design Institute (SNERDI) primarily developed for generation and supply 
of electricity to remote regions, district heating, and to replace the retiring thermal power 
plants. The design integrates the major primary system components including eight (8) 
SGs, reactor coolant pumps (RCPs), PZR, and CRDMs within RPV. This design approach 
minimizes the RPV penetration and eliminates postulated accident scenarios such as LB-
LOCA, rod ejection accident, and also reduce the scope of SB-LOCA. The reactor core 
consists of 69 fuel assemblies in a 15x15 array with the UO2 pellet enriched up to an 
average of 4.5%. The reactivity control in CAP150 is solely achieved by employing control 
rods connected with electromagnetic CRDMs. This eliminates soluble boron from the core, 
and thus avoids boron dilution accidents and provide a better negative reactivity 
coefficient. A high level of safety is assured by the sensible combination of passive and 
active engineered safety systems together with severe accident mitigation features. Passive 
safety systems in CAP150 include the passive DHRS by primary as well as secondary SG 
side, simplified PSIS, and PCCS. Due to the novel and peculiar design safety approach, it 
is claimed that only low pressure injection is needed to maintain core uncover. The key 
features of CAP150 includes a submerged containment in reactor pool, a design life of 80 




International Reactor Innovative and Secure (IRIS) is a light water iPWR with medium 
power of 335 MW(e) per module and up to 4 modules. IRIS has now been chosen to be an 
International Near Term Deployment (INTD) reactor within the Generation IV 
International Forum activities and developed by an international consortium led by 
Westinghouse Electric Co. IRIS is an innovative design relied only on proven light water 
reactor technology. IRIS implements an integral reactor vessel which contains the 
pressurizer, steam generators, and reactor coolant pumps. There are 89 fuel assemblies each 
consisting 264 fuel rods in a 17x17 array using U-235 enrichment range from 2.6% to 
4.95%. There are two normal residual heat removal systems, a passive emergency heat 
removal system (EHRS) with four independent trains immersed in the refueling water 
storage tank, two ADSs and one containment pressure suppression system with 6 water 
tanks and a common tank for non-condensable gas storage which provide a large cooling 
inventory. The normal residual heat removal system of IRIS consists two mechanical trains 
with one pump and one heat exchanger each. It can be used under normal operating and 
shutdown condition to remove both residual and sensible heat. Five additional aspects of 
the IRIS design contribute to DiD which are 1) stable operation, 2) physical plant 
boundaries, 3) passive safety-related systems, 4) non-safety systems, and 5) containing 
core damage. This also provides DiD for IRIS without the need of emergency response 
zone. The principle characteristics of IRIS are the hybrid safety systems including 
optimized maintenance with intervals of at least four years, half-underground containment 
vessel, and the elimination/reduction of many DBAs such as extremely low core damage 
frequency, LOCA and minimized occurrences of containment flooding due to IRIS’s 
integral configuration. Also IRIS is designed to remove the decay heat for 7 days without 
human intervention with the implementation of passive safety systems. [3] 
3.2.1.8 IMR 
The Integrated Modular Water Reactor (IMR) is a medium sized pressurized water reactor 
and developed to generate an electrical output of 350 MW(e). It is designed to achieve 
competitive power cost compared to other reactors and high reliability of safety features. 
Four (4) kinds of primary circuit component are included which are CRDMs, core internal 
structure, 4 SG units, and a riser. IMR reactor core consists of 97 fuel assemblies in 21x21 
array with 4.95% average enrichment using U-235. The main design feature of IMR 
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including the hybrid heat transport system (HHTS), a natural circulation system under 
bubbly flow condition for primary heat transportation and the in-vessel CRDM. Stand-alone 
direct heat removal system (SDHS) as part of the HHTS is a passive safety system. ECCS 
and containment cooling/spray system are eliminated with the deployment of SDHS. Two 
trains of SDHS are used with one in redundancy and decay heat is removed by both water-
cooling and air-cooling in different stages with the vapor-type and liquid-type SGs in RPV. 
The SGs can also be used as decay heat removal heat exchangers during accidents. The 
SDHS is passively actuated when the plant safety is threatened only by the auxiliary feed 
water system. Also the pressurizer is eliminated by the self-pressurization system. Accidents 
such as LOCA, rod ejection, loss-of-flow and locked rotor are eliminated due to its design 
features. What’s more, simplified support systems are implemented including the 
component cooling water system, the essential service water system and the emergency AC 
power system which are powered by a stand-alone diesel generator. The design life of IMR 
is 60 years for main structures and the power can be increased by adding more modules. 
The capital costs per MW(e) are similar to LWRs, while the total capital cost is lower due 
to its small size and short construction period. [3] 
3.2.1.9 Westinghouse SMR 
The Westinghouse SMR is an iPWR with 225 MW(e) power output designed by 
Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC., It is designed based on the advanced passive safety 
features in the AP1000 plant. The W-SMR is developed to provide clean and safe generation 
of electricity and also process heat, district heat, and off-grid applications to produce liquid 
transportation fuel from oil sands, oil shale, and coal-to-liquid. There are 89 fuel assemblies 
are used with the enrichment up to 5% in 17x17 array. And 40 percent of the fuel rods in 
the core is replaced every 2 years. The natural forces of evaporation, condensation and 
gravity are used for the passive safety systems within the Westinghouse SMR. There are 
three diverse decay heat removal methods which are 1) natural circulation cooling of gravity 
feed water from the steam drum through the SG for around 80 minutes; 2) RCS cooled with 
a passive decay heat removal heat exchanger which is located in core makeup tanks; 3) RCS 
cooled with diverse bleed-and-feed methods. Finally, the heat is carried into two ultimate 
heat sink system tanks and they are able to provide a minimum of 7 days of decay heat 
removal. The safety features, such as underground containment, integral RCS design, 
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CRDMs, pump driven RCS flow during power operation, vertical plant arrangement, use of 
natural driving forces and low power density, eliminate LB-LOCA and susceptibility to 
failures and reduce SB-LOCA. As a result, the Westinghouse SMR is capable of 
withstanding natural phenomena hazards and beyond-design-basis accident scenarios and 
has an estimated CDF of 5.0E-8 per reactor year while maintaining an expected capacity 
factor of 95%. [3] Unfortunately, low priority is given to Westinghouse SMR due to 
commercial reasons in 2014 and the project is suspended [37][39]. 
3.2.1.10 RITM-200 
The RITM-200 is an iPWR designed for multi-purpose nuclear icebreaker, floating or land-
based NPP with two modules and 50 MW(e) power each designed by OKBM Afrikantov. 
It is specifically developed for icebreaker ships and can be further modified for desalination 
plants and various industrial applications. Due to the integral design of RITM-200, the 
reactor core and four (4) once through steam generators are located inside the RPV. Four 
(4) vertical reactor coolant pumps are connected onto RPV using pipe stubs. Therefore, the 
primary circulation system takes forced circulation. There are 199 fuel assemblies with high 
fuel enrichment up to 20%. RITM-200 has high safety level which is based on the DiD 
principle and obtained both by inherent self-protection properties and a combination of 
passive and active safety systems. Also high reliability indices are ensured by the 
redundancy of safety systems equipment and channels, and their functional and/or physical 
separation such as two redundant DHRSs and ECCSs. Each DHRS contains a heat 
exchanger located in the tank, a water storage tank and air cooled heat exchanger. Heat is 
removed in the water tank at first and then removed by the air cooled heat exchanger for 
unlimited period after the water evaporated. There are inherent safety features of RITM-200 
including high thermal storage capacity, natural circulation, minimum length pipelines in 
primary system, nozzles equipped with leak stoppers, and large water inventory. Properties 
of intrinsic safety are intended for automatic control of power density and reactor auto-
shutdown, limitation of primary coolant pressure and temperature, heating rate, primary 
circuit depressurization scope and outflow rate, fuel damage scope, maintaining of reactor 
vessel integrity and resistant for possible disturbances. The average costs of construction for 
the land-based station and floating station with the RITM-200 are approximately 6000$/kW 
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and 3900$/kW separately, while the electricity unit costs are 0.095$/kW·hr and 
0.062$/kW·hr separately. [3] 
3.2.1.11 VBER-300 
The VBER-300 is a medium-sized power reactor with an output of 325 MW(e) designed for 
land-based NPPs, nuclear cogeneration plants and transportable floating nuclear power 
plants by OKBM Afrikantov. Well-developed nuclear ship building technologies and 
operating experience are used for VBER-300 which enhance the operational safety and 
reduce the production costs. Only one module is deployed in VBER-300, but more modules 
can be used with power demand. The integral design of RPV consists reactor core, four (4) 
once-through coil SGs, four (4) main coolant pumps and CRDMs. Both forced and natural 
circulation are used as primary coolant systems. There are 85 fuel assemblies using UO2 
with the enrichment up to 5%. Also 61 control rods are used in combination with fuel 
elements mixed with burnable poison materials. The safety systems of VBER-300 are based 
on the DiD principle with redundancy relying on passive safety systems that keeps the core 
cooled and RPV intact with safety margins for at least 24 hours provided by ECCS. And 
then emergency back-up and diverse safety systems ensure core cooling for prolonged time. 
Two DHRSs and two ECCSs are deployed and operated in natural circulation and gravity 
driven separately. Also emergency residual heat removal system is used to provide 72 hours 
passive cooling with water tanks and in-built heat exchangers. Therefore, a small and 
medium break LOCA are eliminated. The specific features of VBER-300 include a double 
containment with low possibility of radioactive release, an ultimate heat sink by air cooling, 
a reduced nuclear steam supply system, both land-based and floating NPP application, and 
a simplified balance of plant. The specific capital investments for construction of floating 
and land-based NPPs are 2800$/kW and 3500$/kW separately, while the net cost of electric 
power are 3.3 ₵/kW·hr and 3.5 ₵/kW·hr. [3] 
3.3 Design characteristics of iPWRs 
To better understand the design philosophy of the eleven (11) iPWR-type SMR designs, a 
comparative assessment is made to distinguish their differences and similarities. The design 
characteristics are presented in Table 3.1 [3]. Conclusions can be made from the table 
demonstrating the inherent safety features that all of the iPWRs integrate SGs in RPV, while 




Table 3.1: Design characteristics of iPWR-type SMRs [3] 
 
*Cited from “Advances in small modular reactor technology developments” by IAEA from vendor declaration (2016) [3]. 
**Cited from “ACRS Subcommittee Presentation: NuScale FSAR”, by U.S. NRC (2019) [40]. 
Note:  
Hybrid: (active + passive); SGs: steam generators; CRDMs: control rod drive mechanisms; ESFs: engineered safety features; PCCM: primary coolant circulation 
mechanism; NC: natural circulation; FC: forced circulation; CDF: core damage frequency; TCD: target construction duration; CC: cogeneration capability
# 
iPWR-type SMR designs 




Major primary system component integration 
SGs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pressurizer Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
CRDMs Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Key design characteristics 
Approach to ESFs Passive Passive Passive Passive Passive Passive Passive Hybrid Passive Hybrid Hybrid 
PCCM NC FC NC FC FC FC FC NC FC FC FC 
MW(th) 100 365 160 385 575 450 1000 1000 800 917 175 
MW(e) 31 100 50 125 195 150 335 350 225 325 50 
Predicted CDF (/ry)* ~10−07 2 × 10−7 < 10−10 ∗∗ < 10−06 ~10−08 < 10−07 ~10−08 3 × 10−07 < 10−08 ~10−06 ~10−06 
Modules per plant 1 1 (1 − 12) (1 − 8) 2 2 (1 − 4) 1 1 1 2 
Design life (years) 60 60 60 60 60 80 60 60 60 60 40 
TCD (months) 36 36 36 36 35 36 36 < 42 < 24 40 48 
CC Possible Yes Possible Possible Possible Possible Possible Yes Possible Yes Yes 
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smaller footprint in structure. This approach also eliminates/reduces the large bore piping 
and small to large penetrations which leads to the elimination of LB-LOCA, rod ejection 
accident and minimizes SB-LOCAs. PSSs are deployed as passive approach for engineered 
safety features (ESFs) for all designs. This passive approach enhances the safety margin 
and reduces the CDF to at least 1.0E-6 which is more reliable than the standard CDF goal 
(1.0E-5) for new nuclear power plants licensed after 2008 by CNSC [41]. Several designs 
take the hybrid approach i.e., employing both active and passive systems which provides 
an addition protection layer as well as diversity to prevent postulated accidents, thus 
increasing the system reliability. Most iPWRs employ forced circulation (FC) as primary 
coolant circulation mechanism instead of natural circulation thus the water circulation in 
the reactor core will be much faster with which low water inventory is necessary for reactor 
cooling (cold shutdown). However, reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) are needed for forced 
circulation, there is a chance for the RCPs to fail. In principle, NC is likely not fail as long 
as the heat source, sink and inventory of coolant is maintained. Also as a benefit of their 
modular design feature, all the iPWRs can be used for other purposes in terms of 
deployment applications such as seawater desalination, heating and steam production for 
remote region and even some designs can be used to power icebreaking vessels. 
3.4 Method of comparison 
The method of comparison is as follows. Wee assert that it is a sensible method based on 
availability of accessible information (both substantiated and targeted) on SMR designs, 
lessons learned over the past 50+ years in the water-cooled reactor design sectors 
(including Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi accidents), and 
engineering judgement based on practical technical consideration, often backed by data 
from operational and maintenance data of LWRs.  The lessons learned include regulatory 
and safety-in-design expectations such as those for Generation IV reactor concepts (relative 
to Generation I, II and III and accepted under the Generation IV International Forum), 
various post-Fukushima Daiichi national/international reports, post-Fukushima and pre-
Fukuhima risk and accident analyses (modeling and simulations) performed and reported 
in the public domains (peer-reviewed or issued). 
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The methodology proposes and use in this work was suggested by the work of C. Williams 
et al. at NuScale Power. The method links links PRA, system code and severe accident 
analyses, scaling and coupling – all in order to propose figures of merit (substantiated and 
targeted probabilities) that contributes to consistency in safety-in-design philosophy. This 
philosophy consists of Defense in Defense philosophy (an aspiration), regulatory 
expectations relative to exiting and past generational reactor designs, and lastly consensus 
understanding of PRA Levels 1 to 3 inclusive. 
The specific methodology for comparative assessment of iPWR-type SMR designs 
partially originates from expectations of safety-in-design of Generation IV designs 
(including SMRs) as noted, the NuScale approach (various papers and publications) 
credited to NuScale’s founder, Professor J. Reyes, and Professor Tokuhiro’s experience on 
various advanced reactor concepts and safety analyses. This integral methodology has also 
been suggested by experts in safety analyses, scaling and confirmatory safety system 
testing, notably M. Ishii and M. Corradini. A comparison of SMR decay heat capability 
using this methodology, to the author’s knowledge is new. 
The methodology in practice is here based on technical specifications summarized various 
tables in the thesis and sections to follow. These key technical specifications and 
performance metrics such as core damage frequency, decay heat removal capability, means 
to respond to or mitigate via use of engineered safety systems to design basis accident and 
beyond (DBAs, BDBAs) are substantiated by design, safety analyses and confirmatory 
experiments/testing over many years. We assert that safety-in-design are described by key 
metrics in summary that are linked to key initiating events such as station blackout and 
small break loss of coolant accidents. While we realize that most of this effort has supported 
existing nuclear reactor concepts (Generation II and a few Generation III designs) in 
operation, we assert that iPWR-type SMR designs are evolutionary changes in design (not 
disruptive) linked to shortcomings found in previous generation designs.  
Advancement in the methodology first suggested by the NuScale SMR design is one of an 
integrated approach. As noted, the approach or method is an integrated approach because 
it links PRA, system code analysis, scaling and coupling – and ultimately generate figures 
of merit, target probabilities that equal or exceed equivalent figures of merit of existing 
designs. And as noted, this approach brings consistency in three separate concepts as 
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follows: Defense in Defense, regulatory expectations relative to exiting and past 
generational reactor designs, and lastly consensus understanding of PRA Levels 1 to 3 
inclusive. Further, since there is an opportunity to advance safety-in-design in 
consideration using modern computational resources, we propose use of dynamic PRA to 
address limitations of classic PRA, and addition of scaling analysis, here for a generic 
passive safety system so that scaling becomes an expectation of SMR concepts and 
designs.  We note that the NuScale design did not report use of dynamic PRA nor report 
use of scaling on variations in PSS design. 
Finally, the proposed weighting methods uses multiple ranking and assigned percentages 
based on conservatism that does not rely on expert panels but instead technical basis 
(models and simulation results). The ranking uses integers, 1 to 4, in either incremental 
form (1, 2, 3, 4) or can be used with restrictions, (1, 3, 4) so that for any designed SMR, 
only one “weak” aspect be included. Further, with recognition of use of various decay heat 
removal subsystems making up the overall decay heat removal system, a percent allocation 
method is used and can be varied. The author feels that this is a new, sensible approach or 
method. 
In the section to follow, we describe the comparative assessment of the passive safety 
system features of the iPWR-type SMRs considered 
3.5 Comparative assessment of PSSs in iPWRs 
Besides the unique design features, another important design feature is the implementation 
of passive systems which inherently eliminates/mitigates DBAs. Simplified PSSs are 
implemented in iPWR designs to counter/mitigate accident initiators and its consequences 
not covered by the inherent features. A review of PSSs deployed in iPWR-type SMR designs 
is presented based on its function (Table 3.2) [3].  
3.5.1 Comparative assessment of PRHRS 
 
All iPWR designs implement Passive Residual Heat Removal System (PRHRS) in NC 
mechanism to remove the decay heat. Though most iPWR designs employ FC as the primary 
coolant circulation mechanism, nevertheless all designs adopt NC mode for emergency 
cooling when power is unavailable in events such as SBO. There are at least two safety 
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Table 3.2: Function based PSSs in iPWR-type SMR designs 
SMR Design 
Passive Safety Systems 
PRHRS PSIS PRDS PCCS 
CAREM25 
Number of trains 2 (RPV side, two-phase) 2 (One-time injection) 3 (ADS and NC based) 1 (Suppression type) 
System 
Components 
Parallel horizontal U tubes, condensers in 
pool 
A tank with borated water 
Safety relief valve (100% 
each)(mainly) and two HXs 
in IC pool 
Drywell, wet well, suppression 
pool 
Cooling Time 36 h 48 h N/A Not found 
SMART 
Number of trains 4 (33.3% each train) (SG side) 
4 (33.3% each train) (NC 
based) 
2 (ADS) 4 (33.3% each train)(Air cooled) 
System 
Components 
Emergency cool down tank, HX, makeup 
tank 
A core make-up tank, a safety 
injection tank 
Automatic depressurization 
valves and piping 
One heat exchanger 
Cooling Time 72 h 72 h N/A Not found 
NuScale 
Number of trains 2(100% each train) (SG side) 2(100% each train) (NC based) 2(100% each train)(ADS) 1 (Pool type) 
System 
Components 
A condenser in pool, one SG 
A reactor vent valve and a 
reactor recirculation valve 
Reactor vent valves and 
piping 
Submerged metal containment 
Cooling Time Minimum 72 h up to 30 d Minimum 72 h up to 30 d N/A Minimum 72 h up to 30 d 
ACP100 
Number of trains 2 (SG side) 2 (NC based) 2(100% each train)(ADS) 1 (Air cooled) 
System 
Components 
One emergency cooler, IRWST 
Two coolant storage tanks, two 
injection tanks, IRWST 
Automatic depressurization 
valves and piping 
Two containment condensers, 
water storage tank 
Cooling Time 7 d 72 h N/A 72 h 
mPower 
Number of trains 2 (SG side) 
2 (Both one-time injection and 
NC based) 
2 (ADS) 1 (Pool type) 
System 
Components 
An air-cooled auxiliary steam condenser, 
containment isolation valves 
Intermediate pressure injection 
tanks, IRWST 
Automatic depressurization 
valves and piping 
An integral water tank 
Cooling Time Not found 7 d N/A Not found 
CAP150 
Number of trains 2(100% each train) (SG side) 1 (NC based) 
 
Eliminated by design 
1 (Pool type) 
System 
Components 
One HX located in IRWST 
Refueling water tank, auxiliary 
depressurization system 
containment cooling water pool, 
supplement pool 




Number of trains 4 (SG side) 
Eliminated by design 
2 (ADS and NC based) 1 (Suppression type) 
System 
Components 
A horizontal U-tube HX in RWST 
Automatic depressurization 
valves and piping 
6 water tanks and a common tank 
for non-condensable gas storage 
Cooling Time Not found N/A Not found 
IMR 
Number of trains 2 (SG side) 
Eliminated by design 
System 
Components 
Passive SG coolers, passive SG cooling 
tanks 
Cooling Time Unlimited time 
W-SMR 
Number of trains 4 (RPV side, single phase) 
2 (Both one-time injection and 
NC based) 
4 (ADS) 2 (100% each train)(Pool type) 
System 
Components 
HXs located in core makeup tank and in 
UHS 
Sump injection tanks, in-
containment pool and tank 
Valves attached to the top 
of CMT and squib-type 
valves 
Outside containment pool and 
UHS 
Cooling Time 7 d Not found N/A Over 7 d 
RITM-200 
Number of trains 2 (SG side) 2 (One-time injection) Not found 2 (Air cooled) 
System 
Components 
A DHRS tank, a water cooled HX, a water 
storage tank and air cooled HX 
Hydraulic accumulators Not found 
HX in water tank connected with 
PRHRS 
Cooling Time Unlimited time Not found N/A Not found 
VBER-300 
Number of trains 2 (SG side) 2 (One-time injection) Not found 2 (Air cooled) 
System 
Components 
Two passive HXs, water tanks and a process 
condenser 
Two stages accumulators  Not found 
One heat exchanger, water 
storage tank 
Cooling Time 72 h 24 h N/A Not found 
Note: 
PRHRS: passive residual heat removal system; PSIS: passive safety injection system; PRDS: passive reactor depressurization systm; PCCS: 
passive containment cooling system; HX: heat exchanger; RPV: reactor pressure vessel; SG: steam generator; IRWST: in-containment refueling 
water storage tank; RWST: refueling water storage tank; UHS: ultimate heat sink; CMT: core make-up tank;  DHRS: decay heat removal system; 




trains of PRHRS in all designs, with each of them having 100% capability, or four trains 
with 33.3% capability each and one train in redundancy. The PRHRS consists of HXs, 
cooling water tanks, piping and valves. While some of the iPWR designs also implement 
air-cooled HXs for long-term cooling such as mPower, IMR and RITM-200. Air-cooled 
HXs can be effective for iPWR with small power rating (such as micro modular reactor). 
As mentioned before, PRHRS are coupled with RPV or SG in single and two-phase flow, 
varying features are adopted in different designs that the two-phase PRHRS has advantages 
to remove the decay heat relative to single phase PRHRS due to the direct decay heat 
removal process under SBO [42]. While under SB-LOCA, the two-phase PRHRS works 
poorly to remove the decay heat as the pressure decreases in RPV, and water saturation 
temperature declines which leads to more water evaporation. The evaporation undermines 
primary NC and less heat can be removed [42]. As a result, single phase PRHRS removes 
more heat than two-phase design under SB-LOCA. While as the most important 
characteristic of the two-phase PRHRS is the more direct decay heat removal process which 
provides faster cooling capacity and more safety margin, thus higher safety level can be 
achieved. Detailed discussion of the heat removal process is studied in Chapter 4 taking 
scaling analysis and PRA. Thus most of the iPWR designs deploy two-phase PRHRS to 
remove decay heat and PSIS to compensate for the water leakage under LOCA. Also no 
radioactive material is released to containment vessel in SG side PRHRS if there is leakage 
which provides more safety margin than RPV side design. The cooling time of PRHRS 
varies based on the designs ranging from 36 hours to 30 days, and even for unlimited time 
based on its water inventory and inherent design features (e.g. air cooling).  
3.5.2 Comparative assessment of PSIS 
 
Passive Safety Injection System (PSIS) is widely used in SMR and LWR mainly to 
compensate for the water leakage under LOCA to cover and cool down the reactor core and 
prevent core melting down accident. Thus severe accidents like radioactive release can be 
mitigated. Most iPWRs take NC based PSIS to inject water from CMT, RWST or IRWST 
into RPV and the PSIS tank is under low to medium pressure. The PSIS will be actuated 
passively by pressure difference when the pressure in the RPV decreases to a certain value. 
After the PSIS is actuated, steam gets into the water tank of PSIS and transfer heat outside 
RPV, then water drains back after condensation. However, no additional water is added to 
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the RPV of NuScale, there are only two trains of valves with one reactor vent valve and one 
reactor recirculation valve each. The CV is vacuum and the pressure equilibrium will be 
soon reached during LOCA with the help of the reactor vent valves. Steam is condensed in 
the CV and returns back to RPV through reactor recirculation valves forming NC. Besides, 
one-time injection PSIS is also deployed (e.g. pressurized accumulators). The pressure in 
the accumulator is higher than in the NC based PSIS tanks to provide quick response to the 
LOCA. However, more heat can be removed with the same amount of water inventory in 
NC based PSIS than one-time injection due to the closed loop system. While one-time 
injection responds faster to provide quick emergency injection cooling. As a result, higher 
safety level is achieved in mPower with both redundancy and diversity in PSIS. 
Nevertheless, no PSIS is used in IRIS and IMR due to their unique features. The water 
inventory is large enough to cover the reactor core of IRIS during LOCA of any size. What’s 
more, the heat is removed and RPV is depressurized from SG side PRHRS without loss of 
water inventory after the pressure equilibrium reached between RPV and CV. As the decay 
heat is removed from the reactor vessel, the steam flow reverses back to the RPV from the 
CV which in term decreases the pressure and temperature in CV. And for IMR, nozzle 
diameter (less than 10 mm) primary pipes are deployed in RPV that the core can be covered 
for a long time that only very small LOCA is possible which eliminates the use of PSIS. 
Also additional water inventory can be refilled back to the PSIS tank from UHS, suppression 
pool or external water sources. 
3.5.3 Comparative assessment of PRDS 
 
Passive Reactor Depressurization System (PRDS) is usually used together with PSIS to 
rapidly reduce the pressure in RPV to create the pressure difference between RPV and the 
injection tank of PSIS in order to put PSIS into operation and compensate for the water 
leakage. Most iPWRs take ADS to rapidly release the pressure inside RPV while some 
designs such as CAREM25 and IRIS rely on both ADS and NC based PRDS. The NC based 
PRDS in CAREM25 is also the PRHRS with two HXs in IC pool removing the decay heat 
and releasing the pressure inside RPV as it is coupled to the RPV side at early stage. Three 
safety relief valves are used as ADS with 100% capability each to release the pressure at 
late stage. While it is a little different for the NC based PRDS in IRIS as it is coupled to the 
SG side PRHRS for early stage. As discussed before, conclusion can be made that the PRDS 
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in CAREM25 has advantages relative to the design in IRIS under LOCA [43]. Also due to 
the unique designs, PRDS is eliminated in CAP150 and IMR. CAP150 has a small enough 
free containment volume which makes the pressure between RPV and CV reach balance 
very soon during LOCA, thus PRDS is not necessary here to release the pressure. While for 
IMR, the PSIS is eliminated with nozzle diameter pipes and the PRHRS is already enough 
to depressurize the RPV due to the both air-cooled and water-cooled PRHRS thus 
eliminating PRDS.  
3.5.4 Comparative assessment of PCCS 
 
Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS) is used to keep the temperature and pressure 
within design limit especially under severe accidents like LOCA. Three different types of 
PCCS are discussed above which are air cooled type, suppression type and pool type. For 
air cooled type, heat is removed to the environment through air cooled HXs inside CV in 
SMART and VBER-300, while the containment of ACP100 is surrounded by reinforced 
concrete that allows for air circulation to remove the heat on the containment surface. Also 
there are water storage tanks on the top of the containment which can spray water on the 
containment surface to remove more heat during emergency. The suppression type PCCS is 
similar for CAREM25 and IRIS that steam is released through ADS to suppression pool. 
And the leaked steam gets condensed on the upper part of the containment known as drywell 
and returns to the suppression pool known as wet well. The suppression pool works as heat 
sink and the water can be injected back to the RPV for severe accidents. While the 
suppression pool is elevated above the reactor core which can be injected back to the RPV 
by gravity in IRIS but pumps are needed in CAREM25 for the same purpose. The pool type 
PCCS is similar for different iPWRs with the containment submerged in a large water 
inventory pool that heat in the CV can be removed to the pool. What’s different is that the 
large water inventory in the pool is used for PRHRS, PCCS and indirectly for PSIS in 
NuScale, while the other designs implement separate tanks for different systems. Also the 
PCCS is eliminated in IMR due to deployment of the air-cooled and water-cool PRHRS and 
the nozzle diameter primary pipes. Heat released to the CV is little and can be easily 
removed by the PRHRS. 




A detailed assessment of PSS among iPWR designs together with their unique features is 
presented below.  
CAREM25: It implements RPV side, two-phase PRHRS with 36 hours cooling time which 
is not long. The one-time injection PSIS has a quick response to the leakage, but the cooling 
ability is not as good as NC based PSIS with the same amount of water inventory. However, 
both NC based PRDS and ADS are used to depressurize the pressure with NC based PRDS 
passively actuated at early stage and ADS at late stage. The redundancy and diversity of 
PRDS makes it more reliable and faster for depressurization. The suppression type PCCS is 
considered to have advantages relative to air-cooled type but not as good as pool type based 
on their cooling ability. While the suppression pool in CAREM25 can provide heat sink and 
injection to RPV for extreme events with pumps. [43]  
SMART: Both of the cooling time in SMART are 72 hours for SG side PRHRS and NC 
based PSIS. The non-diverse PRDS with only redundant ADS are used which is already 
enough for depressurization but not as reliable as the PRDS in CAREM25. The air-cooled 
PCCS with four trains (33% each) of HXs inside the containment which is reliable but the 
cooling capacity is not so high compared with water-cooling. Also IRWST is implemented 
to provide emergency water inventory with pumps. [44] 
NuScale: One large heat sink is provided for all the PSSs with the water in the heat sink 
starting to boil after 72 hours when they are put into operation and boiling for 30 days to 
remove the heat to environment. Also the containment is vacuum to provide thermal 
insulation during normal operation and used as part of PSIS through the reactor venting 
valves and recirculation valves. Heat in the containment is removed to the pool through the 
metal surface surrounded by coolant water. As long as there is water in the pool, the reactor 
is safe. [45] 
ACP100: Long cooling time of PRHRS is provided with minimum time of 7 days and can 
be prolonged to 14 days with water supply. The cooling time of PSIS is 72 hours however 
additional water can be supplied with auxiliary power recharge for 7 days long cooling time. 
The water supplied for PRHRS and PSIS both comes from IRWST inside the RPV. The 
containment is cooled by air flow venting from the bottom to the top into environment and 
spray system is deployed for emergency cooling located above the containment. [3] 
38 
 
mPower: Both water-cool and air-cool HXs are deployed as PRHRS to remove decay heat 
which makes it reliable and long-term cooling can be achieved. Also reliable PSIS with 7 
days long cooling time is reached which both one-time injection PSIS at early stage and NC 
based PSIS at late stage are implemented. The pool type PCCS provides water inventory to 
both PRHRS and PCCS with the water on the top of the containment dome. [46] 
CAP150: The PRHRS and PSIS are general types while PRDS is eliminated by design. 
There is small enough free containment volume making the pressure difference between 
RPV and CV reaches balance very soon during LOCA which eliminates the use of PRDS. 
The pool type PCCS provides 7 days long time cooling with water on the top of the 
containment dome and prolonged cooling can be achieved with supplement pool. Also to 
cope with extreme accidents, part of the water in the containment cooling water pool will 
return to the RWST for PSIS. [3] 
IRIS: PSIS is eliminated due to large water inventory within RPV and depressurization 
without loss of mass from SG side PRHRS. Thus a relatively larger RPV is used in IRIS 
when compared with other iPWR designs. The suppression pool in the containment is 
elevated that the water can be injected to RPV by gravity when the water level is low at late 
stage. [47] 
IMR: It deploys both water-cooled and air-cooled HXs with water-cooled HXs operating at 
early stage and air-cooled HXs working after the water boiled off at late stage for unlimited 
time. The PSIS is eliminated by nozzle diameter (less than 10 mm) primary pipes that only 
very small break LOCA is possible. The leakage can be easily stopped via PRHRS to 
remove decay heat and decrease the pressure thus eliminating the PRDS. While more 
primary pipes are needed as the pipes are small that there is a relatively higher chance for 
the components to fail which decreases the reliability. The function of PRDS is to rapidly 
reduce the pressure of RPV, thus longer time will be needed for IMR to reach the pressure 
equilibrium. No PCCS is implemented with very small leakage into the containment, thus 
more time for the containment to be cooled down. [48] 
Westinghouse SMR: Three diverse decay heat removal methods (active and passive) are 
taken and also the water inventory is large which provides 7 days cooling time. Both one-
time injection and NC based PSIS are deployed with NC based PSIS operating all the time 
39 
 
when there is LOCA and one-time injection PSIS coming into operation at late stage which 
is reverse for mPower. Besides, PRHRS and PCCS share the same UHS for prolonged 
cooling time with 72 hours for one UHS. [49] [50] 
RITM-200: It also deploys both water-cool and air-cool HXs for unlimited time cooling of 
PRHRS. Due to the good cooling ability, PRHRS and PSIS share the same heat sink and 
hybrid safety systems are used with redundancy. The information of PRDS and PCCS for 
RITM-200 and PRDS for VBER-300 are not accessible for the public. [3] 
VBER-300: PSIS with only 24 hours cooling time is deployed. While two stages 
accumulators are used to control any size of LOCA. Air cooled PCCS is deployed with HXs 
and water tanks similar with that in SMART. [51] 
3.6 Ranking analysis of iPWRs 
3.6.1 Evaluation metrics and weighting approach 
A comparative assessment of PSSs for iPWR-type SMRs is here made to show similarities 
and differences among the designs. In order to better understand PSS capacity to maintain 
cooling ability, safety functions and reduce plant damage frequency, ranking analysis is 
made by considering a weighted approach. An integer weighting factor is assigned based on 
evaluation metrics and LENDIT scaling metrics relative to data from simulations as 
available [52]. The LENDIT scaling metrics consider the six parameters which are (1) the 
path from the core to successive heat sinks (L); (2) the total decay heat quantity (Q/E); (3) 
redundancy and diversity (N); (4) the distribution of simulation performance (D); (5) the 
information in the system and simulation (I); (6) the time-based process including 
thermodynamic phenomena with change in phase and/or across volumes (T). Also the 
quantitative weighting factor approach is implemented in the evaluation metrics taking risk-
informed, performance-based methods [53]. Therefore, the evaluation metrics of PSS is 
built (Table 3.3). 
Different PSSs designs contribute to different weighting factors. Taking PRHRS for 
example, the two-phase PRHRS responds faster and removes more heat in transient stage 
than single phase PRHRS under SBO so that a higher weighting is given to two-phase 
PRHRS. This is also similar for the cooling time and redundancy and diversity; a longer 
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cooling time capability and when more redundancy and diversity is deployed, a higher 
weighting is assigned. However, no cooling time is considered for PRDS because it is 
Table 3.3: Evaluation metrics of PSS 
PSS Attributes 
Evaluation Metrics 
4 3 2 1 
PRHRS 
Type  SG side HXs in pool SG side HXs in tank RPV side 
CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
PSIS 
Type  Both NC based One-time 
CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
PRDS 
Type  Both NC based ADS 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
PCCS 
Type  Pool type Suppression pool Air-cooled 
CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
Note: CT: cooling time, R&D: redundancy and diversity 
mainly designed for depressurization. This is a general evaluation of the PSSs without 
considering simulation results of different designs in detail. It serves as a reference with 
other evaluation approaches. The previous evaluation metrics table is built with the same 
PSS function among different iPWR designs, and the metrics among the four PSSs is also 
developed (Table 3.4) together for two-dimensional evaluation in order to provide 
convincing result. 
Table 3.4: Evaluation metrics among each PSS 
Attributes 
Evaluation Metrics 
4 3 2 1 
CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
Safety function 
RPV main decay heat 
removal 
Keep core covered 
RPV 
depressurization 
CV heat removal 
PDF contribution Unavailable 
Note: CT: cooling time, RPV: reactor pressure vessel, CV: containment vessel, PDF: plant damage frequency 
Similar to Table 3.3, the weighting of safety function is given to PRHRS, PSIS, PRDS and 
PCCS as 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively because the primary function of PSS is to remove decay 
heat and to keep the core covered to prevent or mitigate severe accidents leading to core 
degradation (meltdown). Thus HXs are deployed in PRHRS in order to remove the decay 
heat from the RPV and to expel thermal energy into the atmosphere. A large water inventory 
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is injected into RPV by PSIS to maintain inventory when the water level decreases and 
reduces the temperature and depressurizes the RPV. In contrast, there are no HXs in the 
PSIS, thus the decay heat cannot be removed from the RPV and gradually the temperature 
increases. Also PRHRS is to be used when the main heat sink fails or when there is no power 
(no signal input such as under SBO) and operated until safe shutdown, while the PSIS will 
be activated only when the water level is at a low level due to loss of inventory - leaks, 
LOCA or failure of relief valves. Moreover, PRHRS is designed to provide extended energy 
removal in contrast to the PSIS. Therefore, a higher weighting factor is assigned to PRHRS 
than PSIS. PRDS helps to run PSIS by depressurization and by controlling the pressure 
within design limit. We note that the actuation of PRDS (especially for the ADS valves) 
leads to the loss of water inventory but concurrently removes decay heat in the short-term. 
Ultimately loss of inventory in the long-term cooling is disadvantageous. The PCCS is used 
to cool the containment and maintain its integrity. One can argue that this is not as important 
as core cooling system; however, it is a layer of protection consistent with DiD. The attribute 
of plant damage frequency contribution is taken as part of the metrics. However, as the 
PDF/CDF contribution of each iPWR design is proprietary and not available to the public, 
it is not considered in this thesis. Cooling time is also considered as one of the attributes of 
the metrics. As most of the information describing the dimension of water tanks (UHS, 
IRWST, RWST, CMT, IC pool, etc.) is not publically accessible, attention is not only paid 
to the water inventory but also on the inherent (system) design features of the iPWR designs. 
One reference has been included with the simulation of PSS under SBO using MELCOR 
[54]. Table 3.5 provides cooling time before core in exposure with different PSSs under 
SBO. 
Table 3.5: Cooling time with different PSSs under SBO [54] 
PSS Cooling time (second) 
No PSS 14300 (3.97 hrs) 
CMT (NC based PSIS) 57048 (15.85 hrs) 
CMT+ACC (One-time 
injection PSIS)+ADS 
78716 (21.87 hrs) 
CMT+ACC+ADS+PRHRS 
available within mission time  
(more than 72 hours) 
          Note:CMT: Core make-up tank; ACC: accumulator 
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We see that the water inventory in RPV can last for 4 hours (14300s) without PSSs, around 
16 hours (57048s) with only NC based PSIS, thus the water inventory in CMT can last for 
12 hours. It is around 22 hours (78716s) with both NC based and one-time injection PSIS 
which indicates that the accumulator can make up water for about 6 hours of cooling, while 
the cooling time with all the PSSs deployed is available within its mission time – in essence, 
the PRHRS is designed to provide 72 hours decay heat cooling, so the cooling time should 
be over 72 hours. Although the water inventory and tank dimension are not presented in this 
paper, we have a general comparison cooling times that demonstrates the NC based PSIS 
provides longer cooling time than one-time injection. Therefore, the weighting among each 
PSS is made in Table 3.6.  
Table 3.6: Weighting approach among each PSS 
 PRHRS PSIS PRDS PCCS 
CT 3 3 1 3 
Safety function 4 3 2 1 
PDF contribution Vary with design and initiating event 
Average Score 3.5 3 1.5 2 
Percentage 35.0% 30.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
     Note:CT: Cooling Time; PDF: Plant Damage Frequency  
We noted that as additional simulation results and design specification become available, 
the risk-informed and/or technical basis for integer weighting may change. The value here 
is presentation of this approach. The PDF contribution is not publically accessible and it 
varies with designs and initiating events. For example, the PRHRS is mainly designed for 
SBO and PSIS is mainly designed for LOCA as defined by their functions [2]. Thus the PDF 
contribution should be higher for PRHRS under SBO while higher for PSIS under LOCA. 
Here the PDF contribution is not considered; a general weighting of each PSS is given in 
percentage. 
3.6.2 Ranking approach 
With the two-dimensional weighting and evaluation metrics, the ranking approach is 
established in Table 3.7.  
There is an average weighting factor for each PSS calculated as the average of the attributes, 
for example (1+2+2)/3=1.67. The overall score for each iPWR design is obtained by  
43 
 
Table 3.7: Ranking approach of iPWR designs 
iPWR CAREM25 SMART NuScale 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 1 2 2 1.67 2 3 3 2.67 3 3 2 2.67 
PSIS(30%) 1 2 2 1.67 2 3 3 2.67 2 3 2 2.33 
PRDS(15%) 3  4 3.50 1  2 1.50 1  2 1.50 
PCCS(20%) 2 2 1 1.67 1 2 3 2.00 3 3 1 2.33 
Score 1.942 2.358 2.325 
Ranking 8 2 3 
iPWR ACP100 mPower CAP150 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 2 3 2 2.33 2 2 2 2.00 2 2 2 2.00 
PSIS(30%) 2 3 2 2.33 3 3 4 3.33 2 2 1 1.67 
PRDS(15%) 1  2 1.50 1  2 1.50 1  1 1.00 
PCCS(20%) 1 3 1 1.67 3 2 1 2.00 3 3 1 2.33 
Score 2.075 2.325 1.817 
Ranking 7 3 9 
iPWR IRIS IMR W-SMR 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 2 2 3 2.33 2 3 2 2.33 1 3 3 2.33 
PSIS(30%) 2 2 1 1.67 2 2.00 3 2 4 3.00 
PRDS(15%) 3  4 3.50 2 2.00 1  3 2.00 
PCCS(20%) 2 2 1 1.67 2 2.00 3 3 2 2.67 
Score 2.175 2.117 2.550 
Ranking 5 6 1 
iPWR RITM-200 VBER-300 
 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 2 3 2 2.33 2 3 2 2.33 
PSIS(30%) 1 1 2 1.33 1 1 2 1.33 
PRDS(15%) 1  2 1.50 1  2 1.50 
PCCS(20%) 1 2 2 1.67 1 2 2 1.67 
Score 1.774 1.774 
Ranking 10 10 
multiplying the average weighting with its PSS percentage and adding them together. 
Although the information for the two Russian designs, RITM-200 and VBER-300, is 
unavailable at this time, estimations of weighting factors are made based on their design 
philosophy in order to complete the ranking among the 11 iPWRs. Some PSSs are 
eliminated by inherent design, for example the PSIS, PRDS and PCCS are eliminated in 
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IMR. While the function is maintained by other systems and designs, the weighting is also 
given based on its function. Therefore, an average weighting factor is given for PSIS, PRDS 
and PCCS in IMR. Finally, the ranking table for the 11 iPWRs are generated based on their 
score with Westinghouse SMR ranked first. Thought the two Russian designs ranked the 
last, this may not be accurate as they are ranked with estimations due to limited information. 
We noted that the comparison, with uncertainties considered is relative and at best, two 
significant digits. 
This ranking approach is generated based on the two-dimensional evaluation metrics, so the 
final ranking can be different if changes are made for the evaluation metrics. Special 
attention is paid to the time-based process and simulation distribution to reach more accurate 
weighting of each design [42] [54]. Faster response and larger cooling ability is achieved 
for SG side PRHRS under SBO, and more decay heat is removed with the same water 
inventory in transient state. When taking the time-based process, system reliability and 
dependency of PSS is taken into consideration, the demands of other systems are affected. 
For example, the heat removed by RPV side, single phase PRHRS is lower than the decay 
heat generated in the core in the very beginning part of transit state due to the delay for 
establishment of NC [42]. This leads to the demands of SRVs to maintain RPV integrity. 
When there is more demands of the SRVs, there is more likelihood of failure and overall 
higher failure probability of the system.  
Table 3.8: Modified evaluation metrics of PSS among iPWR designs 
PSS Attributes 
Evaluation Metrics 
4 3 2 1 
PRHRS 





CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
PSIS 
Type Both NC based  One-time 
CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
PRDS 
Type Both NC based  ADS 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
PCCS 
Type Pool type Suppression pool  Air-cooled 
CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
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Also, SG side PRHRS provides more safety margin if there is leakage. Therefore, SG side 
PRHRS not only provides faster and larger cooling ability but also has smaller system failure 
probability for both short and long term cooling; thus the weighting evaluation should be 
modified accordingly. Similar analysis is also made for PSIS and PRDS. Further much 
larger heat capacity is achieved in water-cooled type rather than air-cooled type of PCCS. 
Therefore, a modified weighting evaluation metrics is generated (Table 3.8).  
Table 3.9: Modified ranking approach of iPWR designs 
iPWR CAREM25 SMART NuScale 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3.00 4 3 2 3.00 
PSIS(30%) 1 2 2 1.67 3 3 3 3.00 3 3 2 2.67 
PRDS(15%) 4   4 4.00 1   2 1.50 1   2 1.50 
PCCS(20%) 3 2 1 2.00 1 2 3 2.00 4 3 1 2.67 
Score 2.201 2.575 2.608 
Ranking 8 4 2 
iPWR ACP100 mPower CAP150 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 3 3 2 2.67 3 2 2 2.33 3 2 2 2.33 
PSIS(30%) 3 3 2 2.67 4 3 4 3.67 3 2 1 2.00 
PRDS(15%) 1   2 1.50 1   2 1.50 1   1 1.00 
PCCS(20%) 1 3 1 1.67 4 2 1 2.33 4 3 1 2.67 
Score 2.292 2.608 2.100 
Ranking 6 2 9 
iPWR IRIS IMR W-SMR 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 3 2 3 2.67 3 3 2 2.67 1 3 3 2.33 
PSIS(30%) 3 2 1 2.00 2 2.00 4 2 4 3.33 
PRDS(15%) 4   4 4.00 2 2.00 1   3 2.00 
PCCS(20%) 3 2 1 2.00 2 2.00 4 3 2 3.00 
Score 2.533 2.233 2.717 
Ranking 5 7 1 
iPWR RITM-200 VBER-300 
 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 3 3 2 2.67 3 3 2 2.67 
PSIS(30%) 1 1 2 1.33 1 1 2 1.33 
PRDS(15%) 1  2 1.50 1  2 1.50 
PCCS(20%) 1 2 2 1.67 1 2 2 1.67 
Score 1.893 1.893 
Ranking 10 10 
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The modified evaluation metrics is believed to be more accurate with consideration of time-
based process, simulation and system reliability. Also a modified ranking approach (Table 
3.9) can be generated with the final score and ranking of each PSS slightly changed. 
We can see from the ranking table (Table 3.9) that the score changes due to the modified 
weighting evaluation, while the overall ranking only changes slightly with the top designs 
still being the top. This is because the design philosophy for each PSS design is different 
which is presented by the weighting score. Though various PSS designs are considered, they 
are designed for different period of time. And the safety standard is different that some 
designs only take redundancy, while some designs take both redundancy and diversity (such 
as the PRDS in CAREM25 and IRIS).  
Table 3.10: Two-dimensionally modified ranking approach of iPWR designs 
iPWR CAREM25 SMART NuScale 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(45%) 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3.00 4 3 2 3.00 
PSIS(30%) 1 2 2 1.67 3 3 3 3.00 3 3 2 2.67 
PRDS(15%) 4   4 4.00 1   2 1.50 1   2 1.50 
PCCS(10%) 3 2 1 2.00 1 2 3 2.00 4 3 1 2.67 
Score 2.201 2.675 2.642 
Ranking 8 1 3 
iPWR ACP100 mPower CAP150 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(45%) 3 3 2 2.67 3 2 2 2.33 3 2 2 2.33 
PSIS(30%) 3 3 2 2.67 4 3 4 3.67 3 2 1 2.00 
PRDS(15%) 1   2 1.50 1   2 1.50 1   1 1.00 
PCCS(10%) 1 3 1 1.67 4 2 1 2.33 4 3 1 2.67 
Score 2.392 2.608 2.067 
Ranking 6 4 9 
iPWR IRIS IMR W-SMR 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(45%) 3 2 3 2.67 3 3 2 2.67 1 3 3 2.33 
PSIS(30%) 3 2 1 2.00 2 2.00 4 2 4 3.33 
PRDS(15%) 4   4 4.00 2 2.00 1   3 2.00 
PCCS(10%) 3 2 1 2.00 2 2.00 4 3 2 3.00 
Score 2.600 2.300 2.650 
Ranking 5 7 2 
iPWR RITM-200 VBER-300 
 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(45%) 3 3 2 2.67 3 3 2 2.67 
PSIS(30%) 1 1 2 1.33 1 1 2 1.33 
PRDS(15%) 1  2 1.50 1  2 1.50 
PCCS(10%) 1 2 2 1.67 1 2 2 1.67 
Score 1.993 1.993 
Ranking 10 10 
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Therefore, we can have different ranking approaches based on different weighting 
evaluation metrics, and the result of overall ranking will not be largely influenced. Here 
only one evaluation metric is varied. We can also modify other weighting evaluation metrics 
to compare the results (Table 3.10).  
In order to have a better result of the ranking among the 11 iPWR designs, we compare the 
3 ranking approaches and find that no matter how we evaluate the metrics, the overall 
ranking stays similar. Thus we create a figure to visually demonstrate the general result 
(Figure 3.5).  
   
Figure 3.5: Overall ranking of iPWR designs 
The overall ranking is made with three scores for each iPWR and the weighted length is 
shown as the difference between the smallest and largest scores. The shorter the bar, the 
more reliable the weighted approach. The ranking decreases from left to right and the left 
most 5 designs always remain in the top 5. There is a notable decrease from IRIS to ACP100 
which is caused by their design features and possibly the design philosophy. The 11 (eleven) 
iPWR designs are classified into 3 (three) classes with different evaluation: a) Group ① is 
for the first class design with better PSS evaluation providing extended cooling time, cooling 
capacity and reliability; b) Group ② is for the second class with relative marginal but 
accepted evaluation; c) Group ③ is the third group with minimum expectation relative to 







Therefore, based on the overall weighting scores of iPWR designs we suggest horizontal 
attributes as, “Best” “Good” “Expected” and “Minimum”, with weighting scores of 2.6, 2.4, 
2.2 and 2.0 respectively. “Expected” evaluation (scored 2.2) is taken as the benchmark 
requirement which can be met by most of the iPWR designs. Finally, “Minimum” (scored 
2.0) may serve as the lower bound requirement which needs to be improved to at least 
“Expected” by industry and regulator. 
Overall, the ranking of designs do not mean that the iPWR designs are poorly designed. For 
example, an air-cooled system for a smaller thermal output SMR may be designed such that 
enough power is removed. This type of design is economic. It is not correct to judge that 
one design is better than another without considering their design features and structure. 
Here we provide one means to compare the similarities and differences among PSSs of 
water-cooled designs and also to evaluate the PSSs in certain iPWR designs. We learned 
from this exercise that a reference SMR design should be proposed so that a given vendor 
design can be benchmarked against this reference design. This sensibly facilitates regulatory 
review. 
3.7 Conclusions 
A plausible conclusion to be drawn from the proposed ranking table is that the purpose of 
the passive safety systems is to remove thermal energy in the reactor core via passive 
components and systems for a defined length of time under DBAs. Many to all iPWR 
concepts realize energy removal capability via PSS designs, and attention is paid to the 
accident progression and mitigation options in time. As such standard DBAs such as SBO 
and LOCA suggest weighting factors - here for PRHRS and PSIS. Ultimately, iPWRs of a 
design with high rating should represent extended cooling time, cooling capacity, reliability 
(redundancy and diversity) and overall minimal to no need for human intervention. While 
there is uncertainty and dependency in PSS performance associated with phenomenological 
factors such as buoyancy forces, presence of non-condensable gases, heat loss, frictional 
losses and oxidation of relevant surfaces, these factors can be semi- or fully quantified. As 
for ranking, we propose a practical means to undertake comparative assessment of the 
features to demonstrate the similarities and differences of PSSs among the eleven (11) iPWR 
designs, and importantly suggest the need for a reference SMR design so that a given vendor 
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design can be openly or internally benchmarked against the reference. This comparative 
assessment also contains a weakness largely due to the inaccessibility of proprietary design 
information; thus a weighting method linked to likely initiating event response is practical. 
Lastly this work was partially supported by the IAEA-UOIT coordinated research project 
(CRP). We suggest that it supports utilities and licensee in its evaluation of SMR designs 




4 Comparative assessment of PRHRS using scaling analysis  
After the general comparison is made for PSS designs based on four main functions, 
detailed comparison is also needed to enhance system reliability. As the PSS is designed 
to enhance the safety margin of DBAs and to reduce key safety-in-design metrics such as 
the CDF, it is self-evident that removal of the decay heat in a predictable manner is key. 
Thus PRHRS is understood as one of the most important systems in PSS designs. There 
are generally two different PRHRS designs; that is designed based on single phase flow 
versus two-phase flow that when contrasted reveal differences. A comparison between the 
two types of PRHRS was discussed in Chapter 3 with the simulation data from Guoxu 
Zhang et al. (2017) [42]. Here the scaling analysis is used to demonstrate the difference 
from a scaling perspective since there is limited data of existing PRHRS designs of SMR. 
We also aim to provide benchmark for PRHRS of both designs thus contributing to the 
IAEA-UOIT project, and suggests regulatory direction to evaluate different designs. The 
scaling analysis is firstly presented to reveal contrast between the prototype design (LWR) 
and the single/two phase model (SMR), then between the single phase and two-phase 
PRHRS designs. 
4.1 Scaling in Design of Reactors  
Scaling analysis is widely used in the area of heat transfer and fluid mechanics to produce 
order-of-magnitude estimates for desired system variables [55]. Proper scaling and 
similarity helps to maintain the same phenomena in the model (SMR) which happens in 
the prototype (LWR or other), thus the similarity of geometry, kinematics and dynamics 
can be achieved in a largely simplified model [56]. Therefore, the scaling analysis can not 
only preserve the thermal-hydraulic phenomena and processes, but also reduce the cost of 
testing in a largely scaled-down facility, help to increase system reliability and improve the 
design by modifying the scaled-down model before construction [56]. The single and two-
phase flow scaling laws of forced convection have been developed and tested in industry 
for long time [57]. However, the scaling laws for natural convection is still under studying 
due to the sensitive heat transfer phenomena caused by low driving force. There are a 
number of system parameters referred to as phenomenological factors such as buoyancy 
forces, non-condensable gases, heat loss, frictional losses and oxidation in natural 
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convective flows that could influence the convection. These system parameters are not 
issues for active systems as the system is activated and operated by external power, but 
cannot be ignored in PSS with low driving force. Therefore, the scaling result for forced 
convection  cannot be assumed to be accurate nor applicable for natural convection. 
Distortion is a concept related to scaling used to describe how far the result in the model 
design is from the result in the prototype design. And the goal is to reach a minimal level 
of distortion in natural circulation as for forced convection. Thus there is a need for scaling 
methods of natural convection, and PSS using natural convective flows. 
Efforts are made to develop the natural circulation scaling laws such as Linear scaling by 
Carbiener & Cudnik (1969), Power-to-Volume scaling by Nahavandi et al. (1979), Three-
level scaling by Ishii & Kataoka (1983), Hierarchical Two-Tier Scaling (H2TS) by Zuber 
(1991), Power-to-mass scaling by Liu et al. (1997), Modified linear scaling by Yun et al. 
(2004), Fractional Scaling Analysis (FSA) by Zuber et al. (2007) and Dynamical System 
Scaling (DSS) by Reyes et al. (2015). Detailed description and comparison are made by 
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) in 2016 [56]. 
As discussed by NEA, a three-level scaling method was developed with different height 
and area ratios, and it has been used for test facilities with reduced height such as that for 
the Purdue University Multi-Dimensional Integral Test Assembly (PUMA) and Advanced 
Thermal-hydraulic Test Loop for Accident Simulation (ATLAS) [56]. The ideal scaled 
model of a simplified BWR was discussed by V.H. Ransom (1998) [57] using RELAP5 
code to obtain system performance data of PSS under steam line break accident. Ishii, 
Ransom and co-authors noted that the H2TS method was developed to minimize 
arbitrariness with traceable methodology which concurrently is also suitable for reduced 
height and area [56]. It has been used for the Advanced Plant Experiment (APEX) test 
facility, Evaluation Model Development and Assessment Process (EMDAP) and Code, 
Scaling, Applicability and Uncertainty (CSAU). As the PSS discussed here is for a SMR 
with maximum power to be 300 MW(e), the PRHRS needs to be scaled down from a large 
LWR (prototype). Hence attention is paid especially on the scaling of PRHRS. As 
discussed by Zuber and Ishii in 1998, when coupled with three-level scaling method, the 
modified H2TS method for modules of subsystems shows less distortion [58]. Therefore, 
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the H2TS method is taken as the principle of scaling analysis of PRHRS. Use of scaling 
analysis in this generic focus has not been used to date except for specific SMR designs. 
4.1.1 Hierarchical Two-Tiered Scaling 
 
Hierarchical Two-Tiered Scaling (H2TS) was proposed by Zuber in 1991 and then 
modified with the contribution from Ishii in 1998. It consists of 4 stages which are: system 
breakdown, scale identification, top-down and bottom-up scaling analysis. For the first 
stage, the system is broken into different pieces as needed such as subsystems and modules. 
Then the hierarchies are formed from them for measures which represent the transfer 
processes on the second stage. The third stage is the top-down scaling analysis taking the 
conservation laws of mass, momentum and energy to establish a scaling hierarchy. The 
conservation equations are then transformed into non-dimensional equations. The 
processes for the subsystems can be evaluated and ranked based on the importance to the 
system. Thus the priorities of the similarity groups can be determined which vary from 
designs and the purpose of the scaling. The last stage is the bottom-up scaling analysis 
focusing on the key processes and phenomena which helps to minimize distortions by 
taking step-by-step integral method for the processes. This method is especially efficient 
with only PRHRS into consideration due to the attention paid on subsystems and local 
phenomena. 
The similarity groups are taken as an important factor to determine the mathematic 
relationship of the parameters in scaling analysis and the parameters are dimensionless 
which can be obtained from two approaches [58]: 
 The dimensionless field equations 
 The dimensionless characteristic equations in frequency domain analysis 
Also different similarity groups are used for single and two-phase flow due to their different 
mechanisms, and they are discussed respectively below taking passive heat exchanger as 
the main module of PRHRS due to its heat removal function and the maintenance of local 
phenomena. 
4.2 Single phase similarity laws 
The phenomena of single phase natural circulation within a PRHRS design can be 
simulated in the primary side PRHRS design of a PWR, due to the high pressure in RPV 
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without phase change flow. The reference PRHRS is from Westinghouse-SMR with HXs 
immersed in ultimate heat sink coupled with HXs in coolant makeup tank and connected 
to the RPV (Figure 4.1).  
Different similarity groups are applied to single and two-phase flow. Here for single phase 
flow, the similarity groups applied are: geometry similarity groups, Richardson number, 
friction number, modified Stanton number, time ratio number, Biot number and heat source 
number. They are derived from one-dimensional mass, momentum and energy 
conservation equations and boundary conditions in single phase flow for the entire loop as 
below [59]: 
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Also the relationship between the hydraulic diameter 𝑑 and the conduction depth 𝛿 are 









      (8) 
Where, 𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑠𝑖 and 𝜉𝑖 are the flow area, solid cross sectional area and wetted perimeter of i 
th section. Therefore 





      (9) 
However, these are defined for the whole primary loop without considering the PRHRS, 
thus the heat transfer and energy conservation of the HXs are not included. While they 
provide scaling of important parameters such as the length scale of HX tubes is the same 
as heated length scale in RPV, also the scaling of PRHRS can be included based on the 
scaling of primary loop. 
4.3 Two phase similarity laws 
The phenomena of two-phase natural circulation within a PRHRS design can be generally 
simulated in a secondary side PRHRS design due to the coupling with SG leading to the 
phase changing from vapor to condensate after HXs. The HXs are immersed in the water 




Figure 4.2: Two-phase natural circulation 
The similarity groups for two phase flow are: geometry similarity groups, friction number, 
time ratio number, heat source number, density ratio number, phase change number (Zuber 
number), subcooling number, Froude number and drift-flux number. They are developed 
from a perturbation analysis based on the one-dimensional drift flux model and are derived 
as below [59]: 














𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥
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Other similarity groups are similar to single phase flow scaling.  
4.4 Scaling laws of PRHRS 
The main component of PRHRS is the HX which provides heat transfer. When taking the 
HXs of PRHRS as a module of a subsystem using H2TS method, the thermal-hydraulic 
phenomena of the fluid, the heat transfer with the structure and HXs are included, thus the 
continuity equations are obtained below [60]: 






= 0     (15) 
Where, 𝜌  is density; t is time; 𝑢  is velocity; s is pipeline of natural circulation loop; 
subscript i is the ith component. 






= 0     (16) 
Where, subscript m is mixture. 










+ 𝜌𝑔 − 𝜏𝑆𝑃(
𝜉𝑖𝑛
𝑎
)   (17) 
Where, g is gravity; 𝜏  is friction shearing stress;  𝜉  is wetted perimeter; 𝑎  is the cross 
sectional area; subscript in and SP denote tube side and single phase. 




















2 ] (18) 
Where, α is void fraction; 𝑉𝑔𝑗 is the drift velocity, subscript TP and g denote two phase and 
vapor.  









)ℎ𝑆𝑃(𝑇𝑤 − 𝑇𝑓)   (19) 
Where, h is heat transfer coefficient; T is temperature; subscript w and f denote heat wall 
and fluid. 

















)∆ℎ𝑓𝑔𝑉𝑔𝑗  (20) 
Where, ∆ℎ𝑓𝑔 is the heat transfer coefficient difference between fluid and vapor; subscript 
sat denotes saturation. 
HX heat transfer equation for single phase: 
𝜕(𝑎𝜌𝑐𝑉𝑇)𝑠
𝜕𝑡
= 𝜉𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑆𝑃(𝑇𝑓 − 𝑇𝑤) − 𝜉𝑜𝑢ℎ𝑇𝑃(𝑇𝑤−𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑘)   (21) 
Where, 𝑐𝑉 is specific heat capacity of solid; subscript s, ou and sink denote solid, shell side 
and sink. 
HX heat transfer equation for two phase: 
𝜕(𝑎𝜌𝑐𝑉𝑇)𝑠
𝜕𝑡
= 𝜉𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑇𝑃(𝑇𝑓 − 𝑇𝑤) − 𝜉𝑜𝑢ℎ𝑇𝑃(𝑇𝑤−𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑘)   (22) 












𝑉𝑔𝑗)    (23) 
Where, 𝛤𝑔 is vapor mass source. 
The formula of drift velocity and vapor mass source is as below: 
𝑉𝑔𝑗 = 𝑈𝑔 − 𝑗 = 0.2 (1 − √
𝜌𝑔
𝜌𝑓










     (25) 
Due to the very small density change with low natural circulation velocity, the partial 
differential term of fluid density to time could be neglected. The mass and momentum 
conservation equations can be generated by integration through the entire loop: 
Mass conservation equation: 
𝜌𝑚,𝑖𝑎𝑚,𝑖𝑢𝑚,𝑖 = 𝜌𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑢𝑖 = 𝜌𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑢𝑟    (26) 
Where, 𝑟 denotes the representative variable. 




















+ 𝐾)𝑖]𝑖   (27) 
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Where, 𝑙ℎ𝑐 is the evaluation difference between the hot leg and cold leg; ∆𝜌 is the density 
difference. 
In order to represent both single and two-phase energy conservation equation, the 







     (28) 
Then the energy conservation equation for both single and two-phase natural circulation is 













) ℎ𝑇𝑃,𝑖𝑛(𝑇𝑖𝑛 − 𝑇𝑤) (29) 
As the transient state develops slowly in natural circulation due to the low driving force, 
the conservation equations can be simplified via dividing by reference value for steady 
state. Thus the non-dimensional equations are obtained for both single and two-phase flow: 
Non-dimensional mass conservation equation: 
𝑢𝑖
+ = ∏𝑎𝑢𝑟
+      (30) 
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= −∏𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑘(𝑇𝑖𝑛 − 𝑇𝑤)
+   (32) 
The dimensionless numbers in above equations are: 












      (34) 
Friction number: 









+ 𝐾)𝑖]𝑖      (35) 
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Here the heat sink number for single and two-phase flow is a little different. 







)    (36) 







)    (37) 
The heat sink number shows the heat transfer capacity of HXs. Therefore, it varies for both 
flows and HX designs. In order to better compare the difference of PRHRS between single 
and two-phase natural circulation, the scaling of the primary loop is maintained. The 
scaling analysis taking H2TS method made under steady state is proved to be little distorted 
under SBO [60]. Therefore, the conservation equations can be largely simplified under 
steady state, and the momentum conservation equation under steady state is: 













+ 𝐾)𝑖]𝑖     (38) 
The friction number in the equation can be easily satisfied by adding orifices, and also the 
friction in HX is pretty small compared to the friction in primary loop. Thus the similarity 
of friction number can be maintained as 1. As a result, the flow area ratio and heat sink 
number are determined to be the major similarity criteria. 
The same fluid and structure material are selected in integral testing facility to maintain the 
same parameters thus to simplify the scaling analysis. Also the same fluid and structure 
material are considered in the scaling analysis of single and two-phase natural circulation 
PRHRS. Thus 





= 1   (39) 
𝜌𝑠𝑅 = 𝐶𝑝𝑠𝑅 = 𝑘𝑠𝑅 = 𝛼𝑠𝑅 = 1    (40) 
What’s more, the thermal state and performance in the whole loop are maintained to be 
consistent with full pressure that the temperature of each component and system is the same 












= 1     (42) 
Where, subscript R is the ratio between model and prototype. 
4.4.1 Bottom-up scaling analysis 
In order to meet the similarity criteria for both tube side and shell side with less distortion, 
the bottom-up scaling analysis of HX in PRHRS is made. When the heat transfer in tube 
side is single phase convection, it is driven by natural circulation and the Reynolds number 
is much smaller than in forced flow. Therefore, Grashof number should be the 
dimensionless parameter that governs the fluid flow. However, as discussed by Ishii & 
Kataoka (1984) [61] and later proved in integral test facilities that forced convection heat 
transfer correlations are used. The reason is that the flow is driven by the temperature 
difference between the hot leg and cold leg of the primary loop forming the natural 
circulation and not by the temperature difference within the heated section forming the 
natural convection. Thus the forced convection correlations are better suited to describe the 
nature of natural circulation here rather than natural convection in open or simple confined 
configurations. Here the Dittus-Boelter correlation is used to calculate the single phase 




= 𝐶𝑅𝑒0.8𝑃𝑟𝑛    (43) 




     (44) 
When the heat transfer in tube side is two-phase convection, the heat transfer coefficient 
can be calculated using R.K. Shah’s correlation [62] which is suitable for horizontal, 
vertical and inclined tubes for condensation and two-phase convection with experiment 
data from different working fluids. 
For steam condensation, the equation of heat transfer coefficient is: 




]    (45) 
For two phase mixture, the equation of heat transfer coefficient is: 







]  (46) 
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Where, 𝑋𝑎𝑣  is the average vapor quality between the inlet and outlet; 𝑝  is saturated 
pressure; 𝑝𝑐 is boundary pressure. 
The heat transfer in the shell side is nucleate boiling outside tube convection, thus the heat 









3     (47) 
Where, Δ𝑇 is the temperature difference between the tube structure and coolant; 𝑝0  is 
system pressure; 𝑝𝑎 is atmosphere pressure. 
The equation indicates that the heat transfer coefficient ratio of shell side only depends on 
the temperature difference which can be maintained the same with the prototype due to the 
same thermal state maintained in primary loop.  
Due to the design feature of the HXs (tube type), the scaling of the structured parameters 
is: 
𝑎𝐻𝑋,𝑅 = 𝑛𝑅𝑑𝑖𝑛,𝑅
2      (48) 
𝜉𝑅 = 𝑛𝑅𝑑𝑖𝑛,𝑅      (49) 
Where, 𝑛  is the number of HX tubes; 𝑑𝑖𝑛  is the inner diameter of HX tube. Also the 
hydraulic diameter is the same as the inner diameter when in tube. 
The scaling of other parameters in the HX also requires mass and energy conservation. 
(𝜌𝑢𝑎)𝑟,𝑅 = (𝜌𝑢𝑎)𝐻𝑋,𝑅 = 𝜌𝐻𝑋,𝑅𝑛𝑅𝑢𝑅𝑑𝑖𝑛,𝑅
2    (50) 
𝑞𝐻𝑋,𝑅 = 𝜌𝑅𝑢𝑅𝑎𝐻𝑋,𝑅Δℎ𝑅 = 𝜉𝑅𝑙ℎ𝑐,𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑛,𝑅   (51) 
4.4.2 Design of scaled PRHRS 
Here to simplify the problem, the same RPV design parameters and thermal state of a LWR 
are chosen as the prototype for both single and two-phase PRHRS. The similarity in fluid 
performance between the prototype (LWR) and model (SMR) is maintained, thus similarity 
ratios can be generated for the primary loop. Attention is paid to PRHRS that the same 
performance is also maintained due to the scaled-down parameters of primary loop. 




















= 1   (53) 
Simplify equations (52) and (53) by combining them together, then we get: 
𝑢𝑅 = 𝑙ℎ𝑐,𝑅
0.5       (54) 
ℎ𝑖𝑛,𝑅 = 𝑙ℎ𝑐,𝑅
0.5 𝑑𝑅     (55) 
Combine equations (43) and (44) for single phase natural circulation: 
ℎ𝑖𝑛,𝑅 = ℎ𝑆𝑃,𝑅 = 𝑢𝑅
0.8𝑑𝑅
−0.2    (56) 
Combine equations (43), (45) and (46) for two-phase natural circulation: 
ℎ𝑖𝑛,𝑅 = ℎ𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚,𝑅 = ℎ𝑇𝑃,𝑅 = 𝑢𝑅
0.8𝑑𝑅
−0.2   (57) 
Conclusions can be made from the result that the same heat transfer coefficient scaling is 
demonstrated for both single and two-phase natural circulation which also indicates the 
same scaling of PRHRS structured parameters. Then combine equations (54), (55), (56) 
and (57), we get: 
𝑑𝑅 = 𝑙ℎ𝑐,𝑅
0.75      (58) 
Then combine equations (48) and (58), we get the number scaling of HX tubes for both 




1.5      (59) 
With all the ratios of structured parameters, the scaling of heat transfer area can also be 
determined. 
𝑎𝐻𝑇,𝑅 = (𝑛𝑑𝑙)𝑅    (60) 
Results can be generated that as long as the residual heat removal system (either single or 
two-phase design) is determined in the prototype the scaling ratio of structured parameters 
can be obtained. Also the same scaling criteria and ratio are applied for single/two phase 
natural circulation PRHRS between the prototype and model. Nevertheless, the value of 
structured parameters is absolutely different for single and two-phase designs due to fluid 
working mechanisms which leads to different cooling capacity and system reliability. Then 
the scaling between single and two-phase designs is also discussed. 
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4.5 Comparative assessment between single phase and two-phase PRHRS 
Different designs of PRHRS are deployed for eleven iPWR designs, and the two major 
types are the primary side PRHRS coupled with RPV in single phase natural circulation 
and the secondary side PRHRS coupled with SG in two phase natural circulation. Usually 
the shell side cooling mechanism of the PRHRS HX is water cooling, however some 
designs also take air cooling when the decay power is relatively small. Also the system 
reliability is determined by a compromise between redundancy and based on the number 
of components probability for failure of components such as leakage and plugging. 
Therefore, the comparative assessments of PRHRS between the single phase and two phase 
designs, and between water cooling and air cooling are made based on scaling analysis 
with consideration of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). 
4.5.1 Comparison between PRHRS designs 
The function of PRHRS is to remove the continuous core decay and sensible heat from 
RPV by natural circulation with the major components HXs immersed in cooling tank. 
Therefore, due to the energy conservation law, the decay heat is removed and the 
temperature decreases in RPV by transferring heat to the cooling tank through HXs.  
𝑞𝑃𝑅𝐻𝑅(𝑡 − 𝑡0) − 𝑞𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑦(𝑡0) = 𝑐𝑝𝑚
𝑑𝑇
𝑑𝑡
   (61) 




 is the change rate of RPV outlet temperature difference which is a function of 
time. The energy conservation equation takes only the heat source and heat sink into 
consideration and ignores the intermediate energy transfer to the SG with phase change. 
Thus it is valid for both RPV side and SG side PRHRS. The decay power is determined by 
Wigner-Way formula [64] [65]: 
𝑞𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑦 = 𝑃(𝑡) = 0.0622𝑃0[𝑡
−0.2 − (𝑡 + 𝑡𝑜)
−0.2]  (62) 
Where, 𝑃(𝑡)  is the decay power at time 𝑡  in seconds; 𝑃0  is the thermal power before 
shutdown; 𝑡𝑜 is the operating time before shutdown in seconds. 
𝑞𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑦 = 𝑃(𝑡) = 0.0064𝑃0[𝑡
−0.2 − (𝑡 + 𝑡𝑜)
−0.2]  (63) 
Where, the time is in days. 
64 
 
As the same RPV design and thermal state is maintained, the value of decay power, water 
mass of RPV and temperature change is then consistent in both RPV side and SG side 
PRHRS designs. Thus: 
𝑞𝑃𝑅𝐻𝑅,𝑆𝑃 = 𝑞𝑃𝑅𝐻𝑅,𝑇𝑃     (64) 
As the heat transfer coefficient scaling is consistent for both designs (equation 56 and 57) 
and the temperature change of shell side in water tank is kept the same with that in 
prototype due to the scaled heat transfer rate and shell side heat transfer coefficient. Thus 
the heat transfer performance of the PRHRS can be maintained for both single and two 
phase NC with little distortion [60].  
The heat transfer rate can also be represented by heat transfer coefficient: 
𝑞𝑃𝑅𝐻𝑅 = 𝑈𝑎𝐻𝑇Δ𝑇𝐿𝑀 = 𝑈𝑛𝜋𝑑𝑙Δ𝑇𝐿𝑀    (65) 
Where, 𝑈  is overall heat transfer coefficient; Δ𝑇𝐿𝑀  is logarithmic mean temperature 












     (66) 
However, the overall heat transfer coefficient is very hard to determine due to its 
dependence on fluid velocity, viscosity, heat surface condition and size of temperature 
difference.  
Table 4.1: Overall heat transfer coefficient table [66] 
Tube side fluid Tube material Shell side fluid 
Overall heat transfer 
coefficient (W/m2K) 
Water Cast Iron Air 7.9 
Water Mild Steel Air 11.3 
Water Copper Air 13.1 
Water Cast Iron Water 230.0-280.0 
Water Mild Steel Water 340.0-400.0 
Water Copper Water 340.0-455.0 
Steam Cast Iron Air 11.3 
Steam Mild Steel Air 14.2 
Steam Copper Air 17.0 
Steam Cast Iron Water 910.0 
Steam Mild Steel Water 1050.0 
Steam Copper Water 1160.0 
Steam Stainless Steel Water 680.0 
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This work considered representative data is provided from online engineering toolbox 
(2003) for first estimate calculation (Table 4.1) [66]. The difference between the single and 
two-phase flow is compared by taking the average overall heat transfer coefficient in Table 
4.2. A general overall heat transfer coefficient ratio of single and two phase flow can be 
estimated, which indicates that more heat can be transferred in two phase flow due to higher 
overall heat transfer coefficient caused by phase change. Also water cooling has larger 
cooling capacity than air cooling in shell side due to higher specific enthalpy of water. The 
ratio of heat transfer coefficient between single and two-phase HXs provides results to 
estimate failure probability of single and two-phase PRHRS discussed later. 
Table 4.2: Overall heat transfer coefficient ratio 
Material 






W-A S-A   
Cast Iron 7.9 11.3 1.43 
1.33 Mild Steel 11.3 14.2 1.26 
Copper 13.1 17.0 1.30 
 W-W S-W   
Cast Iron 255.0 910.0 3.57 
3.11 Mild Steel 370.0 1050.0 2.84 
Copper 395.0 1160.0 2.94 
Note: W: water, A: air, S: steam, TP: two phase, SP: single phase 
However, the HX tube consist of different materials and for use in single versus two-phase 
flow. The isolation condenser system is used in the primary loop as PRHRS in General 
Electric nuclear energy Simplified BWR (SBWR); further, it was noted in a PWR type 
reactor such as the CAREM-25 [67]. Because there is no open data for PRHRS 
configuration, and ICS is later used in iPWR designs (CAREM-25). Therefore, the 
configuration of HX in PRHRS is referenced from GE SBWR. The HX tube material in 
single phase is 304 stainless steel [68] with the thermal conductivity, 14.4 W/m·k, on 
average under the working temperature. Meanwhile, the tube material for two-phase design 
is the same as for steam generator due to phase change mechanism. As discussed by the 
NRC, the material used for the SG is alloy 690, with the thermal conductivity, 15.4 W/m·k 
on average within the working temperature (INCONEL-alloy-690) [69]. A general thermal 
conductivity table is provided (Table 4.3) together with stainless steel and alloy 690 [70]. 
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Cast Iron 48.0 
Mild Steel 55.0 
Copper 375.0 
Stainless Steel 14.4 
Alloy 690 15.4 
The inner and outer heat transfer coefficients are kept consistent respectively due to the 
scaling analysis, determined by equations (66) that the overall heat transfer coefficient 
increases as the thermal conductivity increases. As there is no available data for the overall 
heat transfer coefficient taking stainless steel and alloy 690 for HX tube material, therefore 
the estimated overall heat transfer coefficient values for single and two-phase flow with air 
cooling and water cooling can be estimated shown in Table 4.4 which is calculated based 
on the overall heat transfer coefficient of other materials.  
Table 4.4: Estimated overall heat transfer coefficient 
Material 
U (W/m2K) of 
Tube-Shell fluid 
W-A W-W 
Stainless Steel 6.0 225.0 
 S-A S-W 
Alloy-690 8.0 700.0 
Attention is paid that the above discussion is made to reach the overall heat transfer 
coefficient of single and two-phase flow of PRHRS as the information is not openly 
available. We can directly move to next stage if the data is provided. 
The ratio of logarithmic mean temperature difference (LMTD) needs to be determined for 
single phase flow without phase change. It can be roughly calculated as the temperature 
difference between the average temperature of tube side and shell side which indicates that 
it decreases after the PRHRS actuation due to heat transfer. In order to reach safe system, 
the PRHRS is designed to remove more heat than decay heat especially at early stage. The 
heat transfer rate decreases as LMTD and natural circulation flow rate decrease, while the 
PRHRS cooling capacity is still larger than the decay power due to HX designs. Therefore, 
the LMTD at the initial stage is chosen for calculation which is easy to obtain. Based on a 
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general PWR, the RPV inlet and outlet temperatures are 287.7 ℃ and 324 ℃. Also the 
temperature in both water-cooled and air-cooled PRHRS tank is 37.8 ℃ [71]. Here as the 
PRHRS tank is open to atmosphere, the water inventory is large enough for at least 72 
hours cooling. And it can be taken as ultimate heat sink for air cool mechanism. As a result, 
the temperature of the shell side coolant can be taken as constant for the initial short time. 
Thus Δ𝑇𝐿𝑀,𝑆𝑃=267.64 ℃. 
However, we cannot use equation 65 to determine the heat transferred for two-phase 
PRHRS. Because the outlet temperature does not increase when there is phase change. 
While, correlation of LMTD for two-phase heat exchanger was discussed by X. Liu in 1996 
[72]. In his paper, assumptions are made as a single phase flow on cold side and a two-
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   (68) 
The sign is defined by both the fluid condition (hot or cold) and the flow arrangement 
(parallel or counter-current). Here a and e may or may not be different with the sign 
determined by the conditions. The explicit expression for ∆𝑇  is not available, and 
numerical procedure might be required to calculate the relationship between the heat 
transfer rate and the LMTD. However, the LMTD can be taken as a function of vapor 
quality assuming the variable heat transfer coefficient is a function of vapor quality only. 
The equation needs to be modified if the heat transfer coefficient depends on other 
variables. Thus, the heat transfer rate equation for two-phase flow can be presented as 
below: 
𝑞𝑃𝑅𝐻𝑅,𝑇𝑃 = 𝑈𝑛𝜋𝑑𝑙Δ𝑇𝐿𝑀(𝑥)     (69) 
The LMTD for two-phase flow also depends on the flow type in two-phase flow, such 
as bubbly, slug, chum annual and dispense flow. The two-phase flow regime map has 
been provided to study the boundary conditions of different flows by M. Ishii and T. 
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Hibiki (2011) [73]. Different void fraction and other parameters were discussed for 
various flows. Thus, empirical correlations for two-phase flow was determined with 
different variables. Detailed discussed can be made to determine the correlations of 
various flow types, while this is beyond our research scope. 














   (70) 
Take the same tube structure, hence the tube diameter and length are the same for single 










= 1    (71) 
Thus the heat transfer area ratio of single and two-phase flow is represented by the number 












    (73) 
It indicates that in order to provide the same heat transfer rate and maintain the local 
phenomena in PRHRS, the number ratio of HX tubes for single and two-phase PRHRS is 
determined by the LMTD ratio in both air cooling and water cooling, and the number ratio 
of HX tubes between single and two-phase is larger in water cooling than air cooling. The 
significance here is not the ratio specifically but the methodology. That is, that scaling 
analysis can be used to consider details of safety system design so that test data from a 
SMR vendor can be confirmed. 
4.5.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment of single and two-phase PRHRS 
In order to access the relationship between the system reliability and the number of HX 
tubes, fault tree analysis is established to compare the failure probability between single 
and two-phase PRHRS.  
As discussed by Burgazzi (2002) [26], the basic events of the isolation condenser system 
failure are composed of natural circulation failure (phenomenological factors failure), 
isolation condenser failure (hardware components failure) and pipe rupture. Here the 
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hardware components failure is discussed in terms of HX failure and valve failure. Further, 
multiple pipe rupture and plugging contribute to HX failure (Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3: Fault tree of ICS 
In Burgazzi’s work, the ICS design is deployed as PRHRS and coupled with a BWR where 
there is natural circulation under two phase flow. Here multiple pipe rupture and plugging 
are used for two phase flow with the failure rate a factor of 10 smaller than single pipe 
rupture and plugging made by Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) [26]. 
However, as the failure rate of single pipe rupture and plugging is so small, the failure rate 
of multiple pipe failure is much smaller than the single pipe failure. Also the single pipe 
failure could already degrade the flow due to the low driving force of natural circulation. 
Hence the single pipe rupture and plugging are considered here. Other basic events of the 
ICS fault tree are similar for other PRHRS designs, here only the fault tree of HX failure 
is discussed for single phase and two-phase flow due to the different failure rate. 
The failure rates of single tube rupture and plugging for single phase HX are 1E-09/hour 
[68], and the failure rate is 3E-10/hour for two-phase HX [26]. The PRHRS is designed for 
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72 hours of demand and the failure probability can be calculated using the exponential 
failure distribution equation.  
𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡     (74) 
Hence the fault tree of single phase and two-phase HX failure can be established (Figure 
4.4a, 4.4b). The HX failure probability is 1.44E-7 for single phase and 4.32E-8 for two-
phase and it is only for one single tube failure, while there are thousands of HX tubes and 
also there are more tubes in single phase than two-phase PRHRS. 
  
Figure 4.4a: Fault tree of single phase HX Figure 4.4b: Fault tree of two-phase HX 
Figure 4.4: Fault tree of HX failure 
Based on the number ratio of air cooling and water cooling, the total HX failure probability 
ratio with single tube failure is achieved by multiplying the failure probability ratio and the 












    (76) 
The result indicates that the single phase PRHRS initially has higher HX failure probability  
than two-phase PRHRS with only one HX tube due to the failure probability of 
components. However, the failure probability ratio for all the HX tubes is determined by 
the LMTD ratio. As the overall heat transfer coefficients of air cooling and water cooling 
are different, the failure probability ratio is calculated respectively for the two cooling 
mechanisms. The quantitative failure probability ratio can be determined after the LMTD 
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for two-phase flow is decided for a certain design. Then it can provide guidance to design 
different PRHRS designs. 
4.6 Estimate of the maximum capacity of the PRHRS 
For estimated designs, thousands of HX tubes are used in the SG and PRHRS to remove 
heat from the RPV. And with more HX tubes used, while heat capability may increase, so 
does the probability for partial to full system fails (leakage, plugging). There is an 
optimization exercise in PRHRS cooling capacity and the PRHRS failure probability.  
The cooling capacity of PRHRS can be calculated using equation (65). The fault tree model 
of the ICS by Burgazzi and as shown in Figure 4.3 can be used for both single phase and 
two-phase PRHRS since it is the same design. Here we take the same components (except 
for HXs) for single phase and two-phase PRHRS to simplify the problem because the 
components structure of PRHRS is similar for different designs discussed in Chapter 3. 
Then the total PRHRS fault tree with failure probability can be achieved to estimate the 
maximum number of HX tubes used in single phase and two-phase PRHRS respectively 
(Figure 4.5 and Table 4.5). The detailed information of how the probability is determined 
is discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Figure 4.5: Fault tree of PRHRS (see table below) 
Since the fault tree is generally made without considering the exact number of HX tubes 
deployed, here the heat exchanger failure (event 07) probability is provided with single 
pipe failure multiplying the number of HX tubes. The exercise is to determine the 
maximum cooling capacity of PRHRS as determined by the heat transfer area, but which 
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Table 4.5: List of events with probability from the fault tree [26] 
Number Event Probability Number Event Probability 
01 PRHRS failure 1.00E-04 16 








Makeup valve fails to 
operate 
3.45E-05 
03 System failure (43.2*n+2.1)E-9 18 
Bypass makeup valve fails 
to operate 
3.45E-05 
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Bypass condensation  valve 
fails to remain open CCF 
7.20E-07 
We assume a maximum top event failure is 1.0E-4 which can be increased or decreased to 
meet different safety requirements. And the only variable in the fault tree is the HX failure 
which is a function of the number of HX tubes. As the other two failure probabilities 
contribute 0.22% (event 02) and 1.73% (event 04) of the top event (event 01), system 
failure (event 03) contributes at most 98.05% with the failure probability to be 9.8E-5. The 
condensation valve failure is 2.11E-9 which is too small compared with 9.8E-5. Hence the 
maximum HX failure is taken as 9.8E-5, and the HX failure probability can be roughly 
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calculated as the HX failure multiply the number of HX tubes which are 𝑛𝑆𝑃*1.44E-7 for 
single phase design and 𝑛𝑇𝑃*4.32E-8 for two-phase design. The probability of single pipe 
failure and heat exchanger failure in Table 4.5 is taken from two-phase design. Therefore, 
the maximum number of HX tubes within safety requirement can be obtained which are 
680 for single phase and 2268 for two-phase HX taking the integer value. Here again, this 
is an example of the order of magnitude provided. Scaling analysis only provides 
correctness in simulation or expectation of phenomena, and should not be single used as a 
detailed design tool. 
The structured parameters of the HX tube are taken from the GE SBWR [67] that the ICS 
condenser tube length, inner diameter and outer diameter are 1.8 m, 46.6 mm and 50.8 mm 
respectively. Here the inner tube diameter is used to calculate the heat transfer area. Taking 
the estimated, maximum number of HX tubes and overall heat transfer coefficient into 
equation (65), the maximum power to be removed by single phase PRHRS is obtained in 
Table 4.6. The cooling capacity of PRHRS is designed to be 2% of full power [43]. Hence 
the maximum full reactor power coupled with the PRHRS can be determined (Table 4.7). 
Table 4.6: Maximum removed power by PRHRS 
Working 
mechanism 
Removed power (MWth) 
Air cooling Water cooling 
SP 0.288 10.791 
Note: SP: single phase 
Table 4.7: Maximum full reactor power coupled with PRHRS 
Working 
mechanism 
Full power (MWth) 
Air cooling Water cooling 
SP 14.4 539.5 
However, it is not safe to connect so many HX tubes together in one HX module, 
redundancy of HX modules and PRHRS are considered with in total 100% cooling 
capacity. By dividing the HX tubes into redundancy modules, the probability of the top 
event failure keeps constant. This is because the redundancy of HX modules only 
contributes to the fault tree under the HX failure event and no more components are 
included. While the total number of HX tubes is divided into two modules that each module 





Figure 4.6: Redundancy of HX modules 
Redundancy of PRHRS can also be deployed (Figure 4.7).  
 



















































Here the fault tree as depicted is simplified so as to model natural circulation failure and 
condensation valve failure as basic events. The whole PRHRS fault tree is duplicated under 
the top event due to redundancy. Besides the redundancy of HX tubes, failures of other 
components are also included which increase the probability of top event failure. As a 
result, fewer HX tubes can be achieved for the same maximum failure probability.  
In general, more HX tubes can be achieved for HX redundancy than PRHRS redundancy 
for the same top event failure. The numbers of HX tubes for each module are then 
calculated to be 1134 for HX redundant design and 1112 for PRHRS redundant design. 
However, the difference (1.94%) between the two values are small, because it’s based on 
the failure probability to be 1.0E-04. The difference of HX tubes number will increase if 
the failure probability decrease. For example, if the failure probability changes to 1.0E-05, 
then the difference is 24.73% (93 HX tubes for HX redundancy and 70 for PRHRS 
redundancy). 
Usually both redundancy of HX modules and PRHRS are deployed to provide both 
redundancy and diversity in industry. Thus the fault tree of PRHRS can be quiet 
complicated and large. Here we provide an approach to determine the relationship between 
the number of HX tubes and the PRHRS failure probability in a simplified design. Also as 
the maximum number of HX tubes used in single phase PRHRS is obtained, the maximum 
cooling capacity can be calculated. At the meantime, the maximum full power of RPV with 
PRHRS deployment can be roughly determined which helps to build the air-cooled PRHRS 
for micro reactor. The difference in number of HX tubes deployed in single and two-phase 
PRHRS, indicates that more HX tubes can be used in two-phase design under the same 
failure probability providing larger cooling capacity. The comparison between the two 
redundancy design provides insights for SMR vendor to improve system designs. 
4.7 Conclusion 
There are many proposed PRHRS designs for iPWRs, and the comparison of single and 
two-phase PRHRS helps to better understand their difference in terms of cooling capacity 
and system failure probability. The RPV thermal state was scaled relative to a PWR as 
reference and then the local phenomena of heat transfer, in the PRHRS HX, was scaled by 
using the H2TS method. The scaling analysis of PRHRS is made to obtain the similarity in 
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local phenomena of heat transfer of HX tube side and shell side via conservation laws. 
Various correlations are considered to represent the different mechanisms of single and 
two-phase natural circulation. While the same similarity ratio of heat transfer coefficient 
for both single and two-phase is obtained, then the cooling capacity scaling of single/two 
phase scaled down PRHRS with prototype can be compared via energy conservation law. 
The comparison approach is provided based on scaling analysis and probabilistic risk 
assessment that the number ratios of HX tubes are dependent on the ratio of LMTD for 
both air cooling and water cooling mechanisms with the same cooling capacity. Based on 
the number ratio of HX tubes, the cooling capacity ratio and maximum values of single 
phase PRHRS for both air cooling and water cooling mechanisms are determined. More 
HX tubes can be used in two-phase PRHRS under the same failure probability of top event, 
also more HX tubes for redundancy of HX module than redundancy of PRHRS. Therefore, 
the cooling capacity with HX redundancy is larger than PRHRS redundancy with the same 
failure probability. The optimization of PRHRS cooling capacity and system reliability can 
be determined based on design requirement. Therefore, two-phase PRHRS provides larger 
cooling capacity with less components than single phase PRHRS due to the higher heat 
transfer rate coefficient and lower system failure probability. However, steam separator is 
required to separate vapor from liquid which increases system design complexity. Here we 
have demonstrated the utility of scaling analysis as part of the PSS assessment and thus 
provide approaches to quantitatively compare single and two-phase PRHRS and 
demonstrate their relationship of important parameters such as scaling ratio with the 
prototype, ratio of HX tube numbers, maximum heat transfer rate and full reactor power. 
This also helps vendors to evaluate the design of PRHRS. 
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Chapter 5: Dynamic PRA via coupling of CAFTA and LabVIEW 
From previous chapters, comparisons of PSS have been made to advance safety-in-design 
that proper PSS designs can be selected for different purposes. While there are still the 
open issues – uncertainty and dependency – in PSS designs which need to be solved. In 
this Chapter, efforts are made to increase knowledge of functional evolution via a dynamic 
approach to classical probabilistic risk assessment focusing on the uncertainty and 
dependency of PSS designs. The approach is demonstrated via coupling of LabVIEW 
(simulation code) and CAFTA (driver code) based on the reference coupling method in the 
literature review. The PRA software analysis tool, Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis 
System (CAFTA), was developed by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) for 
developing reliability models of large complex systems using fault tree and event tree 
methodology. EPRI further proposed a benchmark PWR model called EPRI Nuclear One 
(ENO) with a complete fault tree analysis model using CAFTA [74]. Here similar work is 
done in CAFTA to conduct fault tree analysis (FTA) of the passive safety system (ICS). 
The educational version of CAFTA however is limited to 50 gates. A request for access to 
the full version of CAFTA via OPG’s license in CANDU Owners Group (COG) was turned 
down (2018). We also know that the FTA of a whole PWR plant is very sophisticated with 
hundreds of event gates. Thus the FTA is only considered for a simplified PSS design 
(ICS).  
National Instrument’s Laboratory Virtual Instrument Engineering Workbench (LabVIEW) 
is a system-design platform and development environment based on visual programming 
language. LabVIEW can be programmed for test, measurement, and control with access to 
hardware and data insights with real-time simulation. LabVIEW is used to simulate the 
reactor loop with ICS as RPV side PRHRS and demonstrate the system performance such 
as the water level and temperature change in both RPV and IC pool. The original plan to 
use RELAP as the system analysis code was terminated due to pending controlled goods 
decision (2019). Due to the simplified design (less than 10 components), the ICS is chosen 
as the benchmark system to systematically and quantitatively demonstrate the difference 
between classical and dynamic PRA. Here the simulation is operated under SBO with 
PRHRS actuated to cool down the system without core damage for at least 72 hours. 
78 
 
Further our attention is especially paid to the system performance after the failure of 
components and systems. Here the research is conducted by running the real-time 
simulation of PSS (ICS benchmark system) in LabVIEW, and conducting classical PRA 
of ICS in CAFTA separately. Then the two systems are coupled via Python programming 
language thus linking classical PRA with real-time simulation. Given access to RELAP, 
the coupling would be the same. As shown by Nielsen et al, dynamic PRA provides more 
details with more accurate probabilistic risk assessment of ICS. The configuration of 
CAFTA, LabVIEW and ICS is discussed in detail as below. 
5.1 Benchmark system 
The Isolation Condenser System is taken as the benchmark system due to the simplified 
design in order to mainly remove decay heat and secondarily depressurize the RPV. 
Previously, an ICS was proposed for the GE Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (SBWR) 
[67]. It consists of parallel HX U-tubes immersed in the IC pool that is open to the 
atmosphere with two makeup valves to maintain water level in the pool (Figure 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1: Isolation Condenser System 
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The HXs are connected via piping to the RPV upper plenum and lower head below the 
reactor water level. There is an isolation valve which is normally open and two 
condensation valves with one in redundancy which are normally closed, therefore the HX 
tube bundles are filled with condensate. Also the condensation valves are designed to 
prevent counter current flow (CCF) to allow water draining into the RPV without returning 
to the ICS via the condensation line. Two vent valves are connected with the condensation 
valves which are used to purge the non-condensable gas during condensation. The makeup 
valves are deployed to maintain the heat sink when the water level in the IC pool is low. 
The ICS is triggered by opening the condensation valve automatically when there is loss 
of heat sink or no power/signal input. Steam enters the HXs via the isolation valves through 
the pipe line and is cooled down on the cold surface of the tubes transferring heat to the IC 
pool. The cold flow returns to the RPV lower head establishing a natural circulation circuit 
driven by the water density difference. Thus the decay heat is removed from the reactor 
vessel to the IC pool, and the natural circulation is likely not to fail as long as there is heat 
source and heat sink. However, there is still a chance that the ICS can fail if either the 
isolation condenser or the natural circulation fails. If the ICS fails, automatic 
depressurization system (ADS) will put into use to depressurize steam to the containment 
vessel when the pressure is above the set point. The actuation of ADS leads to the loss of 
water inventory but concurrently removes decay heat in the short-term. Ultimately loss of 
inventory in the long-term cooling is disadvantageous. Also the ADS valves are demanded 
very often after they are actuated leading to the pressure oscillation. Meanwhile the ADS 
valves are more likely to fail as more times they are demanded. Therefore, ICS here is also 
used to minimize the actuation of ADS.  
5.2 LabVIEW (Version 18.0) 
Laboratory Virtual Instrument Engineering Workbench (LabVIEW) can be used as both 
the simulation code and driver code, here it is used to simulate the reactor loop with ICS 
to demonstrate the system performance such as the water level and temperature change in 
both RPV and IC pool. LabVIEW 2018 version 18.0 was used on a laptop with Windows 
10 Enterprise system, Intel Core i7-9750H CPU (2.60GHz) and 64-bit operating system. 
As the goal of the dynamic approach is to check if the coupling method for simulation code 
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and driver code provides dynamic PRA result thus increase knowledge of functional 
evolution, assumptions are made to simplify the problem as: 
1. No heat loss from RPV and ICS (Energy conservation) 
2. No water leakage from RPV and ICS (Mass conservation) 
As the physical laws of the engineered system is complicated especially under natural 
circulation, thus to simplify the problem, models of mass and energy conservation laws are 
considered in the LabVIEW simulation.  
The interface of the LabVIEW is developed with ICS in primary loop coupled with RPV 
together with diagrams, value indicators and controller buttons (Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2: LabVIEW interface 
The key parameters are shown in the color boxes that details of system performance is 
shown in box A; sequence controllers and key output indicators are shown in box B; 
sequence probability output of both classical (output before simulation) and dynamic 
(output after simulation) results are shown in box C. Detailed discussion is made in section 
5.4.1. 
5.2.1 Model programming 
The simulation is mainly programmed with four parts: (1) the RPV side with energy and 
mass conservation; (2) the ICS side with energy and mass conservation; (3) ADS which is 






of other components; (4) the coupling interface with python; (5) failure events 
programming.  
The initiating conditions are set to be a 100 MWth power reactor operating continuously 
for 365 days under normal operation. The full power and operating time can be changed as 
required. Water level in the IC pool is maintained with the HXs fully immersed and the 
condensation valves closed. The main makeup valve (makeup valve 1) will be put into use 
when water level is below the top of the HXs (4 meters) and it can be tripped on demand 
which puts the bypass valve (makeup valve 2) into operation. Also both of the makeup 
valves can be tripped on demand leading to the failure of makeup valves. 
The simulation starts under SBO causing the shutdown procedure and the ICS comes into 
operation at time 0. The decay power after shutdown is simulated with the Wigner-Way 
formula (equation 62) taking time in seconds. The initial power is 100 MWth as full power 
and 5% of power fluctuation [75] is considered for actual power as uncertainty 
programmed with white noise in LabVIEW.  
The reactor parameters are taken from CAREM25 as the same PRHRS design is 
considered, thus the initial RPV outlet temperature is 326 ℃ with the RPV volume to be 
around 80 m3 (3.2 m in diameter and 11m for overall length) [3]. The volume of IC pool is 
determined by the cooling time which is designed for 72 hours cooling. The cooling water 
in the pool is heated to boil from 32 ℃ (room temperature) with the specific heat capacity 
to be Cp = 4.2 kJ/(kg·℃) and then it is boiled off with the enthalpy of vaporization to 
be ∆Hvap = 2257 kJ/kg. Thus the volume can be determined with the heat capability formula 
and the decay heat generated for 72 hours (259200 seconds): 
Q = ρVCp∆T + ρV ·  ∆𝐻𝑣𝑎𝑝    (77) 
Q = ∑ 𝑃(𝑖) × ∆𝑡259200𝑖=1     (78) 
Where; Q is the total heat, ρ is water density, V is the volume of IC pool, the temperature 
difference in the pool ∆T changes from 32 ℃ to 100 ℃, 𝑃(𝑖) is the decay power at time 𝑖 
determined by equation (62), and the time difference ∆𝑡 is 1 second. 
Therefore, IC pool volume is estimated to be 45 m3. This value can be changed if the initial 
power varies which indicates that the model can also be used for scaled reactors. The IC 
pool dimension is made to be 4.5 m2 × 10 m as simplified to be easily represented in 
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diagrams. And the HXs are fully immersed when the water level is above 4 meters (not to 
scale in Figure 5.2). The cooling capacity of ICS is determined by natural circulation mass 
flow rate and heat transfer area. However, the mass flow rate is determined by the driving 
force of NC which cannot be easily simulated with solving the Navier-Stokes equation and 
the heat transfer area is determined by the design of HXs which varies from design to 
design. Therefore, more assumptions are made to further simplify the model: 
1. The cooling capacity of the ICS is assumed to be 1.5 times of the decay heat 
generated in the RPV estimated from G. Zhang’s [42] and J. Ge’s simulation [76] 
of PRHR HX when the HXs are fully immersed in the IC pool and the maximum 
removed power is 2% of the reactor full power [43]. 
2. It changes to both water cooling and air cooling when the HXs are partially 
immersed in the IC pool (water level below 4 meters). The overall heat transfer 
coefficient of the air-cooled ICS is assumed to be 1/30 of the water-cooled ICS 
(discussed in Chapter 4, Table 4.2) with Cp air=1.012 kJ/(kg·℃). 
3. The ratio of the cooling capacity of both water-cooled and air-cooled ICS does not 
change when RPV temperature varies. 
4. The pipe fouling event occurs in a sudden when going beyond the boundary 
condition that the fouling is large enough to change the flow pattern. Therefore, the 
heat transfer coefficient drops sharply when pipe fouling occurs. 
The cooling capacity of the ICS is roughly estimated based on the simulation data made by 
G. Zhang (2017) using RELAP5/Mod3.2 PRHRS and J. Ge (2018) for primary side fluid. 
The single phase PRHRS design in Zhang’s research deploys core makeup tank with HX 
before transferring heat to the ultimate heat sink which delays the power change. The heat 
transfer rate can be controlled by changing the heat transfer area varied from design to 
design, thus the heat transfer power of ICS is roughly assumed to be 1.5 times of the decay 
heat when it is fully water cooling [42] [76]. The cooling capacity changes when the HXs 
are partially covered with the exposed HX tubes in air cooling when water level of IC pool 
is between 0 to 4 meters. And only air cooling is deployed after all the water boiled off. 
However, additional water inventory can be compensated to the pool with the actuation of 
makeup system when the water level is below 4 meters and it keeps adding water till the 
water level reaches 10 meters. Each makeup valve is designed to compensate water with 
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the mass flow rate to be 1.05 kg/s for the IC pool which can hold 45 tons of water calculated 
from a 500-ton chiller with the mass flow rate of the makeup valves to be 22 gallon per 
minute [77]. Based on calculation the heat transfer power equals the decay power when the 
water level is 2.52 meters in the pool. Therefore, the RPV temperature increases if the water 
level is below 2.52 meters which indicates the makeup system fails closed or there is a 
break in the IC pool.  
ADS is actuated and remained open when the RPV pressure is above 14 MPa helps to 
prevent the reactor from explosion caused by high pressure, and the ADS valve is closed 
when the pressure is lower than 13 MPa avoiding losing too much coolant from RPV [43]. 
The water in RPV is assumed to be saturated during the actuation of ADS valves for 
simplification. Based on the valve size and pressure difference, ADS is designed for air 
leaking at a rate of 600-1200 SCF/hr (Standard Cubic Feet) [78]. Here the leaking rate is 
chosen to be 1000 SCF/hr for easy calculation, then the volume flow rate is calculated to 
be 7.866E-3 m3/s for steam flow. Due to mass conservation law, the mass of steam 
depressurized equals the water coolant loss in RPV. Since the density of saturated water 
and steam varies with temperature, the value of density at high temperature is obtained [79] 
via an empirical function of density changing with temperature for both water and steam 
(Figure 5.3a, 5.3b). 
 
Figure 5.3a: Water density vs temperature Figure 5.3b: Steam density vs temperature 
Figure 5.3: Fluid density change with temperature 
The relationship of density and temperature is calculated by the functions shown in the 
diagram which matches the experimental data. Then the functions are programmed into the 
model in LabVIEW, thus the loss of RPV inventory can be estimated and presented in 












































diagram. Also heat is removed by venting steam into containment vessel when ADS is 
actuated, thus the power removed by ADS is calculated to be 1.8 MWth using the enthalpy 
formula (equation 79) with the specific enthalpy of steam to be 2637.9 kJ/kg under 14 MPa 
saturated condition. 
?̇? = 𝜌?̇?ℎ𝑣     (79) 
This is similar to determine the boil-off rate in IC pool. As the water in RPV is assumed to 
be saturated when ADS valve opens, the relationship between temperature and pressure 
can be mapped out in Figure 5.4 based on the data from NIST Chemistry WebBook (as of 
Jan 2008).  
 
Figure 5.4: Pressure vs temperature 
Thus, how the pressure decreases by opening the ADS valve can be presented by the change 
in temperature. The temperature in IC pool changes from room temperature (32 ℃) to 
boiling (100 ℃) and the changes in the property of water are very small which can be 
neglected. Since we only focus on CDF, the first level of PRA, which corresponds to the 
purpose of PSS to reduce and mitigate the DBAs, the simulation is designed to stop when 
the reactor core is uncovered. All the essential parameters and formulas in the model of the 
primary loop with ICS are determined, then they are programmed within a while loop that 
can be executed repeatedly with each repeat in one second thus achieving time resolution 





















5.2.2 Failure events programming 
Failures of components are also programmed to represent the system performance under 
events ordering. All the hardware components can fail leading to failure of the system or 
degradation of natural circulation. As discussed by Burgazzi (2002) [26], the FT of ICS is 
generated with all the FTs of each subsystem/component constructed under the two 
intermediate events which are the natural circulation failure and the IC failure. The FTs of 
condensation valve and HX failure are under the IC failure event together with the pipe 
rupture under OR gate, meanwhile the FTs of vent valve and makeup valve are under the 
NC failure event together with the envelope failure under OR gate. The envelope failure 
mode is given as the failure rate relative to pipe rupture which can be taken as the minimum 
cut-set (MCS), thus the pipe rupture (event 04) is reconstructed under the top event (Figure 
2.2).  
We can see from the fault tree that the phenomenological factors are controlled by the 
hardware components. However, failures will not always result in the failure of system but 
degradation of system instead. Though the probability of more than one failure is small, it 
is still possible for more failures during the mission time. Thus failures of components and 
event ordering of different failures are required to be programmed into LabVIEW. 
Since the failure of condensation valve fails the system, the pipe rupture leads to loss of 
coolant and the influence of the non-condensable is marginally known (in this work, 
omitted), here two general failure events are selected in order to simplify the problem. The 
failure events are excessive pipe fouling and makeup valve failure chosen to degrade the 
system without failing it, and the failure of ICS is also chosen to compare the system 
performance with and without ICS. 
The failure of makeup valve is programmed with the makeup flow rate to be zero when it 
is demanded by the system, thus the water level in IC pool keeps decreasing when the HX 
tubes are uncovered which results in degrading the ICS cooling capacity. Also the pipe 
fouling is modeled as partial flow blockage and the overall heat transfer coefficient 
decreases leading to the degraded heat transfer rate. As discussed by E.E. Lewis (1977) 















 is fractional flow, 𝛾 is fraction of flow area blocked, 𝒦0 is hydraulic resistance. 
Here 𝒦0=15 for PWR [81]. While the coefficient (2.7) and 𝒦0 may change, the functional 
empirical form should be similar in trend. 
The degree of pipe fouling can be taken as the fraction of flow area blocked, thus the 
diagram of flow reduction versus the fractional area blocked is developed given in Figure 
5.5. The reference value is shown as red line, and some possible values are shown in other 
colors. 
 
Figure 5.5: Flow reduction vs fractional area blocked 
It indicates that there is slight influence on the flow rate when the degree of pipe fouling is 
small, however the flow rate decreases sharply after the flow area is more than 60% 







      (81) 
Where, 𝑅𝑑 is fouling factor, 𝑈 is overall heat transfer coefficient of clean HX and 𝑈𝑑 is 
overall heat transfer coefficient after fouling. 
The fouling factor for high temperature water is 0.0002 m2K/W [82]. As mentioned before, 
there is no available data for overall heat transfer coefficient of primary PRHRS (ICS), and 
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also how the degree of fouling increases with time. With larger degree of pipe fouling, the 
heat transfer rate of ICS decreases, thus the system is more likely to fail. The failure of 
real-time pipe fouling cannot be simulated here due to unavailable data, however we 
assume pipe fouling to an extent that results in the overall heat transfer coefficient to be 
70% without fouling. This is determined based on the calculation that the heat transfer rate 
is still larger than decay power even after pipe fouling, but as the system performance 
largely degrades, the performance of other components can be affected. The failure of ICS 
is programmed with the heat transfer rate to be zero leading to the loss of heat sink. If the 
ICS fails, the failure of makeup valve and pipe fouling will not be considered because they 
are part of the ICS. 
All the failures are programmed to be tripped on demand at any given time, thus event 
ordering can be achieved with both single and two failures. This simulated dynamic system 
performance can be produced in LabVIEW. In order to better compare the dynamic 
performance and check the influence of event ordering on system performance, seven (7) 
cases are proposed which are shown below (Table 5.1): 
Table 5.1: Case study of dynamic performance in LabVIEW 
Cases Failure 
Case 1 No ICS 
Case 2 ICS operate without failure 
Case 3 ICS operate with MUS failure 
Case 4 ICS operate with PF 
Case 5 PF first then MUS failure 
Case 6 MUS failure first then PF 
Case 7 PF mid-way then MUS failure 
Note: ICS: isolation condenser system, MUS: makeup system, PF: pipe fouling 
The simulation runs for each case and the event trees can also be established for risk 
analysis with failure probability and consequences in CAFTA. Here the detailed discussion 
of the system performance for the seven cases in Table 5.1 is discussed after the event trees 
and fault trees are developed in CAFTA. This is to show the comparative assessment 




The simulation is programmed step by step based on the mass and energy conservation 
laws of primary loop and ICS respectively. Then the component failures are included to 
fail/degrade the system on demand in order to check the system performance and the 
influence on other components. As the parameters vary during the simulation, the 
relationship of important parameters is determined and programmed in LabVIEW. The 
model using LabVIEW is able to run the simulation with different cases and the result is 
discussed and compared to contrast the classical and dynamic PRA after the coupling is set 
up. 
5.3 CAFTA (Educational version 5.3) 
Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System (CAFTA) is here taken as the driver code to 
determine the event sequences (branches) and calculate the system probability using fault 
tree and event tree methodology. Event tree analysis (ETA) is a top-down, inductive 
procedure to reach all the outcomes with both success and failure events and their 
probability. And fault tree analysis (FTA) is a top-down, deductive procedure to understand 
how systems can fail and determine event failure probability using Boolean logic. Both 
ETA and FTA are constructed in CAFTA with the failure rate of components available, 
thus contributing to the probability of top event and event sequences. The detailed 
information is discussed below. 
5.3.1 Event tree construction 
The event trees (ET) are developed to demonstrate the event sequences (branches) and their 
probabilities with the failure probability provided from FTA. Assumptions are made to 
simplify the analysis:  
1. Components are independent from each other. Thus the failure of the main valve 
does not affect the bypass valve for example.  
2. All the components are non-repairable. The components remain failed state after 
failure. 
The event tree of the ICS under initiating event SBO, is firstly generated taking the failure 
of ICS as one event and the failure of ADS is another event (Figure 5.6). The branch 
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probability is calculated from each event failure obtained from fault tree analysis and the 
consequence is obtained from the simulation. 
 
Figure 5.6: Classical event tree with ICS failure 
Then the event tree is also developed with failure of subsystems/components - makeup 
system and pipe fouling - thus degrading the ICS instead of failing it (Figure 5.7). The 
event ordering is not considered in classical even tree, hence the branch probability is the 
same for different event ordering and different failure time. 
 
Figure 5.7: Classical event tree with failure of subsystem/component 
Here the failure event of ADS is also included in the event trees because one of the function 
of ICS is to reduce the demands of ADS valves, thus the performance and failure 
probability of ADS are considered as important factors. The demand of ADS is influenced 
by the failure of ICS and both failure of makeup system (MUS) and pipe fouling (PF) 
subsequently presented in the simulation. Thus the success and failure branches of ADS 
are only considered for ICS failure and both failures of MUS and PF. 
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5.3.2 Fault tree construction 
As mentioned before, the fault tree of ICS failure is already constructed with both IC failure 
and natural circulation failure in CAFTA without the failure probability. Here the failure 
probability is generated in CAFTA based on the failure rate of each component within the 
mission time. The fault tree of ICS failure is composed of several fault trees of 
subsystems/components failure and the fault tree of condensation valve failure is taken as 
example to show how they are constructed. 
5.3.2.1 Fault tree of subsystems/components 
Condensation valves are used to drain the condensate from the isolation condenser to RPV 
establishing natural circulation to remove decay heat. There are two condensation valves 
with one bypass valve per redundancy (Figure 5.1), hence AND gate is used as it will fail 
when both the main valve and bypass valve fail. The four basic events are built with OR 
gate as they will fail if one of them fails. Here the condensation valve needs to open counter 
current flow (CCF) and remain open CCF that the water only drains from the ICS to the 
RPV irreversibly during the mission time. Most of the failure rate of each basic event is 
referenced from Burgazzi’s work [26] with respect to failure rate/demand and failure 
rate/hour as given in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: IC component reliability data [26] 
Component Failure mode Failure rate Reference 
Valve Fails to open 3.0E-3/d IREP 
Valve Fails to remain open 1.0E-7/h IREP 
Valve Fails to open countercurrent flow 3.0E-4/d Expert judgment 
Valve Fails to remain open CCF 1.0E-8/h Expert judgment 
HX Single pipe rupture 3.0E-10/h IREP 
HX Multiple pipe rupture 3.0E-11/h IREP 
HX Single pipe plugging 3.0E-10/h IREP 
HX Multiple pipe plugging 3.0E-11/h IREP 
HX Excessive pipe fouling 3.0E-11/h IREP 
Piping Rupture 
2.4E-8/h 




Rupture 1.2E-9/h·m x 20 m Expert judgment 
However, the demand of each component within mission time need to be determined for 
failure probability. The demand frequency of condensation valve and makeup valve are 
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estimated to be 1.4 demand/reactor year [83] which is 0.0115 demand/mission time (72 
hours). The demand per mission time is not so accurate by dividing the average value of 
demand per reactor year because here the study is under SBO accident. The demand of PSS 
components varies with system performance and failure of system/component due to the 
recognized dependencies. Here when the data turns out to be proprietary, then the demand 
per mission time is obtained from the average value. Conditional demand for PSS 
components are asked to improve the accuracy of classical PRA. The failure probability is 
calculated as below, 
𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑   (82) 
while the failure probability for failure rate/hour is calculated using equation (82) for non-
repairable components. As the same valve is used say as a bypass valve under redundancy, 
the same probabilities in the main valve are considered for the bypass valve. The data is 
obtained from the Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) and expert judgment [26] 
because of limited data record of PSS components. Then the fault tree of condensation 
valve failure is developed as below (Figure 5.8). 
 
Figure 5.8: Fault tree of condensation valve failure 
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Similar fault trees are constructed for other subsystems/components. Here we only mention 
how the probability is determined without their FTA. The basic failure events of the HX 
are taken as multiple pipe rupture and plugging. Here we take the multiple pipe failure 
since single pipe failure is highly unlikely to fail the system. The failure rate is thus smaller 
than single pipe failure due to thousands of pipes used in HXs evaluated by IREP [26]. The 
failure rate is 3E-11/hour for both failures, thus the probability of HX failure within 72 
hours’ mission time is 2.1E-9. 
The failure rate of vent valve is the same as condensation valve, however the demand 
varies. There is no direct information of how many demands are recorded for vent valve in 
ICS, and the demand is obtained for all the air-operated valves in ICS which is calculated 
to be 17 demand/ry due to the weighted demand for valves of both less than and more than 
20 demands per reactor year [84]. Hence the demand is calculated to be 0.14 
demand/mission time such that the probability of vent valve failure is 2.13E-7. 
The demand of makeup valve is very close to the demand of condensation valve [83] which 
is roughly 1.4 demand/ry. Thus the probability of makeup valve failure is 1.19E-9 within 
mission time. 
5.3.2.2 Fault tree of ICS 
As discussed above, the fault tree of ICS is now updated with the failure probability for 
each event (Figure 5.9 and Table 5.3) leading to the top probability of ICS failure to be 
1.95E-6. Here the probability of pipe rupture contributes 88.7% of the total probability. 
While the pipe rupture failure probability remains constant as the design is decided, but the 
demands of components vary with different initiating event and event ordering. Hence the 
probability of ICS failure depends on system performance of PSS. 
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Table 5.3: List of events with probability from the fault tree [26] 
Number Event Probability Number Event Probability 
01 PRHRS failure 1.95E-06 16 







2.17E-07 17 Makeup valve fails to operate 3.45E-05 
03 System failure 6.42E-9 18 
Bypass makeup valve fails to 
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5.3.2.3 Fault tree of ADS 
The ADS is deployed to rapidly reduce the pressure inside RPV within design limit. The 
fault tree of ADS is not a part of ICS while it is important to indicate how the probability 
of ADS failure varies with different events and event ordering in ICS. In general, there will 
be more demands if part of the subsystems/components fail. The detailed relationship is 
discussed in the coupling approach. The failure rate is 1E-5/demand [85] with 0.1 
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demands/72 hours which is calculated from total 7860 demands for 131 safety/relief valve 
in total service time of 5.74E+6 hours from reference[86]. Then the probability of ADS 
failure is 1E-12 within mission time (Figure 5.10). 
 
Figure 5.10: Fault tree of ADS failure 
The demand of ADS valve depends on the performance of ICS which can obviously be 
seen from the simulation with and without ICS operation discussed later. Also the 
performance of degraded ICS slightly affects the demands of ADS valve. Due to the fact 
that one system depends on another system and system performance on PSS, the classical 
risk analysis is not accurate for PSS without considering the dependence of PSS.  
5.4 Coupling of LabVIEW and CAFTA 
ETA and FTA can provide the failure probability for each branches with its consequence. 
However details of evolution of the transient or accident is beyond ETA/FTA. There are 
more than 800 events in permutation with failures of components ranging from 1 up to 6 
in combination. The analysis and coupling of so many event trees can be very sophisticated 
for analysts if they are doing this manually, thus the dynamic PRA approach is a way to 
save time, provide more details and insights to enhance risk analysis for PSS. The general 
idea of coupling is to provide real-time demands of components for each branch (sequence) 
based on system performance. Then the probability is updated after the simulation is done 
or for each time period as required. We note that the probability can be different for the 
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same component with different event ordering. At last the dynamic probability is compared 
to classical probability to evaluate its utility. The simple flowchart of the coupling approach 
is shown in Figure 5.11. 
 
Figure 5.11: Flowchart of coupling approach 
The simulation code (LabVIEW) and driver code (CAFTA) are coupled via Python with 
ICS failure and degradation caused by failure of subsystems/components. While the event 
tree analysis in CAFTA can be complicated from one failure to all failures (up to 6) with 
event ordering, here only the ETA of failure of makeup system and pipe fouling is 
considered because they are well suited to be simulated in LabVIEW as discussed.  
The simulation of ICS and failures of components together with their event tree analysis 
are developed separately, and here the coupling is made. As the two system codes are 
programmed using different computer languages and the application programming 
interface (API) is not available for them, Python is chosen here to connect the two system 
codes. Because there is an embedded function in LabVIEW which can input the data from 
Python via a string and then execute the strings in LabVIEW, the result can be returned 
back to Python with updated data. Hence, the coupling of LabVIEW and Python is 
satisfied. Since there is no existing API for Python and CAFTA (Educational version 5.3), 
we therefore tried to program the event tree analysis in Python with the existing probability 







the probabilities fore failure of makeup system and ADS are determined by both classical 
and dynamic approaches which are chosen under different conditions. The classical 
approach is chosen to provide a default value in effect to calculate the sequence (branch) 
probability, and the dynamic approach is chosen when there is a demand feedback from 
LabVIEW. Then the dynamic system failure probability is calculated based on the real-
time demands in LabVIEW and automatically transferred to Python. The dynamic 
sequence probability is then determined in Python and again returned to LabVIEW in order 
to demonstrate the difference in probability between classical and dynamic PRA. By 
comparing the difference between the two probabilities, further analysis can be established 
which provides guidance to improve system safety such as replacement of the high-risk 
systems/components. 
5.4.1 Case study in coupling approach 
As the seven cases are mentioned in Table 5.1 with different failures and event ordering, 
the detailed case study is discussed here in coupling approach with both the system 
performance and sequence probability for classical and dynamic PRA approaches. 
5.4.1.1 Case 1: No ICS 
The ICS fails when under demand at time, 0, under SBO. Thus only the ADS works to 
depressurize the RPV by opening the safety relief valves, when the pressure is above the 
set point (14 MPa). The safety relief valve remains open until the pressure is lower than 13 
MPa, and it automatically closes by pressure difference under 13 MPa. Decay heat is 
removed by losing water inventory in the RPV. The coupled simulation panel is shown in 
Figure 5.12. Here the failure of makeup system and pipe fouling is not considered as they 
are part of the ICS; thus no demand of MUS is recorded. The ADS real-time demands keep 
changing and the total demands are determined at the end of simulation. The classical 
sequence probability is shown before the simulation, while the dynamic value is 
automatically generated after the simulation is done. The information in Python is input 
and shown on the top-right of the panel. The sequence is shown with initiating event (SBO) 
as the first event and the other four in sequence are subsystem/component events shown in 




Figure 5.12: Coupled simulation without ICS (interface) 
Here ICS is shown together with MUS and pipe fouling even though their probabilities are 
not considered. Although the ADS is shown as failed, it is simulated in successful status to 
estimate the failure probability based on the demands which is also applied to the makeup 
system. The same IC water level diagram is deployed named “IC water level to determine 
MUS demands” which is programmed based on unfailed makeup system. The difference 
between the two IC water level diagrams can be seen in the simulation when makeup 
system fails. Finally, the classical and dynamic sequence probabilities are shown as output 
before (before the simulation ends) and output after (after the simulation ends) respectively. 
The main system performance is presented below (Figure 5.13). 
   
Figure 5.13a: Decay power vs time  Figure 5.13b: RPV pressure vs time 
Figure 5.13: Coupled simulation without ICS (diagram) 
98 
 
As the RPV is assumed to be saturated if there is no leakage, thus the RPV temperature and 
pressure change in the same manner. Therefore, the figure of RPV pressure vs time is 
presented here (Figure 5.13b). The simulation runs for 69,351 seconds (19.26 hours) and 
stops due to the uncover of reactor core leading to core damage with 35 demands of the 
ADS valve; therefore ADS failure probability increases to 3.50E-10, some 350 times larger 
than the classical probability. As a result, the sequence probability increases 
correspondingly in dynamic approach.  
5.4.1.2 Case 2: ICS operating with no failure 
The ICS is normally operating with no failure of systems or components (Figure 5.14). The 
decay power is shown in white and the removed power is shown in red in the diagram 
depicting decay power. As the ICS is designed to remove 2% of the total power [43], the 
decay power is larger than removed power at first and decreases faster due to the decrease 
of natural circulation flow rate caused by the declining decay power. Therefore, the RPV 
pressure increases at first and then decreases (Figure 5.14b). 
    
Figure 5.14a: Decay power vs time  Figure 5.14b: RPV pressure vs time 
      
Figure 5.14c: IC pool temperature vs time  Figure 5.14d: IC water level vs time 
Figure 5.14: Coupled simulation with ICS 
99 
 
The simulation runs for 259,200 seconds (72 hours) with safe end state (system 
parameters). The IC pool starts boiling at 8,300 seconds (2.31 hours) and keeps boiling 
during the mission time (Figure 5.14c). The makeup system is first demanded at 80,500 
seconds (22.36 hours). There are 4 demands of makeup valve (Figure 5.14d) leading to the 
increase of MUS failure probability to 4.14E-7, a value that is 348 times that of the classical 
probability. The ADS is not actuated because the ICS is capable of removing decay heat; 
thus no demand of the ADS is simulated here, leaving the ADS failure probability to be the 
classical value (default value). Here the demand of the ADS can be largely reduced with 
deployment of ICS comparing case 1 and 2. Since there is no failure in this sequence, the 
probability indicates the availability of the sequence. Although the difference (4.13E-7), is 
small for the sequence probability, the failure probability of makeup system in dynamic 
approach is much larger (348 times) than classical probability. 
5.4.1.3 Case 3: ICS operating with failure of makeup system 
The ICS is operating with the makeup system failed before it is demanded, that both of the 
makeup valves are failed on demand in LabVIEW (Figure 5.15). The makeup valve 
remains closed until it is demanded, but the influence of the failure comes into effect after 
it is demanded. As there is no makeup water for the IC pool, the heat removal capability 
degrades after HX tubes are not fully covered at 80,500 seconds (22.36 hours) when the 
MUS is demanded but failed. The cooling mechanism changes to both air cooling and water 
cooling. When the water level of ICS is too low at 110,000 seconds (30.55 hours), ICS can 
no longer remove sufficient heat (Figure 5.15a) and the RPV temperature and pressure 
starts increasing (Figure 5.15b). However, the ICS is designed with large enough water 
inventory to remove decay heat for at least 72 hours without makeup water (Figure 5.15d). 
Here the makeup system is failed on demand that no demand of MUS should be recorded. 
However, in industry we don’t know when MUS will fail. In order to determine the 
sequence probability, we take the failure probability of MUS if it is not failed into 




Figure 5.15a: Decay power vs time  Figure 5.15b: RPV pressure vs time 
     
Figure 5.15c: IC pool temperature vs time   Figure 5.15d: IC water level vs time 
 
Figure 5.15e: IC water level to determine MUS demands 
Figure 5.15: Coupled simulation with failure of MUS 
Finally, the simulation ends at 259,200 seconds (72 hours) with high RPV temperature and 
pressure (13.9 MPa). No actuation of ADS is recorded while it will be demanded soon 
beyond the mission time. The demand of MUS is simulated to be 4 times if it is not failed, 
thus the potential failure probability increases to 4.14E-7 a value that is 348 times that of 




5.4.1.4 Case 4: ICS operating with pipe fouling 
The ICS is operating with pipe fouling when ICS is actuated at time 0. The pipe fouling 
degrades the heat transfer coefficient of ICS into 70% of the one with clean pipes. The 
simulation of system performance is presented in Figure 5.16.  
  
Figure 5.16a: Decay power vs time  Figure 5.16b: RPV pressure vs time 
    
Figure 5.16c: IC pool temperature vs time   Figure 5.16d: IC water level vs time 
Figure 5.16: Coupled simulation with pipe fouling 
As the heat transfer rate decreases, it (shown in red) is slightly higher than the decay heat 
(shown in white) (Figure 5.16a). The simulation ends at 259,200 seconds (72 hours) with 
high temperature and pressure (9.9 MPa) in the RPV which is not safe end state (Figure 
5.16b). It takes both longer time to reach boiling in IC pool (13,000 seconds also as 3.61 
hours) (Figure 5.16c) and actuation of MUS (131,000 seconds also as 36.39 hours) (Figure 
5.16d). And 2 demands of makeup valve are recorded due to the degraded heat removal 
rate with the failure probability increased to 2.07E-7 a value that is 174 times that of the 
classical probability. Here the sequence probability is calculated with the successful 
probability of MUS as it doesn’t fail, thus the sequence probability slightly decreases due 
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to the increase of MUS failure probability. The total probability of all event trees is 1 by 
adding all the sequence probability together, thus the probability of one sequence decreases 
leading to the increase of other sequences. 
5.4.1.5 Case 5: Pipe fouling first then MUS failure 
The ICS is operating with failures of two subsystems/components. Here the pipe fouling 
occurs when ICS is actuated (at time 0), and the makeup system fails when it is demanded 
(at time 131,000 seconds) (Figure 5.17).  
   
Figure 5.17a: Decay power vs time  Figure 5.17b: RPV pressure vs time 
        
Figure 5.17c: IC pool temperature vs time   Figure 5.17d: IC water level vs time 
 
Figure 5.17e: IC water level to determine MUS demands 
Figure 5.17: Coupled simulation with PF first then MUS failure 
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Though the MUS failure time on the panel is set to be at time 1, the makeup valve remains 
closed until it is demanded. And the influence of the failure comes into effect after it is 
demanded. As the pipe fouling occurs from the beginning, the system performance is the 
same as in section 5.4.1.4 before MUS is first demanded (Figure 5.17c). The MUS fails 
when it is demanded leading to uncover of HX tubes and the RPV temperature increases 
after the water level is too low in IC pool. Because now the temperature is still high due to 
the degraded heat transfer rate caused by pipe fouling, the ADS is actuated in this 
simulation when the pressure is above the set point (14 MPa).  
The simulation ends at 259,200 seconds (72 hours) with high temperature and pressure in 
the RPV (Figure 5.17b) and 9 demands are recoded for the ADS with the failure probability 
increased to 9.00E-11 a value that is 90 times that of the classical probability. The real-
time system performance of IC water level is shown in Figure 5.17d. Also the demand of 
MUS is estimated to be 2 if it is not failed (Figure 5.17e). Thus the sequence probability 
increases to 4.02E-26 a value that is 15,652 times that of the classical probability (2.57E-
30) caused by the increased demands of both the ADS and the MUS in dynamic approach. 
5.4.1.6 Case 6: MUS failure first then pipe fouling 
The ICS is operating with failures of two subsystems/components. Here the makeup system 
fails first when ICS is actuated at time 0 and pipe fouling occurs when HX tubes start to 
uncover at time 80,500 seconds (Figure 5.18). Pipe fouling occurs indicating that the 
system performance is influenced after 80,500 seconds and the same system performance 
is simulated as in section 5.4.1.2 before 80,500 seconds (Figure 5.18c). ICS was able to 
remove excessive decay heat before the failure, however the removed power deceased 
faster than decay power with both pipe fouling and uncover of HX tubes after 80,500 
seconds (Figure 5.18a). This phenomenon can be clearly seen from the diagrams with the 
inflection point. 
The simulation ends at 259,200 seconds (72 hours) with high temperature and pressure 
(13.4 MPa), and 4 demands of ADS recorded (Figure 5.18b) with failure probability 
increased to 4.00E-11. The real-time system performance of IC water level is shown in 
Figure 5.18d. Also the demand of MUS is estimated to be 2 if it is not failed (Figure 5.18e). 
Thus the sequence probability increases to 1.79E-26 a value that is 6,958 times that of the 




Figure 5.18a: Decay power vs time  Figure 5.18b: RPV pressure vs time 
       
Figure 5.18c: IC pool temperature vs time   Figure 5.18d: IC water level vs time 
 
Figure 5.18e: IC water level to determine MUS demands 
Figure 5.18: Coupled simulation with MUS failure first then PF 
5.4.1.7 Case 7: Pipe fouling mid-way then MUS failure 
The ICS is operating with failures of two subsystems/components. Here the pipe fouling 
occurs mid-way before MUS is demanded which is between time 0 and 80,500 to 131,000 
seconds based on when pipe fouling occurs. And MUS fails when it is demanded. Here the 
example is given with pipe fouling occurs at 30,000 seconds (Figure 5.19).  
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Figure 5.19a: Decay power vs time  Figure 5.19b: RPV pressure vs time 
   
Figure 5.19c: IC pool temperature vs time   Figure 5.19d: IC water level vs time 
 
Figure 5.19e: IC water level to determine MUS demands 
Figure 5.19: Coupled simulation with PF mid-way then MUS failure 
Pipe fouling occurs with decrease in power removed, even while it is still capable of 
removing decay heat with degraded heat transfer rate (Figure 5.19a). After the cooling 
water in IC pool is boiled off to uncover HX tubes at 105,000 seconds (29.22 hours), the 
RPV pressure starts increasing at 111,000 seconds (30.83 hours) (Figure 5.19b). The 
simulation ends at 259,200 seconds with high temperature and pressure (13.5 MPa). The 
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real-time system performance of IC water level is shown in Figure 5.19d. And 6 demands 
of ADS recorded and 2 demands of MUS estimated if it is not failed (Figure 5.19e). This 
leads to an increased sequence probability as 2.68E-26, which is 10,437 times that 
attributed to classical probability (2.57E-30). 
5.4.2 Analysis of Dynamic PRA 
The coupled simulations of system performance for all the seven cases under SBO are 
studied above with real-time demands of subsystems/components. In order to better 
compare their difference, a table of key conditions is presented (Table 5.4).  
Table 5.4: Timing of system performance for 7 cases under SBO 
Event 
Time/h 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 
ICS on - 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Boiling in IC pool - 2.31 2.31 3.61 3.61 2.31 2.31 
Pipe fouling - - - 0 0 22.36 22.36 
HX tubes uncover - 22.36 22.36 36.39 36.39 22.36 29.17 
Makeup system on - 22.36 - 36.39 - - - 
ADS on 0.86 - - - 59.44 67.78 64.44 
Core uncover 19.24 - - - - - - 
Simulation End 19.24 72 72 72 72 72 72 
Pressure at the end 
(MPa) 
13.6 0.75 13.9 9.9 13.8 13.4 13.5 
ICS water level (m) 10.0 8.3 0.4 6.0 1.2 0.7 0.9 
RPV water level (m) 4.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.8 8.9 8.4 
One can conclude that the pipe fouling degrades the heat transfer rate such that this results 
in more system time for the events in ICS. And pipe fouling is a time-dependent factor that 
the earlier it fails, the lower RPV water level is when considering event ordering shown in 
case 5, 6 and 7. A given RPV water level is caused by the actuation of ADS, which is less 
reliable for the system if the water level is low due to more demands of ADS valves. Also 
the high RPV pressure at the end indicates the actuation of ADS beyond the mission time 
which leads to potential core damage if no human intervention is taken. 
The ICS fails in case 1, thus uncovering the core with relatively higher probability. The 
ICS is degraded to different degrees in case 2 to case 7 with single failure or failure events 
ordering. The sequence probabilities for each case are calculated and shown in LabVIEW, 
thus the difference of sequence probability between classical and dynamic approaches can 
be compared (Table 5.5). 
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1 0 1.19E-09 35 3.50E-10 1.95E-18 6.82E-16 
2 4 4.14E-07 0 1.00E-12 1-(1.95E-6) 1-(2.37E-6) 
3 4 4.14E-07 0 1.00E-12 1.19E-09 4.14E-07 
4 2 2.07E-07 0 1.00E-12 (2.16E-9)*[1-(1.19E-9)] (2.16E-9)*[1-(2.07E-7)] 
5 2 2.07E-07 9 9.00E-11 2.57E-30 4.02E-26 
6 2 2.07E-07 4 4.00E-11 2.57E-30 1.79E-26 
7 2 2.07E-07 6 6.00E-11 2.57E-30 2.68E-26 
Note: MUS: makeup system, ADS: automatic depressurized system 
The average (classical) failure probability for makeup system (MUS) and ADS is shown 
when the demand is zero. this probability is attributed to industry data per reactor year and 
changed to per mission time (72 hours). Then the classical sequence probability is 
determined for each sequence (case 1 to 7). In contrast, the component failure probability 
of PSS varies in real-time simulations based on system performance as described by 
dependency of PSS. Thus the dynamic probabilities are shown with the real-time demands 
in each case. In cases 2 and 4, the difference is small and thus require many significant 
figures to demonstrate the difference between. Therefore the sequence probabilities of case 
2 and 4 are not directly shown with the final probability. Here 1.95E-6 is the classical 
probability of ICS failure and 2.37E-6 is the dynamic probability in case 2. This is similar 
to case 4 with 2.16E-9 to be the failure probability of pipe fouling, 1.19E-9 to be the 
classical probability of MUS and 2.07E-7 to be the dynamic probability of MUS. When 
comparing the classical to the dynamic probability, higher sequence probabilities are 
obtained for the dynamic approach by 2 to 4 orders of magnitude indicating more accurate 
result due to consideration of PSS uncertainty and dependency. The same classical 
sequence probability is provided for case 5 to 7. The sequences with the very small 
probability are not likely to happen, however the difference in probability using dynamic 
versus classic PRA reveal that for one there are more component demands with different 
event ordering. As a result, it is important to consider system/component failure probability 
with consideration of events ordering in real-time condition for PSS due to its dependency. 
Also the dynamic PRA approach can be used to predict the high-risk component whose 
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real-time failure probability is higher than set-point, for different events to help improve 
overall passive safety system reliability. 
5.5 Conclusions  
The dynamic PRA approach is further demonstrated by coupling the simulation code 
(LabVIEW) and driver code (CAFTA) such that together they provide insight into failure 
probability. The two system codes separately simulate ICS failure and degradation cause 
by failure of subsystems/components and event ordering. Then, they are coupled together 
via Python.   
As discussed before, classical PRA is mainly designed for active systems/components and 
the phenomenological factors such as heat loss, flow friction, void fraction, fouling and 
presence of non-condensable gas are not forefront issues for active components, but they 
cannot be ignored in passive safety systems where the flow driving mechanism is smaller 
in comparison. Due to the uncertainty and dependency of PSS systems, real-time 
simulation and events ordering are considered in this dynamic approach the failure 
probability and sequence probability are found to be higher than in classical approach. Thus 
the dynamic PRA approach shows potential to provide more accurate probability especially 
for passive safety system. Overall consideration of an integrated method can improve 
system reliability by providing information for different phases of postulated accident 
evolution. To further enhance this coupling method and deal with data uncertainty, real-
time data reconciliation and prediction should also be considered. Here we propose the 
coupling method to contrast results, which is believed to be more accurate for passive 




Chapter 6: Conclusions 
6.1 Conclusions 
Various Passive Safety System designs and design methodologies are considered in the 
design of Small Modular Reactors. The purpose of PSS is to remove residual thermal 
energy (decay heat) in the reactor via passive components and systems for a defined length 
of time, at minimum, under design basis accidents. If intact, the PSS should also mitigate 
beyond design basis accidents in terms of decay heat removal. For existing PSS designs, 
there exist uncertainties in PSS performance attributed for example to phenomenological 
factors (such as heat loss, flow friction, void fraction and distribution, fouling and 
blockage, and presence of non-condensable gas).  
Here efforts are made to improve detailed knowledge of PSS design and performance, then 
focusing on one generic PSS type with different variations, and finally proposing a dynamic 
method via coupling to demonstrate evolution of PSS performance. Attention is paid to 
accident progression and mitigation details, notably the design basis accidents initiated by 
events such as SBO and LOCA. The research also mirrors NuScale Power’s design 
approach, suggests weighting factors – here for PRHRS and PSIS. Evaluating PSS 
performance is important because evidence of DBA analysis is expected by the regulator. 
Thus the evaluation metrics and ranking table are used to rate the identified iPWR-type 
SMR designs based on features of PSS designs. The evaluation metrics are constructed 
from two respects as follows: a) with respect to designs that perform the same PSS function, 
and b) among the PSS designs performing different functions. A comparative assessment 
is made by considering of different weighting combinations, based on different evaluation 
metrics.  
Ultimately, the iPWRs of a design with higher overall rating represent extended cooling 
time, cooling capacity and reliability (redundancy and diversity) such that there is minimal 
to no need for human intervention up to 72 hours after event initiation. While it is not 
definitive that the PSS design with higher rating is better than another PSS design, this 
work suggests minimal expectations of PSS performance, and possibility of detailed 
information accident evolution. As detailed information of iPWR designs is largely 
protected except a few metrics such as core damage frequency, our comparative assessment 
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provides important guidance. We thus propose a practical means to undertake comparative 
assessment of the design features of eleven iPWRs using a weighting method linked to 
likely initiating event response (and not on an expert panel). Further, the comparative 
assessment and ranking approach suggests the need for a reference SMR design so that a 
given vendor design can be openly or internally benchmarked against a reference. This is 
consistent with LWR practices. However, the LWR reference plant and benchmark 
exercises arrived after the plants were constructed and operated. With the SMR, we have 
the opportunity to change this.  
The PRHRS is taken as example to further compare the difference of various PRHRS 
designs – its heat removal capability is a key safety-in-design attribute. The comparison of 
single phase and two-phase PRHRS designs reveals differences in terms of cooling 
capacity and system failure probability. Since no existing PRHRS design is available, 
scaling analysis is taken to scaled down the system from a conventional LWR and preserve 
anticipated phenomena in SMR. The scaling analysis of PRHRS aims to preserve similarity 
in a heat exchanger of tube and shell type via conservation laws. Different correlations are 
considered to represent the different mechanisms of single phase and two-phase natural 
circulation. While the same similarity ratio of heat transfer coefficient for both single and 
two-phase is obtained, scaling of the cooling capacity for both single/two phase, when 
scaled down to the PRHRS can be compared via the energy conservation laws. Based on 
scaling analysis and relative to probabilistic risk assessment, the lower the overall heat 
transfer rate coefficient, an increase in heat transfer (more HX tubes) is required when one 
expects single phase rather than a two-phase PRHRS, for both air cooling and water cooling 
mechanisms, with the same cooling capacity along the shell side. Based on the number 
ratio of HX tubes, the cooling capacity ratio and maximum values of single phase PRHRS 
for both air cooling and water cooling mechanisms can be determined. For a given 
probability of top event failure, more HX tubes can be used in two-phase PRHRS, also 
more for redundancy of HX module than redundancy of PRHRS. Thus the optimization of 
PRHRS cooling capacity and system failure probability can be determined based on design 
requirement. Therefore, two-phase PRHRS provides larger cooling capacity with less 
components than single phase PRHRS due to the higher heat transfer rate coefficient and 
lower system failure probability. However, steam separator is required to separate vapor 
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from liquid; thus adding complexity (another component) and increasing system failure 
probability. Here we provide an approach to quantitatively compare single phase and two-
phase PRHRS, and demonstrate their relationship of important parameters such as scaling 
ratio with the prototype, ratio of HX tubes (in number), maximum heat transfer rate and 
full reactor power. This suggests to vendors, a way to evaluate the design of PRHRS.  
Passive safety system is affected by both hardware components and phenomenological 
factors such as heat loss, flow friction, fouling and flow blockage, void fraction and 
distribution, and presence of non-condensable gas in condensation. All hold uncertainty 
and some measure of significance to the PSS. Meanwhile, classical PRA is mainly designed 
for active components without explicit consideration of the evolution of system response. 
Thus dynamic PRA approach is established by coupling a simulation code (here LabVIEW) 
and driver code (CAFTA) to increase knowledge of functional evolution. It is believed that 
the dynamic PRA approach provides more accurate failure probability since it is based on 
real-time simulation and for example events ordering, so that uncertainties and subsystem 
dependencies are better understood. The dynamic output is generated after the real-time 
simulation, then classical and dynamic output of sequence probabilities are demonstrated 
together in LabVIEW for post simulation analysis after data communication among 
LabVIEW, Python and CAFTA. A higher sequence probability value is obtained in 
dynamic PRA for example, due to more component demands, influenced by failure of other 
systems/components. (Also failure event ordering matters such that different sequence 
probabilities are obtained. ) The system reliability can be improved by replacing the high-
risk systems/components. To further enhance this coupling method and deal with data 
uncertainty, real-time data reconciliation and prediction can also be included. Here we 
propose a coupling method to provide different result which we believe to be more accurate 
for passive safety systems. 
In summary, we provide an approach to better understand the similarities and differences 
of various PSS designs from different respects; then dynamic PRA provides the evolution 
of PSS performance details. With respect to INSAG-10 DiD levels 1, 2 and 3, guidance is 
provided for vendors to select proper designs for different purposes and to draw on insights 




The research resulted in major and minor contributions. A comparative assessment of 
passive safety system using evaluation metrics based on LENDIT heuristics and weighting 
method using risk-informed, performance-based method was developed in order to assess 
various iPWR-type SMR designs. This contribution was presented at the 27th International 
Conference on Nuclear Engineering (ICONE27) in Tsukuba, Tokyo, Japan, May 2019, and 
subsequently submitted to the Journal of Mechanical Engineering of Japan Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (JSME). It is now under review. Further, we have demonstrated the 
utility of scaling analysis as part of the PSS assessment connected to PRA. One of the major 
contributions is demonstration of dynamic PRA method including coupling between 
system analysis and PRA codes for a PSS. Beyond a classical PRA, knowledge of system 
phenomena is believed to be improved with real-time simulation coupled with PRA. 
Difference in failure probability relative to classical PRA revealed that there are more 
component demands with different event ordering. Event ordering is not easy to investigate 
using classical PRA. This research work provides initial evidence of the potential value of 
dynamic PRA for PSS in iPWR-type SMR designs.  
6.2 Future work 
There are many unsolved issues (due to the restriction of software license) in the dynamic 
PRA approach leading to result with uncertainties. The simulation code LabVIEW is not 
able to perfectly simulate every parameter due to the complex condition in reactor core, 
especially for the transient state after shutdown. However, the simulation code still needs 
to be improved with various correlations of different local phenomena for different research 
purposes. Besides, the coupling method is not systematically coupled between system 
codes that hundreds of sequences (event branches) need to be set up for analysis. Since the 
available API of CAFTA is obtained only for Visual Basic and C++ computer language 
with different computer versions (32-bit versus 64-bit), the dynamic PRA approach is not 
directly coupled between LabVIEW and CAFTA but via Python. Here the coupling method 
is demonstrated with only two failure events exchanged in order However there are more 
than 800 events ordering. This cannot be manually coupled. Thus the coupling method 
needs to be systematically approach between system codes.  
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Possible solutions are provided for future work that RELAP5 or RELAP7 can be used to 
take the place of LabVIEW with its SCDAP package to also simulate the performance in 
reactor core and primary loop. RELAP code has been updated via an user group and many 
papers have been published using RELAP code to simulate reactor system performance 
under various conditions. Also it is able to run batch file automatically which can be used 
to automatically generate the sequences in event trees and it is much faster than LabVIEW. 




1. World Nuclear Association (as of Sept 2019), “Nuclear Power in the World Today”, 
retrieved from https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-
generation/nuclear-power-in-the-world-today.aspx, (8 Oct, 2019). 
2. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Design Safety Considerations for Water Cooled 
Small Modular Reactors Incorporating Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Daiichi 
Accident”, TECDOC-1785, IAEA, Vienna (2016).  
3. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Advances in Small Modular Reactor 
Technology Developments”, A supplement to: IAEA Advanced Reactors Information 
System (ARIS), IAEA, Vienna (2016).  
4. A. D. Volpo, “Nuclear Reactor Safety: Lessons from Three Mile Island and 
Fukushima”, Federation of American Scientists Public Interest Report, 2012. 
5. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Defense in Depth in Nuclear Safety. A report 
by the International Nuclear Safety Group”, INSAG-10, IAEA, Vienna (1996).  
6. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Integral Pressurized Water Reactor Simulator 
Manual”, IAEA, Vienna, 2017. 
7. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Safety related terms for advanced nuclear 
plants”, TECDOC-626, IAEA, Vienna, Austria (1991).  
8. L. Burgazzi, “Addressing the challenges posed by advanced reactor passive safety 
system performance assessment”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, 241.5, 1834-1841 
(2011). 
9. Passive Nuclear Safety from Wikipedia (as of Sept 2019), retrieved from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passive_nuclear_safety, (8 Oct, 2019). 
10. Profile, “B. John Garrick: Nuclear Risk Assessment Pioneer”, Risk Analysis, Vol. 29, 
No. 7, 2009. 
11. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (as of Jan 2018), retrieved from 
https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/risk-informed/pra.html, (8 Oct, 2019). 
12. C. Zeliang, et al., “Design Philosophy and Application of Defense-in-Depth Strategy 
in Integral Pressurized Water Reactor type Small Modular Reactors”, Journal of 
Nuclear Science and Technology (under review), 2019. 
13. H. Kumamoto and E. J. Henley, “Probabilistic risk assessment and management for 
engineers and scientists”, second edition by IEEE Press, 1996 
14. L. Burgazzi, “Evaluation of the dependencies related to passive system failure”, 
Nuclear Engineering and Design, 239.12, 3048-3053 (2009). 
15. C. Picoco, et al., “Coupling of RAVEN and MAAP5 for the Dynamic Event Tree 
analysis of Nuclear Power Plants”, The 2nd international Conference on Engineering 
Sciences and Technologies, Slovak Republic (2016). 
16. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of 
Accident Risks”, WASH-1400, NRC, U.S. (1975). 
17. C. Zeliang, “Dynamic probabilistic safety assessment using dynamic flowgraph 
method and markov/cell-to-cell mapping technique”, MASc thesis in Ontario Tech 
University, 2018. 
18. J. Devooght, and C. Smidts. “Probabilistic reactor dynamics—I: the theory of 
continuous event trees”, Nuclear Science and Engineering 111.3 (1992a): 229-240. 
115 
 
19. M. Marseguerra, and E. Zio, “Monte Carlo approach to PSA for dynamic process 
systems”, Reliability Engineering & System Safety 52.3 (1996): 227-241. 
20. T. Aldemir, et al., “NUREG/CR 6901: Current state of reliability modeling 
methodologies for digital systems and their acceptance criteria for nuclear power plant 
assessments”, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington DC (2006). 
21. M. Belhadj and T. Aldemir, “The Cell to Cell Mapping technique and Chapman-
Kolmogorov representation of system dynamics”, Journal of Sound and Vibration 
181.4 (1995): 687-707. 
22. C. Acosta and N. Siu, “Dynamic event tree analysis method (DETAM) for accident 
sequence analysis”, Cambridge, MA: Dept. of Nuclear Engineering, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (1991). 
23. T. Aldemir, “Computer-Assisted Markov Failure Modeling of Process Control 
System”, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 36 (1987):1, 133-144. 
24. C. Acosta, and N. Siu, “Dynamic event trees in accident sequence analysis: application 
to steam generator tube rupture”, Reliability Engineering & System Safety 41.2 (1993): 
135-154. 
25. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Natural circulation in water cooled nuclear 
power plants”, IAEA, Austria, 2005. 
26. L. Burgazzi., “Passive system reliability analysis: a study on the isolation condenser”, 
Nuclear Technology, Vol. 139, July 2002. 
27. W. E. Vesely, et al., “Fault tree handbook”, NUREG/CR-0492, Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington DC (1981). 
28. M. Stamatelatos, et al., “Fault tree handbook with aerospace applications”, Office of 
Safety and Mission Assurance, NASA HQ, (2002). 
29. N. Siu, et al., “Physical dependencies in accident sequence analysis”, Cambridge, MA: 
Nuclear Engineering Dept., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1989). 
30. N. Siu, “Risk assessment for dynamic systems: an overview”, Reliability Engineering 
& System Safety 43.1 (1994): 43-73. 
31. V. Rychkov., et al, “ADAPT-MAAP4 coupling for a dynamic event tree study”, 
International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, PSA 
2015, 1, pp. 140-143. 
32. A. Alfonsi., et al, “Dynamic Event Tree Analysis through RAVEN”, ANS PSA 2013 
International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, 
Columbia (2013). 
33. A. Hakobyan., et al, “A methodology for generating dynamic accident progression 
event trees for level-2 PRA”, PHY-SOR-2006 - American Nuclear Society's Topical 
Meeting on Reactor Physics (2006), p9. 
34. E. Hofer., et al, “An approximate epistemic uncertainty analysis approach in the 
presence of epistemic and aleatory uncertainties”, Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety 77: 229-238 (2002). 
35. Y.H. Chang, et al, “Dynamic PRA using ADS with RELAP5 code as its thermal 
hydraulic module”, PSAM 4, Springer-Verlag, New York: 2468-2473 (1998). 
116 
 
36. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Passive Safety Systems in Advanced Water 
Cooled Reactors (AWCRs)”, TECDOC-1705, case studies-A report of the International 
Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, IAEA, Austria (2013). 
37. S. Thomas, et al., “Prospects for small modular reactors in the UK & worldwide”, 
Nuclear Free Local Authorities, Nuclear Consulting Group, 2019, p24. 
38. mPower Consortium Hals Project (as of March, 2017), retrieved from 
http://ansnuclearcafe.org/2017/03/16/mpower-consortium-halts-project/, Oct 17, 2019. 
39. Westinghouse backs off small nuclear plants (as of Feb, 2014), retrieved from 
https://www.post-gazette.com/business/2014/02/02/Westinghouse-backs-off-small-
nuclear-plants/stories/201402020074, Oct 17, 2019. 
40. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “ACRS Subcommittee Presentation: NuScale 
FSAR”, NuScale Power, LLC, 2019. 
41. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, “Guidance on the Use of Deterministic and 
Probabilistic Criteria in Decision-making for Class I Nuclear Facilities”, Archived Web 
Page - RD-152 (as of 2013), retrieved from https://www.cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca/eng/acts-and-
regulations/consultation/comment/rd-152-1.cfm, (29 Nov, 2019) 
42. G. Zhang., et al., “Comparison and analysis on transient characterisitics of integral 
pressurized water reactors”, Annals of Nuclear Energy, 104 (2017) 91-102. 
43. M. Giménez., et al., “CAREM-25 accident analysis”, IAEA-SR-218/5 (2001). 
44. H.S. Park., et al., “Experiments on the Heat Transfer and Natural Circulation 
Characteristics of the Passive Residual Heat Removal System for an Advanced Integral 
Type Reactor”, Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology, Vol 44, No. 5, p. 703-713 
(2007). 
45. J.N. Reyes Jr., “NuScale Plant Safety in Response to Extreme Events”, Nuclear 
Technology, 178:2, 153-163 (2012). 
46. R.P. Martin., et al., “Thermal-hydraulic design of the B&W mPower SMR”, 
Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, 109:2269-2272 (2013). 
47. M.E. Ricotti., et al., “Preliminary Safety Analysis of the IRIS Reactor”, ICONE10-
22398 (2002). 
48. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Status report 95 – Integrated Modular Water 
Reactor (IMR)”, IAEA ARIS (2011). 
49. J. Liao., et al., “Development of a LOCA safety analysis evaluation model for the 
Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor”, Annals of Nuclear Energy, 98 (2016) 61-73.  
50. M.C. Smith., et al., “Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor Passive Safety System 
Response to Postulated Events”, Proceedings of ICAPP 12, Paper 12157 (2012). 
51. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Status report 66 – VBER-300”, IAEA ARIS 
(2011). 
52. J. Nielsen et al., “Optimization method to branch-and-bound large SBO state spaces 
under dynamic probabilistic risk assessment via use of LENDIT scales and S2R2 sets”, 
Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology, 2014. 
53. C. Williams et al., “Integrating quantitative defense-in-depth metrics into new reactor 
designs”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, 2018. 
54. S. Yin, et al., “Simulation of the small modular reactor severe accident scenario 
response to SBO using MELCOR code”, Progress in Nuclear Energy 86 (2016)87-96. 
117 
 
55. Scale analysis (mathematics) from Wikipedia (as of July 2019), retrieved from: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scale_analysis_(mathematics), Oct 18, 2019. 
56. Nuclear Energy Agency, “A state-of-the-art report on scaling in system thermal-
hydraulics applications to nuclear reactor safety and design”, NEA/CSNI/R (2016)14. 
57. V.H. Ransom, et al., “Use of an ideal scaled model for scaling evaluation”, Nuclear 
Engineering and Design 186 (1998) 135-148. 
58. N. Zuber, et al., “An integrated structure and scaling methodology for severe accident 
technical issue resolution: Development of methodology”, Nuclear Engineering and 
Design, 186 (1998) 1-21. 
59. M. Ishii, et al., “Investigation of Natural Circulation Instability and Transients in 
Passively Safe Small Modular Reactors”, Nuclear Energy University Programs, 
PU/NE-16-24 (2016), p63. 
60. Y. Liu, et al., “Scaling analysis and design of passive heat exchanger in integral effect 
test facility”, Journal of Harbin Engineering University, Vol.40 No.3, 2019 (In 
Chinese). 
61. M. Ishii and I. Kataoka, “Scaling laws for thermal-hydraulic system under single phase 
and two-phase natural circulation”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, 81 (1984) 411-
425. 
62. J. Yu, “Principle and design of heat exchanger”, Beijing: Beihang University Press, 
2006 (In Chinese), p198. 
63. B. Qian, et al., “Simplified heat transfer handbook”, Higher education press, 1983 (In 
Chinese), p219. 
64. K. Way and E. P. Wigner, “The rate of decay of fission products”, Phys. Rev., 73, 1318 
(1948). 
65. K. Way and E. P. Wigner, “Radiation from fission products”, Phys. Rev., 70, 115 
(1946). 
66. Engineering ToolBox (as of 2003), “Overall Heat Transfer Coefficients for Fluids - 
Heat Exchanger Surface Combinations, retrieved from: 
https://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/overall-heat-transfer-coefficients-d_284.html, 
(8 Oct, 2019). 
67. M. Ishii, et al., “Scientific design of Purdue University Multi-Dimensional Integral Test 
Assembly (PUMA) for GE SBWR”, U.S. NRC, NUREG/CR-6309, PU-NE 94/1, 1996, 
p38. 
68. L.C. Cadwallader, “Selected component failure rate values from fusion safety 
assessment task”, U.S. Department of Energy, 1998, p44 (fission reactor such as PWR 
and BWR are covered). 
69. Special Metals Corporation, “INCONEL® alloy 690”, Publication number SMC-079, 
U.S. 2009. 
70. Engineering ToolBox (as of 2005) “Thermal Conductivity of Metals, Metallic 
Elements and Alloys”, retrieved from: https://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/thermal-
conductivity-metals-d_858.html, (8 Oct, 2019). 
71. J. Buongiorno (as of Fall 2010), “PWR Description”, MIT OpenCourseWare, retrieved 
from: https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/nuclear-engineering/22-06-engineering-of-nuclear-
systems-fall-2010/lectures-and-readings/MIT22_06F10_lec06a.pdf, (21 Oct, 2019) 
118 
 
72. X. Liu, “LMTD applications in two-phase heat transfer and two-phase heat 
exchangers”, International Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Conference, Carrier 
Corporation, United Technologies, 1996. 
73. M. Ishii and T. Hibiki, “Thermal-Fluid dynamics of two-phase flow”, Second Edition, 
Springer, LLC 2011. 
74. Electric Power Research Institute, “Education of risk professionals: PRA 102-102A 
system analysis / using PRA software”, EPRI, Charlotte, North Carolina, October 19-
23, 2015. 
75. Nuclear Energy Agency, “Technical and economic aspects of load following with 
nuclear power plants”, NEA, 2011, p12. 
76. J. Ge, et al., “CFD investigation on thermal hydraulics of the passive resudual heat 
removal heat exchanger (PRHR HX)”, Nuclear Engineering and Design 327 (2018) 
139-149. 
77. H. W. Stanford, “HVAC Water Chillers and Cooling Towers: Fundamentals, 
Application, and Operation”, Basel, New York, Marcel Dekker, Inc., 2003, p183. 
78. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (as of May 2015), “Information notice No. 86-
51: Excessive pneumatic leakage in the automatic depressurization system”, NRC 
(1986), retrieved from: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-
comm/info-notices/1986/in86051.html, (8 Oct, 2019). 
79. D. R. Lide, “CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics (85 ed.)”. CRC Press. pp. 6–
15. ISBN 0-8493-0485-7, 2004. 
80. E.E. Lewis, “Nuclear Power Reactor Safety”, first edition handbook, 1977, p327-329. 
81. L.S. Tong and J. Weisman, “Thermal analysis of pressurized water reactor”, first 
edition, 1970. 
82. Engineering ToolBox (as of 2010), “Fouling and Reduced Heat Transfer in Heat 
Exchangers”, Available at: https://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/fouling-heat-
transfer-d_1661.html, (8 Oct, 2019). 
83. G. M. Grant, et al., “Isolation condenser system reliability, 1987-1993”, Idaho National 
Engineering Laboratory, INEL-95/0478, 1996, p52, p81. 
84. J.A. Schroeder, “Enhanced component performance study: Air-operated valves 1998-
2013”, Idaho National Laboratory, INL/EXT-15-34433, 2015, p17, p45-46. 
85. U.S. NRC, “Reactor safety study: Failure data. Appendices Ⅲ and Ⅳ”, NRC, WASH-
1400 (NUREG-75/014), 1975, p55. 
86. R. J. Borkowski, et al., “The in-plant reliability data base for nuclear plant components: 
Interim Report – The valve component”, U. S. NRC, NUREG/CR-3154, 1984, p46. 
119 
 
Appendix A. Event tree and fault tree model from CAFTA 
 
A1. Event tree from CAFTA 
 
Figure A1.1: Classical event tree with MUS failure first then PF 
 
Figure A1.2: Classical event tree with PF first then MUS failure 
 
A2. Fault tree from CAFTA 
 




Figure A2.2: Fault tree of makeup valve failure 
 





Appendix B. Block diagram from LabVIEW 
 
 





Appendix C. Python code of coupling 
 
C1. Coupling codes from Python 
import math 
import sys 
from ICS_MUS_to_PF import MUSPF 
from ICS_PF_to_MUS import PFMUS 
 





value1=1.19E-09 #average failure probability for MUS (classical) 
value2=1E-12 #average failure probability for ADS (classical) 
#initial failure probability of MUS and ADS respectively (value1 and value2) 
if(len(sys.argv)>1): 
    for i in range(1,5): 
        if (sys.argv[i].upper()=='S'): 
            seq.append(True) 
        elif (sys.argv[i].upper()=='F'): 
            seq.append(False) 
        elif (sys.argv[i].upper()=='N'): 
            seq.append(None) 
 
    ft["MUS"] = int(sys.argv[5]) 
    ft["PF"] = int(sys.argv[6]) 
    if (len(sys.argv)>7): 
        value1 = float(sys.argv[7]) 
        value2 = float(sys.argv[8]) 
 
else: 
    for i in range(depth-1): 
        d=input(str(i+1)+"th event: ") 
        if (d.upper()=='S'): 
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            seq.append(True) 
        elif (d.upper()=='F'): 
            seq.append(False) 
        elif (d.upper()=='N'): 
            seq.append(None) 
        else: 
            exit() 
 
MP = MUSPF(value1,value2) 




    cur=MP.root 
else: 




for i in range(1,depth): 
    if (cur.left==None or cur.right==None or cur.child==None): 
        if (seq[i-1]==True): 
            cur=cur.right 
        elif (seq[i-1]==False): 
            cur=cur.left 
        else: 
            cur=cur.child 
        mul*=cur.data 





C2. MUS failure first then PF codes from Python 
class MUSPF: 
#v1 MUS failure probability, v2 ADS failure probability 
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    def __init__(self,v1,v2): 
 
        self.root = node(1,"SBO", True) 
        self.root.left = node(1.95E-6,"ICS F",False) 
        self.root.left.child = node(1,"MUS", None) 
        self.root.left.child.child = node(1,"Pipe Fouling", None) 
        self.root.left.child.child.left = node(v2,"ADS F", False) 
        self.root.left.child.child.right = node(1-v2,"ADS S", True) 
        self.root.right = node(1-(1.95E-6),"ICS S",True) 
        self.root.right.left = node(v1,"MUS F", False) #1.19E-09 if MUS fail when demanded 
        self.root.right.left.left = node(2.16E-09,"Pipe Fouling F", False) 
        self.root.right.left.left.left = node(v2,"ADS F", False) 
        self.root.right.left.left.right = node(1-v2,"ADS S", True) 
        self.root.right.left.right = node(1-(2.16E-09),"Pipe Fouling S", True) 
        self.root.right.left.right.child = node(1,"ADS", None) 
        self.root.right.right = node(1-v1,"MUS S", True) 
        self.root.right.right.left = node(2.16E-09,"Pipe Fouling F", False) 
        self.root.right.right.left.child = node(1,"ADS",None) 
        self.root.right.right.right = node(1-(2.16E-09),"Pipe Fouling S", True) 
        self.root.right.right.right.child = node(1,"ADS",None) 
 
class node: 
    def __init__(self,data,name,decision): 
        self.left = None 
        self.right = None 
        self.child = None 
        self.data = data 
        self.name = name 
        self.decision = decision 
 
    def __str__(self): 
        decision="" 
        if self.decision==True: 
            decision="Success" 
        elif self.decision==False: 
            decision="Failure" 
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        else: 
            decision="None" 
 
        return "[ " + self.name + " \t| " + str(self.data) + " \t| " + decision + " \t]" 
 
C3. PF first then MUS failure codes from Python 
class PFMUS: 
 
    def __init__(self,v1,v2): 
 
        self.root = node(1,"SBO", True) 
        self.root.left = node(1.95E-6,"ICS F",False) 
        self.root.left.child = node(1,"Pipe Fouling", None) 
        self.root.left.child.child = node(1,"MUS", None) 
        self.root.left.child.child.left = node(v2,"ADS F", False) 
        self.root.left.child.child.right = node(1-v2,"ADS S", True) 
        self.root.right = node(1-(1.95E-6),"ICS S",True) 
        self.root.right.left = node(2.16E-09,"Pipe Fouling F", False) 
        self.root.right.left.left = node(v1,"MUS F", False) 
        self.root.right.left.left.left = node(v2,"ADS F", False) 
        self.root.right.left.left.right = node(1-v2,"ADS S", True) 
        self.root.right.left.right = node(1-v1,"MUS S", True) 
        self.root.right.left.right.child = node(1,"ADS", None) 
        self.root.right.right = node(1-(2.16E-09),"Pipe Fouling S", True) 
        self.root.right.right.left = node(v1,"MUS F", False) 
        self.root.right.right.left.child = node(1,"ADS",None) 
        self.root.right.right.right = node(1-v1,"MUS S", True) 
        self.root.right.right.right.child = node(1,"ADS",None) 
 
class node: 
    def __init__(self,data,name,decision): 
        self.left = None 
        self.right = None 
        self.child = None 
        self.data = data 
        self.name = name 
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        self.decision = decision 
    def __str__(self): 
        decision="" 
        if self.decision==True: 
            decision="Success" 
        elif self.decision==False: 
            decision="Failure" 
        else: 
            decision="None" 
 




Appendix D. Response to questions from the examination committee members 
Committee member A: Prof. Glenn Harvel. 
Committee member B: Dr. Muhammad Aamir.  
 
Reply to general questions/comments: 
1. Issues about the evaluation metrics 
 
Use of the integer values for evaluation metrics can be seen as a weak point of the 
thesis. This was anticipated. We thus tried several evaluation strategies (for example, 
evaluation metrics with and without consideration of system performance, and ranking 
tables with varying percentage weightings in order to produce an average value) to 
evaluate the 11 iPWRs. Due to proprietary or vendor-declared (but not substantiated in 
detail) information, the evaluation metrics were primarily developed based on decay 
heat removal characterization - on cooling time, cooling capacity, and 
redundancy/diversity. The work provides a method, and thus guidance, in order to 
evaluate different PSS designs in SMR. We realized that PSS designs have different 
functions during decay heat removal and thus, various features/functions need to be 
compared. However, we mainly focused PSS function that maintains the safety of RPV 
under key DBAs (SBO and SBLOCA). We assert that these will be considered, 
regardless of the SMR design for designs with thermal output large enough so that 
either water-cooling is needed or there is a coolant and/or structure (ultimate heat sink) 
with sufficient thermal capacities. 
 
2. Edits and corrections from Prof. Lixuan Lu were made as part of the edits/correction 
effort and replies below. 
 
3. Edits and corrections from Prof. Akira Tokuhiro were made as part of the 
edits/correction effort and replies below. 
 
 
To committee member A: 
1. Explain how the evaluation metric is decided, i.e. why pool is better than tank which is 
better than RPV side. 
 
Because we realize the limits on availability of proprietary information, the evaluation 
metrics are proposed based on accessible information as follows: a) type of PSS design 
(discussed in section 3.5), b) cooling time (detailed information on water inventory is 
not available), c) redundancy and diversity. Thus comparing the pool type and tank 
type PRHRS for example, the type of PSS design and cooling time are considered 
advantageous when compared to tank type, due to larger safety margin, water inventory 
and longer cooling time. For example, if a large pool is used as the ultimate heat sink 
and boil-off of this pool inventory takes 2 weeks or more, it is considered advantageous 
when compared to a tank type design. Further, SMR of small enough thermal power 
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that uses air as the ultimate heat sink would be advantageous as well.  Our approach is 
consistent with the C. Williams’ paper that describes an integrated design philosophy. 
 
2. How many modules are necessary for it to be an SMR? 
 
Typically, more than one reactor module (at least two) may be necessary to take into 
account system reliability, failure and planned outage for the module. This provides 
one operating module while the other is out of service. A module is here defined as one 
operating/operable reactor unit. 
 
3. Is a steam generator a component or module? 
 
It can be both. Usually SG is taken as a module because as a system, it is composed 
one or more HXs, valves and piping. However, its function may be modeled or thought 
of, as a component – that removes decay heat in SMR. 
 
4. You claim that a pool type is better than air cooled. I challenge that on the basis that if 
air cooling is good enough, then the reactor can go anywhere on the planet, even the 
desert. If you lose the pool water, you fall back to air cooled. Please justify why pool 
type is better than air cooled. 
 
Our results are based on our evaluation metrics and approach mentioned above. And 
the conclusion is mainly based on the heat capacity, heat removal rate, heat transfer 
efficiency and length of availability. This is to remove the decay heat. The pool type 
has advantages relative to tank type as noted. If the SMR decay heat is small enough, 
it can be air cooled –or the air serving at the ultimate heat sink.  
 
For example, the maximum decay heat removed for air cooled model is smaller relative 
to a water cooled SMR concept (also discussed in Chapter 4). Thus air cooled type can 
only be used for micro modular reactors (e.g. U-battery with 4 MWe and 10 MWth 
each unit) and a water-cooled SMR with small thermal power rating. Therefore, a water 
cooled type SMR assuming the water cooled system is available has the advantage of 
higher power output, relative to air cooled system for most current iPWR designs. Here, 
the suitability of the SMR depends on the application; that is, for a remote site versus 
a city. For a SMR of small thermal output, it can certainly be located anywhere with 
air as the ultimate heat sink.   
 
For the NuScale SMR design, once the pool type ultimate heat sink is depleted (on the 
order of weeks), the decay heat is estimated to be small enough so that then, air can 
serve as the ultimate heat sink. 
5. In table 3.1, you state predicted CDF values without giving reference to the source. 
Considering that only one or two of the concepts you reviewed are under construction, 
then how can there be any assurance to these values? How can you assign a valve failure 




The noted CDF values are provided by vendors to IAEA (cited from “Advances in small 
modular reactor technology developments”, IAEA, 2016). One can say that only the 
NuScale value has been (technically) substantiated. All the others CDF values are self-
declared. The CDF value for NuScale was updated from 1.0E-08 to 1.0E-10 (cited from 
“ACRS Subcommittee Presentation: NuScale FSAR”, U.S. NRC (2019), during the 
design certification and review process. The original CDF value was submitted as part 
of the application in December 2016.  As detailed information for the CDF in iPWR-
type SMRs are self-declared values, we can only say that there is full expectation of 
these values. 
 
In order to keep manufacturing costs low, the valves used for PSS (SMR) are expected 
to be convential valves already used in the industry. This means that they may be of 
same type and function – such as an air-operated-valve (AOV) that has a record of 
failures/malfunctions from use. While other type valve can be used, it is to the SMR 
vendor’s advantage to use values with the most reliable history in existing plants. 
 
6. The dynamic PRA results are interesting. The labview is impossible to see in the thesis 
and needs to be improved. Please draw on the white board a simple graph that shows 
how the dynamic PRA is affecting the result. 
 
The thesis only shows static results of the simulations in snapshots. The actual labview 
simulation and graphic display changes quickly in time. Generally speaking, different 
components/systems failures (event ordering) influence linked components/systems 
within the modeled system. I have added additional figure and explanation of the PSS 
model by circling each of the components and systems.  
 
The dynamic PRA simulation shows how system performance is impacted by event 
ordering.  That is, one has to consider failure/malfunction of the ADS valve or Isolation 
Condenser System to be possible one or the other in two ways and in sequence in 
different order as well.  These are examples of event order accommodated by dynamic 
PRA. The thesis has been edited to explain the LabVIEW graphic user interface (GUI) 




Here we look at how the failures of ICS components (with event ordering) influence 
the demands of ADS valve (SRV). Different ADS demands are recorded in different 
cases (Case 1 – 7); thereby showing possible system states. 
 
7. Referring ageing phenomena. 
 
There are a many factors that may impact the driving force (natural circulation) of PSS 
such as heat loss, flow friction, oxidation, fouling over time and of course ageing of 
surfaces and components. Here we did not focus on the details that affect the driving 
force, but we provide a dynamic PRA to address most of the possible factors in real-
time simulation. Abnormal operation and system performance will be shown in the 
real-time simulation, and it takes time to develop into increasingly severe accident 
conditions. That is, an accident has an evolution. Evidence can be revealed and (within 
limit of the model) predicted using dynamic PRA; thus human intervention (manual 
input) can be taken as warranted when and if needed under DBA or BDBA conditions. 
 
8. Why are DiD levels and PSS relevant (table 1.1)? 
 
In brief the PSS system as designed to funciont is considered to correspond to DiD 
levels 1, 2 and 3 when they are called activated to serve its purpose - to enhance safety-
in-design. The safety-in-design philosophy for SMRs is to prevent escalation in DiD 
level. For example, the SMR design has to accommodate DiD Level 1 but also be 
designed to prevent or mitigate escalation to Level 2. This is the approach described by 
the publication by C. Williams et al. and that proposed by Prof. Tokuhiro. 
 
9. Are these honest targets? What is reasonable to achieve? (table 1.2) 
 
As the attribute in DiD Level 3 corresponds to core damage frequency. A value, 1.0E-
08 has been technically substantiated for the NuScale SMR design. This sets an 
expectation for many, if not all SMR vendors.  At the same time, the SMR design is 
expected to prevent progression to the next DiD level. For DiD Levels 4 and 5, we 
correspondingly propose 1.0E-10 and 1.0E-12 as opposed to the engineering practice 
of 1000 times smaller for Levels 1, 2 and 3. We do this because at E-11 and E-14, the 
uncertainties may cast doubt (lack of confidence) on this result and further, the 
regulator may also express doubt in such small numbers. It remains to be seen if the 
target in practice for Levels 4 and 5 may ultimately be simply E-09 and E-10 
respectively. We have taken what we call conservative values.   
 
10. Why only 11 iPWRs are studied? There are more than 11 designs. (section 1.3) 
 
According to “Advances in Small Modular Reactor Technology Developments”, 
IAEA, 2018 (as of September 2018), there are 11 SMRs classified as integral 
pressurized water reactors (iPWR) in designs. There are of course non-water cooled 
designs. Since the NuScale SMR is the only completed design submitted for regulatory 
reviews (start of 2017), there was a preference for iPWR-type SMR. The non-water 
cooled design has been less developed technically and have less technical precedence 
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in many respects. Thus in regulatory terms, it will raise more questions than a variant 
of existing reactor designs – the water-cooled type. 
 
11. Maybe explain classical PRA first then its limitation? Some of these references are very 
old so where is the proof they are still valid? Why does the set clearly indicate a need 
by dynamic PRA? (section 2.1) 
 
As recently as 2018 (Zeliang) and 2014 (Nielson), the inadequacy of classical PRA was 
shown in detail. The older works cited provided the fundamental theory (Smidts and 
deVooght) and early evidence of the potential need for dynamic PRA. The explanation 
of PRA is generally presented in the first paragraph, and there are many papers focusing 
on this, foremost WASH-1400 (1975) by NRC. Some aspects of the limitation of 
classical PRA is evident from the description of classic PRA itself.  The theory of 
probability of changing states as propose by Smidts and deVooght is an variant of the 
Chapman-Kolmogorov method (according to Prof. Tokuhiro). Here we only focus on 
its limitations. Since regulatory usage is not required, it remains an additional tool for 
licensing expectations and requirement. 
 
As there are not many newly published paper focusing on this topic, it remains a nuclear 
energy R&D topic. We believe that the references are still valid. We will definitely 
refer to new papers as they are published. 
 
These references reveal that the main limitations in classical PRA is the time element, 
dynamic interactions, system modelling with multiple-states, event ordering and human 
error. These are not easily handled for active systems, and should not be ignored in 
passive systems, because expectations in safety are even higher for SMRs. Thus, 
dynamic PRA is needed for PSS. 
 
12. Wrong order for the comparative assessment. 
 
The methodology for comparative assessment partially originates from unstated 
expectations of safety-in-design of Generation IV designs (including SMRs), the 
NuScale approach (various papers and publications) and Prof. Tokuhiro’s experience. 
The contribution of this thesis is to use this to compare iPWR type SMRs. The approach 
or methodology is an integrated approach because it links PRA, system code analysis, 
scaling and coupling in order to propose figures of merit (target probabilities) that bring 
together DiD, regulatory expectations and PRA Levels 1 to 3 inclusive.   
 
Actually, we first sought to quantitatively compare PSS designs with the hope of 
comparing system analyses –RELAP results for standard SBO and SBLOCA initiating 
events. However, not enough published or accessible results are available. Thus, the 
comparison of PSS designs based on their function and features, using a combination 
of accessible results and engineering judgement is the best we could do here.   
 




Uncertainty is considered by considering variations of several weighting percentages 
and engineering judgement such as higher/lower ranking of one time systems versus 
continuously available systems in design. This is why, for each SMR, there is a range 
(vertical line) shown in Figure 3.5.  The vertical extent corresponds to a range of values 
that partially account for the uncertainly. 
 
14. CAREM is built we though it does not meet the “minimum” expectation. 
 
We only focus on the passive safety system here, not the overall reactor design. The 
CAREM SMR is under construction at this time. The design is not final but near final. 
The overall ranking and expectation is provided based on our evaluation metrics and 
weighting, and it is incomplete due to lack of detailed information. Even for the 
CAREM, which is relatively advanced in design because it is under construction, 
vendor specific information is not publically accessible. We only provide an approach 
to evaluate different PSS designs. Prof. Tokuhiro has contacted CNEA in Argentina to 
propose a collaboration so that some additional generic design details can be made 
public. 
 
15. Why does this matter to your thesis? (section 3.7 conclusions) 
 
The effort of the comparative assessment (Chapter 3) is to provide guidance to contrast 
the PSS design for various known initiating events. This is the first step to advance 
SMR safety-in-design, because other than the NuScale SMR design, the decay heat 
removal system design has not been finalized for many designs. This is based partially 
on Dr. Tokuhiro’s experience at NuScale. Also this is a very general comparison due 
to uncertainties associated with ‘targeted’ information. Thus more detailed comparison 
is made for the decay heat removal system (the most important PSS) using scaling and 
PRA to quantitatively (relative number) figure out the relationship between different 
designs (single phase and two phase). I think it is the basis to improve SMR design. 
Dynamic PRA later provides an example PSS design selected to show the potential 
details of functional evolution related to PSS designs. The relationship is shown in 
graphical form below. Since NuScale used an integrated approach linking design, 
classical PRA, system analysis, (integral thermal-hydraulic test facility) experiments, 
accident analysis and dispersion modeling (not covered here), our approach is to 
convey this integrated approach. The existing LWR practice including CANDU type 
reactors is to separate – for example, design, PRA analysis, safety/accident analysis 
and licensing. According to Prof. Tokuhiro, the NuScale approach was to integrate all 




16. Are you taking the SMR from a scaled LWR or changing the design? For your purpose, 
what did you matter? Who says LWR in the proper reference? 
 
As there is very limited information for heat removal system in SMR (most for latest 
generation LWRs), we have taken the PSS design from a scaled SMR design, relative 
to conventional scale LWR.  
 
For example, the BWRX-300 SMR one can clearly see scaling from the SBWR, 
ESBWR type larger scale designs. Vendor design costs are saved by scaling from LWR 
designs. Scaling from LWRs have been reported by researchers propose a SMR 
conceptual design. The NuScale SMR originated from lessons learned from 
Westinghouse AP600, AP1000 designs and R&D work done by J. Reyes – the founder 
of NuScale. Another example is by M. Ishii, et al (2016), titled “Investigation of natural 
circulation instability and transients in passively safe small modular reactors”. 
 
17. Well the more tubes, higher chance of leakage so less reliable. No? (section 4.5.2) 
 
This is true. We compare the number ratio of HX tubes in single and two-phase PRHRS 
under two conditions/assumptions: a) with the same cooling capacity (section 4.5.2), 
and b) with the same failure probability of PRHRS (section 4.6, assumed to be 1.0E-
04). It is found that more HX tubes are needed in single phase PRHRS, thus two-phase 
PRHRS design is relative more reliable than single phase design. However, we realize 
that there is a compromise. 




18. Maintenance issue for PRHRS and the number of HX tubes. 
 
There are a number of issues associated with HX tubes in industry. However, here we 
mainly focus on the approach for comparison of different designs for PRHRS system. 
And we only consider part of the important factors (cooling capacity and number of 
HX tubes). We think that the PRHRS design can be improved with this comparative 
approach; also the number of HX tubes can be reduced by choosing the proper design 
and redundancy. Ultimately cost and time can be saved for maintenance. 
 
19. A lot of your numbers come from single reference. Any confirmation? (Table 4.5) 
 
Most of the probability numbers come from Luciano Burgazzi’s work (2002). Here the 
number is changed to 72 hours mission time, based on the failure rate data. Since all 
desired information is not available for failure probability, some data is provided by 
expert judgement (most are from IREP) provided by Burgazzi. I realize that this is a 
limitation of the research. I learned from Prof. Tokuhiro that the values for example are 
conventional values (at least for NuScale) from manufacturers for the LWR industry. 
Data for component reliability/failure has been studied and published by various 
organizations in the US – EPRI, ASME, DOE, INL, INPO and related. So, the 
assumption of failure rates from LWR plant experience is reasonable. L. Burgazzi is 
part of the IAEA CRP on passive safety system design for SMRs and communicated 
with Prof. Tokuhiro at a CRP meeting. 
 
20. Labview is not a suitable code, RELAP5 and CATHENA is. 
 
We first tried to use RELAP5. However, our use and collaboration (with Innovative 
Software Systems in Idaho Falls, Idaho, US) was terminated due to the “controlled 
good” issue; the licensed use is not available for us. And CATHENA is a one-
dimensional thermal hydraulics computer code developed, primarily to analyze 
postulated accident scenarios for CANDU nuclear reactors. We chose not to use 
CATHENA because of the time required to learn use of the code with no precedent on 




To committee member B: 
1. Many simplified assumptions have been used in this thesis, such that the results of this 
thesis cannot be directly employed by the industry. 
 
Yes, this is partially true. In this sense, as you noted, the thesis research is exploratory. 
As much of the information is proprietary or vendor declared (without public technical 
substantiation), the ‘value’ of the study is limited. Thus assumptions are made to help 
us make a reasonable effort to compare designs. We realize that there are many 
proposed SMR design in North America and globally. Further, we mainly tried to 
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provide an approach to compare and evaluate PSS in iPWR type SMR designs. We 
only focused on decay heat removal factors, such as cooling capacity, cooling time and 
system reliability. While other factors and details, as proposed by different SMR 
vendors may be revealed, we have no guarantee of their accessibility. We assume that 
decay heat removal must be addressed unless the thermal power is so small that air 
cooling can be the ultimate heat sink. 
 
2. Two different pieces of work have been employed. I don’t understand the relation of 
these two aspects and flow of this thesis. 
 
The comparative assessment (Chapter 3) is to provide guidance to contrast the PSS 
design for various technical objectives. I think this is needed to advance SMR safety-
in-design. Also this is a general comparison due to uncertainties associated with 
information, either not available or vendor declared (thus aspirational). Thus a detailed 
comparison is made for the decay heat removal system (the most important PSS) using 
scaling and PRA to quantitatively (relative number) figure out the relationship between 
different designs (single phase and two phase). They are the basis to improve SMR 
design advancement. Dynamic PRA is later provided a basis (on PSS design) to show 
the potential details of functional evolution related to PSS designs. The relationships 
of these aspects is shown in the graphical ‘flowchart’ below. The research is meant to 
show an integrated approach, starting with dynamic PRA, system analysis, scaling and 
ranking of PSS or decay heat removal system design. The original integrated design 
approach, here developed and applied (as I learned from Prof. Tokuhiro), is one that is 
used by NuScale Power. Although hidden from the general public, the SMR vendors, 
for unfinished designs, are asking these questions as they refine their design. 
 
= this work 
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3. How can the frequency for PRA level 2 is much higher than level1? 
 
The frequency for PRA level 2 is for conditional containment failure probability, while 
level 1 is for core damage frequency.  Level 1 is about the design safety systems. Level 
2 addresses the probability of engineered safety system failure in the primary cooling 
system and damage of the core wherein a transport of radionuclides, out to the primary 
system is possible. Containments can fail under postulated conditions –overpressure 
and leakage mechanisms For the SMR the safety in design is likely or claimed to be so 
well developed that escalation of an accident from Level 1 to Level 2 is thought to be 
unlikely. The containment failure probability is thus conventional and conservative. 
This needs future investigation. 
 
4. Explain the relationship of void fraction to driving force of PSS. 
 
The relationship is based on an existing single phase natural circulation. Under high 
heat flux and surface to bulk temperature difference, there could be nucleate boiling or 
film boiling. If confined in volume (say inside a pipe), a corresponding flow two-phase 
regimes will exist. If there are discrete vapor bubbles within a continuous liquid phase, 
the driving force can increase locally. This may also be true under film boiling but then 
the surface to bulk temperature may be large enough to avail a surface dry out a 
concern. One has to consider the local to overall circulation for natural or buoyancy 
driven operations and system designs. When the continuous liquid phase fraction 
decreases to say less than 80-90% within a defined volume, then the single-phase 
driving force can be reduced because the cross sectional liquid area/volume needed to 
sustain natural circulation is decrease. A natural circulation ‘margin’ must therefore be 
considered. 
 
5. What is the contribution of the research to the public? What value is this research 
providing? (section 3.6.2) 
 
The research provides a reference that utilities, licensees and public, a means of 
evaluating various SMR designs (assuming a technical background), and information 
on PSS performance. It provides guidance that contrast PSS designs for those with 
detailed technical interests. Within context of the Canadian interest in SMRs, this 
research may represent a reference document. 
 
6. How does the NC based PSIS work? What is vent valve for? 
 
The NC based PSIS is connected to the upper dome of the RPV with steam going into 
the injection tank, and also connected to the downcomer of RPV with condensate 
coolant water flowing to RPV. The upper valve is normally open and the lower valve 
is normally closed. The water tank is elevated above the core. And the lower valve 
opens to drain water into RPV by gravity and steam keeps going into the tank via the 
upper pipeline forming natural circulation. If condensate (liquid) blocks the pipe, the 
RPV pressure increases to be larger than the pressure inside the injection tank such that 
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the condensate eventually flows into the tank.  Then the blocked condensate is pushed 
into the tank, and again forming the natural circulation. 
 
The vent valve is used to discharge accumulated non-condensable gases in order to 
prevent degradation of condensation. 
 
7. How do we evaluate and assign scores? How is “both” better than NC based? Why is 
pool better than air-cooled? What is the difference for suppression pool and pool? (table 
3.3) 
 
The evaluation and scores are assigned with additional considerations relative to the 
method proposed by C. Williams et al. We take a baseline approach with all “1,2,3,4” 
giving equal consideration as a starting point. In C. Williams’ case, only “1,3,4” was 
used since only one case of “1” was permitted to skew weighting to (conservative) 
designs with the best features. We note that this weighting should be skewed with 
technical arguments. 
 
Here “both” means both NC based and other type are deployed. NC based design can 
provide extended cooling capacity, while other type (one-time injection or ADS) 
provides immediate response. Thus “both” provides means to address shorter and 
longer term decay heat removal response. Having both can be advantageous. 
 
This was addressed in a previous response. Because the result is based on our 
evaluation metrics mentioned above. And the conclusion is mainly based on the heat 
capacity, heat removal rate, heat transfer efficiency and length of availability. For pool 
type has advantages relative to air cooled type design. For example, the maximum 
removed decay heat for air cooled model is smaller relative to a water cooled SMR 
concept (also discussed in Chapter 4). Thus air cooled type can only be used for micro 
modular reactors (e.g. U-battery with 4 MWe and 10 MWth each unit) and SMR with 
small power rate. Therefore, a water cooled type SMR assuming the water cooled 
system is available has advantages relative to air cooled system for most of the iPWR 
designs. For an air cooled SMR of small thermal output, it can be deployed in many 
locations because air is the ultimate heat sink.  
 
The function of the suppression pool is to condense steam injected into this defined 
volume. The pool on the other hand serves as an ultimate heat sink as the last means to 
remove decay heat and other DBA/BDBA such as removal of release of fission gases 
in case of fuel and cladding breach. 
 
8. Why does the fast response matter? (section 3.6.1) 
 
In simple terms, a fast response in time may impact the end state condition. First, it is 
based on the assumption that the system is above the pressurized thermal shock (PTS) 
criteria. At the very beginning phase of DBAs, decay heat can accumulate in time. Also 
one can conservatively expect time lag for PSSs to assume full function. Thus there are 
chances some systems are called upon more than without a system or systems 
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responding relatively quickly in time. For example, the SRV in ADS may be in demand 
when decay heat removal system is already running. The response depends on the 
initiating event (SBO vs SBLOCA). Although decay heat decreases quickly upon 
shutdown, there is accumulated thermal energy in the reactor that takes time to remove. 
This can often be conduction limited when there is a fractional mass of material (metal) 
with thermal storage capability. 
 
9. Question with more demands, more likely the component/system fails. (3.5.2) 
 
It is true that the unavailability for SRV is low considering redundancy. However, the 
unavailability is definitely distinct for different demands during the same period of 
time. For example, the unavailability is of course higher with 10,000 demands than 100 
demands in one reactor year.  
 
I think what is important here in SMR design is for a given set of valves, to ask what is 
likely the number of demands expected in order to optimize this aspect as part of the 
design. This is ‘new’ thinking relative to conventional reactor designs. 
 
10. What conclusion can be drawn from these two groups of designs? (figure 3.5) 
 
The 9 (nine) iPWR designs are classified into 3 (three) classes with different evaluation: 
a) Group ① is for the first class design with better PSS evaluation providing extended 
cooling time, cooling capacity and reliability; b) Group ② is for the second class with 
relatively marginal but acceptable evaluation; c) Group ③ is the third group with 
minimum expectations relative to other SMR design and marginal improvement 
relative to conventional LWR designs. 
 
11. Explain equation (61) and (64). 
 
The equation has been corrected shown below. 




𝑞𝑃𝑅𝐻𝑅,𝑆𝑃 = 𝑞𝑃𝑅𝐻𝑅,𝑇𝑃   (64) 
Where, 𝑞𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑦(𝑡0) is the decay power at time 𝑡0, 𝑞𝑃𝑅𝐻𝑅(𝑡 − 𝑡0) is the removed power 
at time t, 
𝑑𝑇
𝑑𝑡
 is the change rate of RPV outlet temperature difference which is a function 
of time. 
 
Taking the primary loop for energy conservation, heat is provided by decay heat and 
then removed by PRHRS. Here the PRHRS is deployed to removed more heat than 
decay heat, that the RPV outlet temperature decreases. 
 
As the same RPV design and thermal state (geometric and dynamic similarities) is 
maintained in the prototype and model (single phase and two phase), and the energy 
conservation is studied for primary loop. We thus conservatively assumed that the same 




Here the sign of 
𝑑𝑇
𝑑𝑡
 can be both positive and negative. If the sign is positive, removed 
power is larger than decay power which happens for most of the function time of 
PRHRS. If the sign is negative, decay power is larger than removed power which 
usually happens at the initial time of the PRHRS when natural circulation is not well-
established. 
 
12. What are the limitations of Wigner-Way formula? 
 
The Wigner-Way formula is used to approximate in time the decay heat. It is based on 
a composite single half-life that represents the overall decay of the core over a certain 
period of time. Actually there are hundreds of different radionuclides present in the 
core, each with its own concentration and decay half-life. These are lumped into a 
practical decay heat empirical expression. 
 












    (76) 
 
 
They are based on the ratio of failure probability of HX single tube between single and 
two-phase, and the number ratio of HX tubes with the same cooling capacity (equation 
72 and 73). That the total HX failure probability ratio equal the result from multiplying 












    (73) 
I admit this may be in error and needs to be considered in terms of the effective heat 
transfer area, not the number of HX tubes. In the case of the LWR steam generator, 
tubes are plugged if they fail and the SG still operated with a margin of the number of 
plugged tubes. In effect the effective heat transfer area with margin is maintained. 
 
14. Explanation for figure 4.5: relationship between heat transfer area and number of HX 
tubes 
 
Here the fault tree is generated to determine the maximum number of HX tubes. Of 
course the more HX tubes used, more heat can be removed, also more likely 
components fail. Based on a given failure probability, the number of HX tubes can be 
determined as one guiding reference. As noted, consideration of the effective heat 
transfer area with safety margin needs to be considered. Thus although we can 
determine the maximum cooling capacity of a PRHRS design for any reactor type with 




I realize that simplistic approach and result may be in error. It remains as a 
demonstration of the detail that can be considered. 
 
15. How do you calculate the LMTD for two-phase flow? (section 4.5.1) 
 
The equation of LMTD is used for single phase flow, while LMTD cannot be used for 
two-phase flow, because the outlet temperature does not increase when there is phase 
change. While, correlations of LMTD for two-phase heat exchanger was discussed by 
X. Lin (1996) for various situations. In his paper, assumptions are made as a single 
phase flow on cold side and a two-phase flow on hot side, thus the LMTD (Δ𝑇) for 











































The sign is defined by both the fluid condition (hot or cold) and the flow arrangement 
(parallel or counter-current). Here a and e may or may not be different with the sign 
determined by the conditions. The explicit expression for ∆T is not available, and 
numerical procedure is needed to calculate the relationship between the heat transfer 
rate and the LMTD. However, the LMTD can be taken as a function of vapor quality 
assuming the variable heat transfer coefficient is a function of vapor quality only. The 
equation needs to be modified if the heat transfer coefficient depends on other variables. 
Thus, the heat transfer rate equation for two-phase flow can be presented as below: 
 
𝑞𝑃𝑅𝐻𝑅,𝑇𝑃 = 𝑈𝑛𝜋𝑑𝑙Δ𝑇𝐿𝑀(𝑥) 
 
The LMTD for two-phase flow also depends on the flow type in two-phase flow, such 
as bubbly, slug, churn annular and disperse flow. The two-phase flow regime map has 
been provided to study the boundary conditions of different thermal-hydraulic flows by 
M. Ishii and T. Hibiki (2011). Different void fraction and other parameters were 
discussed for various flows. Thus, empirical correlations for two-phase flow can be 
determined with different variables. One can consider this in detail. This was beyond 
our research scope. 
 
16. Show the calculations of equation 75 and 76. 
Q = ρVCp∆T + ρV ·  ∆𝐻𝑣𝑎𝑝    (75) 
Q = ∑ 𝑃(𝑖) × ∆𝑡259200𝑖=1      (76) 
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ICS is used to remove decay heat to the IC pool open to atmosphere. The coolant water 
in the IC pool is heated from room temperature (32 degree) to boiling (100 degree). 
The RPV volume is around 80 m3 (3.2 m in diameter and 11m for overall length) from 
CAREM design. Equation 75 and 76 are used to determine the dimension of IC pool. 
Also Wigner-way formula is used to determine the decay heat. The calculation is 
programmed in labview using energy conservation law shown below. 
 
17. Where did we get the individual probability numbers? What’s n? why are we adding 
probabilities instead of multiplying? (table 4.5) 
 
Most of the probability numbers come from Luciano Burgazzi’s work (2002). Here the 
time of performance is changed to 72 hours mission time, based on the failure rate. 
Since information is not available for part of the failure probability, some data is 
provided by expert judgement (most are from IREP) provided by Burgazzi. I realize 
that this is a limitation of the research. I learned from Prof. Tokuhiro that the values for 
example are conventional values (at least for NuScale) manufactured for the LWR 
industry. So, the assumption of failure rates from LWR plant experience is reasonable. 
 
“n” is the number of HX tubes which is used to calculate single pipe failure (rupture 
and plugging) with the number of HX tubes to be “n”. Here we mainly focus on the 
number ratio of HX tubes between single phase and two-phase PRHRS with the same 
cooling capacity. Thus some assumptions are proposed, that every HX tube is 
independent from the others and one HX tube failure results in the failure of PRHRS. 
We understand (and admit) that this is an extreme assumption. For the probability of 
system failure (event 03), it is the parent event with OR gate. Thus we add the 
probability of the events under this parent event instead of multiplying. 
 
18. Replacement at certain frequencies is part of maintenance strategy. Why do you believe 
that (more accurate for PRA), given the assumptions and inaccuracy of the data 
simulated? 
 
Our dynamic PRA method is believed to provide more information on the postulated 
accident evolution, thus providing safety engineers additional insights into design basis 
and related type of accidents for the plant as designed and operated. According to Prof. 
Tokuhiro’s understanding, OPG uses classical PRA/PSA and holds corresponding 
knowledge based on this institutional use. Consideration of dynamic PRA may avail 
new results and additional consideration. According to Prof. Tokuhiro, in Japan classic 
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PRA/PSA is not required by the regulator for plant safety analysis. Cliassic PRA/PSA 
is used as optional technical information. Such is the difference in regulatory 
requirements.  
 
Although assumptions are proposed and relative numbers are provided, we here 
provide the dynamic PRA approach to possibly conduct (or suggest) advancements in 
risk assessment. The imitations will be addressed by use of best estimate system codes 
and industry data to test and correct the method. Thus future work is proposed to modify 
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Abstract 
Small Modular Reactor (SMR) concepts are seen as attractive in terms of its unique features, simplified design, 
and flexible power generation and applications. Here we focus on integral pressurized water reactor (iPWR) type 
SMRs. We identified and reviewed eleven iPWR designs in various developmental phases. This design integrates 
the major primary reactor coolant system components within a single pressure vessel; the purpose of which is to 
minimize the design basis accidents. Additionally, SMRs are expected to feature renewed Defence-in-Depth and 
to systematically mitigate elevation. With these considerations, iPWRs designs employ passive safety systems 
(PSSs) to enhance the safety margin, and reduce the predicted core damage frequency. PSSs take advantage of 
natural physical laws, thus negating reliance on external power nor human intervention to assure safe end state. 
A comparative assessment of PSSs in iPWR-type SMRs is presented featuring surveyed safety features. A generic 
categorization of PSSs based on the class, operating mechanism and functions is presented. We limit our 
discussion to four key functional PSSs namely: the decay heat removal system, safety injection system, reactor 
depressurization system and containment cooling system. These functional systems largely determine the path to 
safe shutdown given a spectrum of initiating events. This study contributes to a better understanding of the 
differences in PSS designs which helps to improve the safety and reliability of new generation reactors.  
Keywords : Small modular reactor(SMR), Integral pressurized water reactor(IPWR), Passive safety system(PSS), 




Nuclear energy currently provides about 11% of the world’s electricity and is the second largest source 
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of low-carbon energy worldwide, besides providing a safe, reliable and sustainable energy future. Meanwhile, 
there is a strong interest in small and simpler nuclear power plants (NPP) units, including small modular 
reactors (SMRs). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines SMRs as “advanced nuclear 
reactors with electric power of up to 300 MW(e), built as modules in a factory setting then shipped to sites 
as demand arises, aiming for the economy of multiple by shortening construction schedule” (IAEA, 2016b). 
Innovative SMR concepts are in particular seen as attractive in terms of its unique features, simplified design, 
and flexible power generation and applications (IAEA, 2016a). Here, we focus our attention on integral 
pressurized water reactor (iPWR) type SMRs because of its difference in design from other types of SMRs. 
The major uniqueness is that iPWR integrates the major primary reactor coolant system components within 
a single pressure vessel. This approach minimizes the design basis accidents (DBAs) to the extent possible. 
In this paper, eleven (11) iPWR-type SMR designs in various developmental phases are reviewed with 
primary focus on the safety features.  
With the awareness of reactor safety and reliability issues after some severe accidents, iPWR designs 
employ passive safety systems (PSSs) to enhance the safety margin, and subsequently reduce the predicted 
core damage frequency (CDF). The IAEA defines PSSs as “a system that is composed entirely of passive 
components and structures or a system, which used active components in a very limited way to initiate 
subsequent passive operation (IAEA, 1991)”. PSSs take advantage of natural physical laws like gravity and 
buoyancy driven, thus negating reliance on external power nor human intervention to assure a safe end state. 
This reduces and mitigates the likelihood of postulated severe accidents such as station-black-out (SBO). 
PSSs are claimed to be more reliable than active systems for a defined safety function. This is achieved 
through the requirement of fewer active components and reduced human error as no human intervention is 
needed. Thus resulting in a simplified design and significantly economic relative to active systems. 
 
2. Classification of PSS 
 
Passive safety systems (PSSs) in SMRs as well as conventional reactors can be broadly characterized 
into three (3) major types based on: (1) Class (IAEA, 1991); (2) Operating principle, and; (3) Safety functions. 
Note that, classification of PSSs in nuclear industry is mainly based on the system’s objective and functional 
requirements. In this paper, PSS classification is performed based on functional requirements. PSSs in iPWR-
type SMRs can broadly be classified into four (4) key functions namely: passive residual heat removal system 
(PRHRS), passive safety injection system (PSIS), passive reactor depressurization system (PRDS) and 
passive containment cooling system (PCCS).   
2.1 Passive residual heat removal system 
Passive residual heat removal system (PRHRS) removes the continuous core decay and sensible heat by 
natural circulation (NC). Typically, PRHRS consist of two (2) or more redundant trains which is sufficient to 
remove the decay heat (IAEA, 2013). Each train is generally composed of heat exchangers (HXs) immersed 
in cooling water, associated piping and valves. PRHRS is actuated by opening of dedicated valves which 
typically fails open under loss of power or signal condition. This enables steam to enter tube side of the 
immersed HXs which are then condensed by transferring heat to the water in the pool. The condensate returns 
to the vessel or steam generator (SG) by gravity, thus establishing a natural circulation loop. PRHRS can be 
categorized into three types with distinct system configuration: (a) reactor pressure vessel (RPV) side NC with 
HXs immersed in a coolant tank (e.g., CAREM25); (b) SG side NC with HXs immersed in a coolant tank (e.g., 
SMART), and; (c) SG side NC with HXs immersed in reactor pool (e.g., NuScale). Fig. 1 depicts the 




    
Fig. 1a RPV side in cooling tank Fig. 1b SG side in cooling tank Fig. 1c SG side in reactor pool 
 
2.2 Passive safety injection system 
The function of passive safety injection systems (PSIS) includes the control of reactor coolant inventory 
and removal of reactor decay heat. PSIS is provided to accommodate loss of coolant due to leaks or LOCA, 
when the normal makeup system is unavailable. In many iPWRs, the main purpose of PSIS is to prevent core 
damage during SB-LOCA. PSIS can be categorized into two types: (a) NC based injection (e.g. core makeup 
tank) and; (b) One-time injection (e.g. accumulator). The key difference between the two approaches is 
depicted in Fig. 2a and 2b. Typically one-time injection PSIS consist of a tank with borated water pressurized 
with nitrogen or other inert cover gas, whereas the borated tank in NC based PSIS is under system pressure 
through a pressure balance line and a normally open valve. An outlet valve connects bottom of the tank to 
the direct vessel injection line which is connected to the reactor vessel downcomer, thus enabling direct vessel 
injection. 
 
2.3 Passive reactor depressurization system 
The function of passive reactor depressurization system (PRDS) is to rapidly reduce the reactor coolant 
system pressure to enable safety injection systems operation so that the reactor water level is maintained 
above the top of active fuel. PRDS can be categorized into two types: (a) Automatic depressurization system 
(ADS) (e.g. ACP100); and (b) NC based depressurization system (e.g. isolation condenser system in 
CAREM25). The later has the advantage of depressurizing the reactor vessel without loss of coolant 
inventory. ADS consist of several safety relief valves (SRVs) mounted on the main steam lines that are 
automatically operated in stages based on the reactor water level. The reactor pressure is reduced by releasing 
steam directly into the containment, water storage tank inside the containment or suppression pool, where 
steam is condensed. The NC based depressurization system is similar to the PRHRS where the RPV is 
coupled with immersed HXs, establishing a circulation loop. However, it must be underlined that the primary 
function of this system as credited in the design is to depressurize the reactor vessel, in contrast to the PRHRS 
whose objective is to remove decay heat. Thus, NC based depressurization system is a pressure regulating 
system that is initiated by signals including RPV pressure, main steam line isolation valve (MSIV) closure 




    
Fig. 2a NC based PSIS Fig. 2b One-time injection PSIS  Fig. 3 Reactor Depressurization System 
 
2.4 Passive containment cooling system 
Passive containment cooling system (PCCS) is designed to maintain the integrity, pressure and 
temperature inside the containment within the design limit. PCCS can be broadly classified into: (a) air cooled 
(e.g. ACP100); (b) suppression type (e.g. CAREM25); (c) pool type (e.g. NuScale). Air cooled containment 
(Fig. 4a) consists of a large volume of metal containment surrounded by reinforced concrete that allows for 
air circulation, thus condensing steam at the inner surface of the containment. In the suppression type 
containment (Fig. 4b), high temperature steam released from the pressure vessel is directed to a suppression 
pool, which is condensed thus mitigating pressure increase in the containment. Submerged containment (Fig. 
4c) is unique to iPWRs, where a metal containment is submerged in a water pool allowing a continuous 
passive cooling of containment. The steam released inside the containment is condensed as well as heat is 
removed through the containment wall to the external water pool. 
 
        
  Fig. 4a Air cooled      Fig. 4b Suppression type     Fig. 4c Pool type 
 
3. Design characteristics and technology 
3.1 Design characteristics of iPWRs 
To better understand the design philosophy of the eleven (11) iPWR-type SMR designs, a comparative 
assessment is made to distinguish their differences and similarities. The design characteristics of iPWR-type 
SMRs are presented in Table 1 (IAEA, 2016a). Conclusions can be made from the table demonstrating the 
inherent safety features that all of the iPWRs integrate SGs in RPV, while most of the designs integrate RCS 
components such as pressurizer and CRDMs resulting in a compact design and smaller footprint in structure. 
This approach also eliminates/reduces the large bore piping and small to large penetrations which leads to 
the elimination of LB-LOCA, rod ejection accident and minimizes SB-LOCAs. PSSs are deployed as passive 
approach for engineered safety features (ESFs) for most designs. This passive approach enhances the safety 
margin and reduces the CDF to at least 10E-6 which is 100 times lower than the standard CDF goal (10E-4) 
(NRC, 2000). Some designs take the hybrid approach i.e., employing both active and passive systems. The 
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hybrid approach provides an addition protection layer as well as diversity to prevent postulated accidents, 
thus increasing the reliability. However, reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) are needed for forced circulation, 
there is a chance for the RCPs to fail thus indicating that FC is relatively less reliable when compared to NC. 
In principle, NC is likely not fail as long as there is a heat source, sink and inventory of coolant is maintained. 
Also as a benefit of their modular design feature, in terms of deployment applications, all the iPWRs can be 
used for other purposes such as seawater desalination, heating and steam production for remote region and 
even some designs can be used for power icebreaking vessels. 
 
Table 1: Design characteristics of iPWR-type SMRs 
iPWR 
designs 
Primary compoent integration Approach 
to ESFs  
MW(th) MW(e) 
Predicted 
CDF (/ry) SGs  Pressurizer  CRDMs 
CAREM Yes Yes Yes Passive 100 31 1.0E-07 
SMART Yes Yes No Passive  365 100 2.0E-07 
NuScale Yes Yes No Passive  160 50 1.0E-08 
ACP100 Yes No  No Passive 385 125 1.0E-06 
mPower Yes Yes Yes Passive  575 195 1.0E-08 
CAP150 Yes Yes Yes Passive  450 150 1.0E-07 
IRIS Yes Yes Yes Passive  1000 335 1.0E-08 
IMR Yes Yes  Yes Hybrid  1000 350 3.0E-07 
W-SMR Yes Yes Yes Passive  800 225 1.0E-08 
VBER-300 Yes  No  Yes  Hybrid 917 325 1.0E-06 
RITM-200 Yes  No  No  Hybrid 175 50 1.0E-06 
Note: Hybrid: (active + passive); SGs: steam generators; CRDMs: control rod drive mechanisms; 
ESFs: engineered safety features; CDF: core damage frequency  
 
3.2 Comparative assessment of PSSs in iPWRs 
Besides the unique design characteristics, another important design feature is the implementation of 
passive features. Simplified PSSs are implemented in iPWR designs to counter and mitigate accident 
initiators and its consequences not covered by the inherent features. A review of PSSs deployed in iPWR-
type SMR designs is presented based on its function (Table 2). 
 
3.2.1 Comparative assessment of PRHRS 
All iPWR designs implement PRHRS in NC mechanism to remove the decay heat which is about 8% of 
the rated power. Though most iPWR designs employ FC as the primary coolant circulation mechanism, 
nevertheless all designs adopt NC mode for emergency cooling when power is unavailable (e.g. SBO). There 
are at least two safety trains of PRHRS in all designs, with each of them having 100% capability, or four 
trains with 33.3% capability each with one train in redundancy. The PRHRS consists of HXs, cooling water 
tanks, piping and valves. While some of the iPWR designs also implement air-cooled HXs for long-term 
cooling, which can be extremely effective for iPWR with small power rating. As mentioned before, PRHRS 
are coupled with RPV or SG. Varying features are adopted in different designs that due to the direct decay 
heat removal process under SBO the SG side PRHRS has better performance to remove the decay heat than 
RPV side PRHRS (Guoxu et al, 2017). While under SB-LOCA, the SG side PRHRS works poorly to remove 
the decay heat as the pressure decreases in the RPV, and water saturation temperature declines which leads 
to more water evaporation into steam and therefore the NC gets weak with low driving force and less heat 
transferred to the UHS (Guoxu et al, 2017). As a result, more cooling water is needed for SG side PRHRS 
under SB-LOCA. However, as the most important characteristic of the SG side PRHRS is the more direct 
decay heat removal process which provides faster cooling capability, more reliable system and higher safety 
level can be achieved. Thus most of the iPWR designs deploy SG side PRHRS and PSIS to compensate the 
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water leakage for LOCA. The cooling time of PRHRS varies based on the designs ranging from 36 hours to 
30 days, and even for unlimited time based on its water inventory and inherent design features (e.g. air 
cooling). 
 
3.2.2 Comparative assessment of PSIS 
PSIS is widely used in SMR and LWR mainly to compensate the water leakage in LOCA to cool down 
the reactor core and prevent core melting down accident. Thus severe accidents like radioactive release can 
be eliminated. Most iPWRs take NC based PSIS to inject water from CMT, RWST or IRWST into RPV and 
the PSIS tank is under low to medium pressure. The PSIS will be actuated passively when the pressure in the 
RPV decreases to a certain value. After the PSIS is into operation, steam gets into the water tank of PSIS and 
transfer heat to the outside of the RPV, then water drains back after the condensation. However, no additional 
water is added to the RPV of NuScale, there are only two trains of valves with one reactor vent valve and 
one reactor recirculation valve each. The CV is vacuum and the pressure equilibrium will be soon reached 
during LOCA with the help of the reactor vent valves. Steam is condensed in the CV and returns back to 
RPV through reactor recirculation valves forming NC. Also some designs deploy one-time injection PSIS 
through pressurized accumulators. The pressure in the accumulator is higher than in the NC based PSIS tanks 
to provide quick response to the LOCA. The water inventory in the RPV can provide 2.5 hours cooling time 
in CAREM25 and the PSIS can provide additional 48 hours cooling time for the biggest leakage. However, 
mPower implements both one-time injection PSIS through intermediate pressure injection tanks at early stage 
(high pressure) and NC based PSIS through RWST at late stage (low pressure). Westinghouse SMR also 
implements both of the designs, but the NC based PSIS operates through the whole LOCA process while 
one-time injection PSIS comes into operation at late stage through in-containment pool when the pressure 
equilibrium is reached. NC based PSIS can remove more heat and less water inventory will be needed to 
remove the same amount of heat. While one-time injection responds faster to provide quick emergency 
injection cooling. As a result, higher safety level is achieved in mPower with both redundancy and diversity 
in PSIS. Nevertheless, no PSIS is used in IRIS and IMR due to their unique features. The water inventory is 
large enough to cover the reactor core of IRIS during LOCA of any size. What’s more, the heat is removed 
and RPV is depressurized from SG side PRHRS without loss of mass after the pressure equilibrium reached 
between RPV and CV. As the decay heat is removed from the reactor vessel, the steam flow reverses back to 
the RPV from the CV which in term decreases the pressure and temperature in CV. And for IMR, nozzle 
diameter (less than 10 mm) primary pipes are deployed in the RPV, the RPV core can be covered with the 
water inventory for a long time that only very small LOCA is possible which eliminates the use of PSIS. 
 
3.2.3 Comparative assessment of PRDS 
PRDS is usually used together with PSIS to rapidly reduce the pressure in RPV and create the pressure 
difference between RPV and the injection tank of PSIS in order to compensate for the leakage. Most iPWRs 
take ADS to rapidly release the pressure while some designs such as CAREM25 and IRIS rely on both ADS 
and NC based PRDS. The NC based PRDS in CAREM25 is the PRHRS with two HXs in IC pool removing 
the decay heat and also releasing the pressure at early stage. Three safety relief valves are used as ADS with 
100% capability to release the pressure each at late stage. While it’s a little different for the NC based PRDS 
in IRIS as it is coupled to the SG side PRHRS for early stage. As discussed before, conclusion can be made 
that the PRDS in CAREM25 has better performance than it in IRIS under LOCA. Also due to the unique 
designs, PRDS is eliminated in CAP150 and IMR. CAP150 has a small enough free containment volume 
which makes the pressure between RPV and CV reach balance very soon, thus PRDS is not necessary here. 
While for IMR, the PSIS is eliminated with nozzle diameter pipes and the PRHRS is already enough to 
depressurize the RPV due to the both air-cooled and water-cooled PRHRS thus eliminating PRDS. 
 
3.2.4 Comparative assessment of PCCS 
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PCCS is used to keep the temperature and pressure within the design limit especially under severe 
accidents like LOCA. Three different types of PCCS are discussed above and also presented in Table 3. For 
air cooled type, heat is removed to the environment through air cooled HXs inside CV in SMART and VBER-
300, while the containment of ACP100 is surrounded by reinforced concrete that allows for air circulation to 
remove the heat on the containment surface 
Table 2: Function based PSSs in iPWR-type SMR designs 
SMR Design 
Passive Safety Systems 




2 (RPV side) 
2 (One-time 
injection) 
3 (ADS 100% each 
and NC based) 





condensers in pool 
A tank with 
borated water 
Safety relief valve 
(mainly) and two 
HXs in IC pool 
Drywell, wet well, 
suppression pool 





train) (SG side) 
4（33.3% each 







down tank, HX, 
makeup tank 
A core make-up 




valves and piping 
One heat exchanger 





train) (SG side) 




1 (Pool type) 
System 
Components 
A condenser in 
pool, one SG 
A reactor vent 
valve and a reactor 
recirculation valve 





Minimum 72 h up 
to 30 d 
Minimum 72 h up 
to 30 d 
N/A 





2 (SG side) 2 (NC based) 
2(100% each 
train)(ADS) 



















2 (SG side) 
2 (One-time 
injection and NC 
based) 













valves and piping 
An integral water tank 





train) (SG side) 




1 (Pool type) 
System 
Components 


















4 (SG side) 
Eliminated by 
design 
2 (ADS and NC 
based) 




tube HX in RWST 
Automatic 
depressurization 
valves and piping 
6 water tanks and a 
common tank for non-
condensable gas 
storage 




2 (SG side) 




SG cooling tanks 




4 (RPV side) 
2 (One-time 







HXs located in 
core makeup tank 





Valves attached to 
the top of CMT and 
squib-type valves 
Outside containment 
pool and UHS 




2 (SG side) 
2 (One-time 
injection) 
Not found Not found 
System 
Components 
A DHRS tank, a 
water cooled HX, 
a water storage 




Not found Not found 




2 (SG side) 
2 (One-time 
injection) 
Not found 2 (Air cooled) 
System 
Components 
Two passive HXs, 





One heat exchanger, 
water storage tank 
Cooling Time 72 h 24 h N/A Not found 
Note: PRHRS: passive residual heat removal system; PSIS: passive safety injection system; PRDS: passive reactor 
depressurization systm; PCCS: passive containment cooling system; HX: heat exchanger; RPV: reactor pressure 
vessel; SG: steam generator; IRWST: in-containment refueling water storage tank; RWST: refueling water storage 
tank; UHS: ultimate heat sink; CMT: core make-up tank; DHRS: decay heat removal system; ADS: automatic 
depressurization systems; NC: natural circulation; IC: isolation condenser. 
 
Also there are water storage tanks on the top of the containment which can spray water on the containment 
surface to remove more heat during emergency. The suppression type PCCS is similar for CAREM25 and 
IRIS that steam is released through ADS to suppression pool. And the leaked steam gets condensed on the 
upper part of the containment also known as drywell and part of the condensed water returns to the 
suppression pool. The suppression pool works as heat sink and the water can be injected back to the RPV for 
severe accidents. While the suppression pool is elevated above the reactor core which can be injected back 
to the RPV by gravity in IRIS but pumps are needed in CAREM25 for the same purpose. The pool type PCCS 
is also similar for different iPWRs with the containment submerged in a large water inventory pool that heat 
in the CV can be removed to the pool. What’s different is that the large water inventory in the pool is used 
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for PRHRS, PCCS and indirectly for PSIS in NuScale. While the other designs implement separate tanks for 
different systems. Also the PCCS is eliminated in IMR due to the air-cooled and water-cool PRHRS and the 
nozzle diameter primary pipes. Heat released to the CV is little and can be easily removed by the PRHRS. 
 
3.2.5 Detailed assessment of PSS 
A detailed assessment of PSS together with their unique features is presented below taking CAREM25 
for example.  
CAREM25: It implements RPV side PRHRS with 36 hours cooling and the cooling ability of RPV side 
PRHRS is not as good as SG side PRHRS discussed above. The one-time injection PSIS has a quick response 
to the leakage, but the cooling ability is not better than NC based PSIS with the same amount of water inventory. 
However, both NC based PRDS and ADS are used for depressurization with NC based PRDS passively 
actuated at early stage and for ADS at late stage. The redundancy and diversity makes it more reliable. The 
suppression type PCCS is considered to be better than air-cooled type but not better than pool type based on 
their cooling ability. (Marcelo et al, 2001).  
 
3.3 Ranking analysis of iPWR-type SMRs 
3.3.1 Evaluation Metrics and weighting approach 
Comparative assessment of PSSs for iPWR-type SMRs is made to show the similarity and differences 
among the designs. In order to better understand PSS capacity to maintain the cooling ability, safety functions 
and reduce plant damage frequency, ranking analysis is made by considering the weighting factor approach. 
An integer weighting factor is assigned based on evaluation metrics and LENDIT scaling metrics relative to 
data from simulations as available (J. Nielsen et al, 2014). The LENDIT scaling metrics consider the six 
parameters which are (1) the path from the core to successive heat sinks (L); (2) the total decay heat quantity 
(Q/E); (3) redundancy and diversity (N); (4) the distribution of simulation performance (D); (5) the 
information in the system and simulation (I); (6) the time-based process (T). Also the quantitative weighting 
factor approach is implemented in the evaluation metrics (C. Williams et al, 2018). Therefore, the table of 
evaluation metrics of PSS is built (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Evaluation metrics of PSS among iPWR designs 
PSS Attributes 
Evaluation Metrics 
4 3 2 1 
PRHRS 
Type  SG side HXs in pool SG side HXs in tank RPV side 
CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
PSIS 
Type  Both NC based One-time 
CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
PRDS 
Type  Both NC based ADS 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
PCCS 
Type  Pool type Suppression pool Air-cooled 
CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
 Note: CT: cooling time, R&D: redundancy and diversity 
 
As mentioned before, the different designs of each PSSs contribute to different weighting factors. Taking 
PRHRS for example, the SG side one responds faster and removes more heat than RPV side one under SBO 
that the higher weighting is given to SG side PRHRS. This is also similar for the cooling time and redundancy 
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& diversity that the longer cooling time it can provide and the more redundancy and diversity is deployed, 
the higher weighting is given. This is a general evaluation of the PSSs without considering the simulation of 
different designs in detail. Another evaluation metrics will be generated later. The general evaluation 
approach is important as a comparison with other evaluation approaches and the ranking approach will be 
more accurate with different approach. The previous evaluation metrics table is built within the same PSS 
among different iPWR designs, and we also need to generate another metrics among the four PSSs for two 
dimensional evaluations. Thus the evaluation metrics table is made (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Evaluation metrics among each PSS 
Attributes 
Evaluation Metrics 
4 3 2 1 
CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
Safety function RPV main decay heat removal Keep core covered RPV depressurization CV heat removal 
PDF contribution Unavailable 
Note: CT: cooling time, RPV: reactor pressure vessel, CV: containment vessel, PDF: plant damage frequency 
 
Similar with table 3, the weighting of safety function is given to PRHRS, PSIS, PRDS and PCCS as 4, 
3, 2 and 1 respectively determined by their function to reach safe end state. A large water inventory is injected 
into RPV by PSIS to maintain inventory when the water level lowers and reduces the temperature and 
pressure. There are no HXs in the PSIS, thus the decay heat cannot be removed from the RPV and gradually 
the temperature increases. While HXs are deployed in PRHRS and it is actuated when the main heat sink 
fails or when there is no power/signal input and operated until safe shutdown, the PSIS will be activated only 
when the water level is at a low level due to leaks, LOCA or failure of relief valves. Therefore, a higher 
weighting factor is assigned to PRHRS than PSIS. PRDS helps to run PSIS by depressurization and control 
the pressure within design limit. We noted that the actuation of PRDS (especially for the ADS valves) leads 
to the loss of water inventory but concurrently removes decay heat in the short-term. Ultimately loss of 
inventory in the long-term cooling is disadvantageous. The PCCS is used to cool the containment. One can 
argue that this is not as important as core cooling system; however, it’s a layer of protection consistent with 
DiD. The attribute of PDF contribution is taken as part of the metrics. However, as the PDF/CDF contribution 
of each iPWR design is proprietary, it’s not considered in this paper. Cooling time is also considered. As most 
of the information describing the dimension of water tanks is not publically accessible, attention is not only 
paid to the water inventory but also on the inherent (system) design features of the iPWR designs. One 
reference has been included for the simulation of PSS under SBO (Shasha et al, 2016). Table 5 is provided 
with cooling time for total core uncover under SBO. 
 
Table 5: Cooling time for total core uncover under SBO (Shasha et al, 2016)  
PSS Cooling time (second) 
No PSS 14300 
CMT (NC based PSIS) 57048 
CMT+ACC (One-time injection 
PSIS)+ADS 78716 
CMT+ACC+ADS+PRHRS available within mission time 
   Note: CMT: Core make-up tank; ACC: accumulator 
 
We see that the water inventory in RPV can last for 4 hours (14300s) without PSSs, around 16 hours 
(57048s) with only NC based PSIS thus the water inventory in CMT can last for 12 hours. It’s around 22 
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hours (78716s) with both NC based and one-time injection PSIS which indicates that the accumulator can 
make up water for about 6 hours of cooling, while the cooling time with all the PSSs deployed is available 
within its mission time – in essence, the PRHRS is designed to provide 72 hours’ decay heat cooling, so the 
cooling time should be over 72 hours. Although the water inventory is not presented in this paper, we can 
only have a general comparison among the cooling time which demonstrates that the NC based PSIS provides 
longer cooling time than one-time injection. Therefore, the weighting among each PSS is made (Table 6). 
As the PDF contribution is not public accessible, the weighting factor is not completed. However, it varies 
with designs and initiating events. For example, the PRHRS is mainly designed for SBO, while PSIS is mainly 
designed for LOCA. Thus the PDF contribution should be higher for PRHRS under SBO while higher for 
PSIS under LOCA. Here the PDF contribution is not considered, then a general weighting of each PSS is given 
in percentage.  
 
 
Table 6: Weighting approach among each PSS 
 PRHRS PSIS PRDS PCCS 
CT 3 3 1 3 
Safety function 4 3 2 1 
PDF contribution Vary with designs and initiating events 
Average Score 3.5 3 1.5 2 
Percentage 35.0% 30.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
 
3.3.2 Ranking approach 
With the two dimensional weighting and evaluation metrics, the ranking approach is established in table 
7. There is an average weighting factor for each PSS calculated as the average of the attributes. The overall 
score for each iPWR design is obtained by multiplying the average weighting with its PSS percentage and 
adding them together. There are only 9 iPWR designs because some information for the two Russian designs, 
RITM-200 and VBER-300, is proprietary. Also some PSSs are eliminated by inherent design. While the 
function is maintained by other systems and design, the weighting is also given based on its function. Finally, 
the ranking table for the 9 iPWRs are generated based on their score with Westinghouse SMR ranks the first 
and CAP150 the last.  
However, the final ranking can be different if changes are made for the evaluation metrics. As mentioned 
before, the two evaluation metrics are made without considering the simulation of different designs of PSS. 
Special attention is paid to the time-based process and simulation distribution to reach more accurate 
weighting of each design. Faster response and larger cooling ability is achieved for SG side PRHRS under 
SBO, and more decay heat is removed with the same water inventory in transient state. When taking the time-
based process and system reliability into consideration, there will be less demands for other systems in 
transient state with SG side PRHRS design. For example, the heat removed by 
 
Table 7: Ranking approach of iPWR designs 
iPWR CAREM25 SMART NuScale 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 1 2 2 1.67 2 3 3 2.67 3 3 2 2.67 
PSIS(30%) 1 2 2 1.67 2 3 3 2.67 2 3 2 2.33 
PRDS(15%) 3   4 3.50 1   2 1.50 1   2 1.50 
PCCS(20%) 2 2 1 1.67 1 2 3 2.00 3 3 1 2.33 
Score 1.942 2.358 2.325 
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Ranking 8 2 3 
iPWR ACP100 mPower CAP150 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 2 3 2 2.33 2 2 2 2.00 2 2 2 2.00 
PSIS(30%) 2 3 2 2.33 3 3 4 3.33 2 2 1 1.67 
PRDS(15%) 1   2 1.50 1   2 1.50 1   1 1.00 
PCCS(20%) 1 3 1 1.67 3 2 1 2.00 3 3 1 2.33 
Score 2.075 2.325 1.817 
Ranking 7 3 9 
iPWR IRIS IMR W-SMR 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 2 2 3 2.33 2 3 2 2.33 1 3 3 2.33 
PSIS(30%) 2 2 1 1.67 2 2.00 3 2 4 3.00 
PRDS(15%) 3   4 3.50 2 2.00 1   3 2.00 
PCCS(20%) 2 2 1 1.67 2 2.00 3 3 2 2.67 
Score 2.175 2.117 2.550 
Ranking 5 6 1 
 
RPV side PRHRS is lower than the decay heat generated in the core in the very beginning part of transit state 
which leads to the actuation of PRDS to maintain the RPV integrity (Guoxu et al, 2017). While more demands 
for the PRDS, less reliability for the system. Therefore, SG side PRHRS not only provides faster and larger 
cooling ability also increases the system reliability for both short and long term cooling, the weighting 
evaluation should be modified. Similar analysis is also made for PSIS and PRDS. And much larger heat 
capacity is achieved in water-cool rather than air-cool one of PCCS. Therefore, a modified weighting 
evaluation metrics is generated (Table 8). 
 
Table 8: Modified evaluation metrics of PSS among iPWR designs 
PSS Attributes 
Evaluation Metrics 
4 3 2 1 
PRHRS 
Type SG side HXs in pool SG side HXs in tank  RPV side 
CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
PSIS 
Type Both NC based  One-time 
CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
PRDS 
Type Both NC based  ADS 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
PCCS 
Type Pool type Suppression pool  Air-cooled 
CT  >72 hour >24 h and ≤72 h ≤24 hour 
R&D Both R and D 4 R 2 R No R nor D 
Note: CT: cooling time, R&D: redundancy and diversity 
 
Table 9: Modified ranking approach of iPWR designs 
iPWR CAREM25 SMART NuScale 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 1 2 2 1.67 3 3 3 3.00 4 3 2 3.00 
PSIS(30%) 1 2 2 1.67 3 3 3 3.00 3 3 2 2.67 
PRDS(15%) 4   4 4.00 1   2 1.50 1   2 1.50 
PCCS(20%) 3 2 1 2.00 1 2 3 2.00 4 3 1 2.67 
Score 2.083 2.575 2.608 
Ranking 9 4 2 
iPWR ACP100 mPower CAP150 
155 
 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 3 3 2 2.67 3 2 2 2.33 3 2 2 2.33 
PSIS(30%) 3 3 2 2.67 4 3 4 3.67 3 2 1 2.00 
PRDS(15%) 1   2 1.50 1   2 1.50 1   1 1.00 
PCCS(20%) 1 3 1 1.67 4 2 1 2.33 4 3 1 2.67 
Score 2.292 2.608 2.100 
Ranking 6 2 8 
iPWR IRIS IMR W-SMR 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(35%) 3 2 3 2.67 3 3 2 2.67 1 3 3 2.33 
PSIS(30%) 3 2 1 2.00 2 2.00 4 2 4 3.33 
PRDS(15%) 4   4 4.00 2 2.00 1   3 2.00 
PCCS(20%) 3 2 1 2.00 2 2.00 4 3 2 3.00 
Score 2.533 2.233 2.717 
Ranking 5 7 1 
The modified evaluation metrics is believed to be more accurate with consideration of time-based process, 
simulation and system reliability. Also a modified ranking approach is generated with a little change to the 
final score and ranking (Table 9). We can see from the ranking table that the score changes a lot due to the 
modified weighting evaluation, while the overall ranking only changes a little. However only one dimensional 
weighting evaluation is varied and we can also modify the other dimension weighting evaluation metrics to 
compare the results. As mentioned before that the weighting approach among each PSS is incomplete nor 
accurate due to the non-accessible data, and the weighting for each PSS is given as 35%, 30%, 15% and 20% 
respectively. Also it varies from design to design under different initiating events. Based on the system function 
and simulation, we know that the reliability of PRDS and PCCS increases if PRHRS and PSIS do not fail. 
Therefore, higher weighting should be put on PRHRS and PSIS. Finally, we manually change the weighting 
of each PSS into 45%, 30%, 15% and 10% for all the iPWR designs as simplified approach. Then table 10 is 
generated below. 
In order to have a better result of the ranking among the 9 iPWR designs, we compare the 3 ranking 
approaches and find that no matter how we evaluate the metrics, the overall ranking stays similar. Thus we 
create a figure to visually show the general result (Fig 5). 
The overall ranking is made with the average scores of every iPWR and the value length is shown as the 
difference between the smallest and largest scores. The shorter the bar, the more reliable the weighting 
approach. The ranking decreases from the left to the right. There is a sharp decrease from IRIS to ACP100 
and from IMR to CAREM25 which is caused by their design features/philosophy. However, the designs 
ranks the last do not mean that the designs are terrible. The more systems and components are used, the lower 
the system reliability is as more components lead to higher possibility of failure. Also the power of some 
designs are small, and the air-cool system is totally enough to remove the decay heat which saves a lot of 
money. It’s not correct to judge that one design is definitely better than another without considering their 
design features and structure. Here we provide one means to compare the similarity and difference among 
PSSs and also evaluate the PSSs in certain iPWR designs. A reference SMR design should be built so that a 
given vendor design can be benchmarked against a reference design. 
 
Table 10: Two dimensionally modified ranking approach of iPWR designs 
iPWR CAREM25 SMART NuScale 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(45%) 1 2 2 1.67 3 3 3 3.00 4 3 2 3.00 
PSIS(30%) 1 2 2 1.67 3 3 3 3.00 3 3 2 2.67 
PRDS(15%) 4   4 4.00 1   2 1.50 1   2 1.50 
PCCS(10%) 3 2 1 2.00 1 2 3 2.00 4 3 1 2.67 
Score 2.050 2.675 2.642 
Ranking 9 1 3 
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iPWR ACP100 mPower CAP150 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(45%) 3 3 2 2.67 3 2 2 2.33 3 2 2 2.33 
PSIS(30%) 3 3 2 2.67 4 3 4 3.67 3 2 1 2.00 
PRDS(15%) 1   2 1.50 1   2 1.50 1   1 1.00 
PCCS(10%) 1 3 1 1.67 4 2 1 2.33 4 3 1 2.67 
Score 2.392 2.608 2.067 
Ranking 6 4 8 
iPWR IRIS IMR W-SMR 
Attributes Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average Type CT R&D Average 
PRHRS(45%) 3 2 3 2.67 3 3 2 2.67 1 3 3 2.33 
PSIS(30%) 3 2 1 2.00 2 2.00 4 2 4 3.33 
PRDS(15%) 4   4 4.00 2 2.00 1   3 2.00 
PCCS(10%) 3 2 1 2.00 2 2.00 4 3 2 3.00 
Score 2.600 2.300 2.650 
Ranking 5 7 2 
 
Fig. 5: Overall ranking of iPWR designs 
 
4. Conclusions 
A plausible conclusion to be drawn from the ranking table is that the purpose of the passive safety 
systems is to remove unwanted thermal energy in the reactor core via passive components and systems for a 
length of time. Many to all iPWR concepts realize energy removal capability via a passive design. SMRs and 
other advanced reactor concepts are expected to demonstrate resilience to DBAs to an extent demonstrating 
partial to full control of the anticipated end state. Thus attention should be paid on the accident progression 
and mitigation options. As such standard DBAs suggest weighting factors - here for PRHRS and PSIS. 
Ultimately, iPWRs design with high rating should offer extended cooling time, cooling capacity and 
improved systems reliability (redundancy and diversity). While there is uncertainty in PSS performance 
associated with phenomenological factors (e.g. buoyancy forces, oxidation of relevant surfaces, etc.), these 
factors can be semi- or fully quantified. As for ranking, we propose a practical means to undertake 
comparative assessment of the passive features. The exercise demonstrates the similarities and differences of 
PSSs among the eleven iPWRs, and importantly suggests the need for a reference SMR design such that a 
given vendor design can be openly or internally benchmarked against the reference. As some design details 
are proprietary, comparative assessment can only provide guidance; thus a weighting method linked to likely 
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